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1.0 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF THE STUDY
1.1 Background to the Study
The evolution of money can be traced back from the days of the barter trade when commodities were exchanged between parties and later on to coins, paper and now mobile money. The evolution has witnessed the transition of mobile phones technology from a simple device used for making calls, playing simple games and texting friends to a complex device. Currently, mobile phones are widely used for accessing the Internet, making video calls, take photos, and find location on a map, purchase various items and even for banking, among many other applications. Such gigantic and fabulous escalations in mobile technology and Near-Field Communications (NFC) have affected the scope and trend of financial services. The traditional method of paying and buying goods or services or sending and receiving money has been replaced by mobile technology.​[1]​

Innovations in mobile money services​[2]​ globally have taken place in different phases to reach the current situation. In 2000, the Philippines launched the Smart Money, the world’s first electronic cash card connected to a mobile phone by mobile operator Smart. The innovations opened a new wave of financial transactions and spread so rapidly in various countries around the world such as South Africa, Kenya, Pakistan and Tanzania specifically.​[3]​The success of M-PESA in Kenya stands as just one of many successful deployments of mobile banking (M-banking) and mobile money (M-Money) services in the world.​[4]​ Initially launched in 2007 for person-to-person (P2P) transfers, by 2010, M-PESA had more than 9.4 million customers and more than 18,000 agents, and accounted for US$5.27 billion in P2P transfers.​[5]​As a money transfer service, M-PESA started by serving the needs of many families scattered across rural and urban areas. M-PESA is now processing more transactions domestically within Kenya than Western Union does globally and provides mobile banking facilities to more than 70 per cent of the country’s adult population.​[6]​ 

In Tanzania, mobile money services have become one of the most successful mobile money markets in the world. More than 25% of the population are active mobile money users (with almost 11 million in December 2013), and they conducted an estimated USD 2 billion in transactions per month in 2014. Most money is sent person-to-person (P2P) and represents 40% of all transaction volumes.​[7]​ This achievement has proven that mobile money services have the potential to revolutionize access to financial services worldwide where over 2.5 billion adults do not have formal bank accounts, and yet about 6 billion people have access to mobile phones (86 percent penetration rate).​[8]​ Most of the unbanked population resides in the developing regions of the world such as Sub-Saharan Africa where only 24 percent of the adults have formal bank accounts.​[9]​ 
A number of scholars, business leaders, economic development experts, and opinion leaders have hypothesized that the mobile phone with its antecedent accessories such as mobile money has the potential to transform the developing world, and most especially Africa, in ways that the green and industrial revolutions failed. Their conviction stems from the fact that the mobile phone has been able to short-cut the infrastructural limitations that have for many years hindered the developing world’s transformational agenda.​[10]​ Following the success in Kenya, Vodafone simulated the M-PESA solution in Tanzania through its partnership with Vodacom. In 2008, the government opened the door for mobile money regulatory arrangements after conceiving the idea from the Mobile Money Network Operators that a mobile phone could do much more than making calls.​[11]​ The idea transformed the thinking of the Government and specifically the BOT. The BOT opened a new chapter and started to learn more about the potential of digital financial inclusion, a new and unfamiliar topic to the Bank.​[12]​ 

In order to attract financial inclusion to a large segment of people at the bottom of pyramid the BOT selected to take soft approach through issuing ‘letters of no objection’ to the partner banks of Vodacom’s M-PESA and Zantel’s Z-Pesa (relaunched in 2012 as “Ezy Pesa”), allowing them to launch in 2008. Two more deployments followed: Zain’s Zap in 2009 and Tigo Pesa in 2010. These developments attracted a good number of people who were previously excluded from formal financial services. In December 2013 there were more than 11 million active mobile money accounts and around 153,369 agents in Tanzania across four deployments.​[13]​ In the same month, mobile money deployments carried out transactions worth more than TZS 3 trillion (US$1.8 billion). These value of transactions convinced that the market for mobile money in Tanzania is dynamic and the four providers are highly competitive.​[14]​

There are good reasons for rapid development of mobile money in Tanzania. However, the development faces a number of challenges related to security; system availability and some cases of fraud in which money vanish from customers’ accounts without their knowledge. This calls for careful measures to be taken in order to ensure the safety of customers’ information and ensure that transactions are conducted securely.​[15]​ Since the introduction of the mobile banking services in 2008 in the country, there have not been in place proper law to guide and regulate the M-Money services despite the tremendous growth and dynamism.​[16]​ This lacuna in the legal system provides potential loopholes for illicit activities such as money laundering and terrorism financing that might engulf the rapidly increasing mobile phone transactions.

Chatain, P et.al​[17]​ argues that, although there is a substantial potential opportunity for M-Money to support financial inclusion, significant concerns have been raised regarding the integrity of M-Money. The analysis, supported by research and data, suggests that the abuse of M-Money could stem from four major risk categories: anonymity,​[18]​ elusiveness,​[19]​ rapidity,​[20]​ and poor oversight.​[21]​ Whereas the first three risk categories may be inherent in the operation of the M-Money business model, poor oversight could create conditions that increase the likelihood of abuse emerging from the other three risk factors. Therefore, it should be emphasized again that an enabling environment for M-Money” must also entail effectively regulating and supervising any potential risk concerns that may arise from these services, including those of ML/TF.​[22]​

At the inception of the idea in 2008, there were no laws governing mobile money services in the country and the regulators had to determine how to regulate these newly proposed payments services. A 2006 amendment to section 6 of the Bank of Tanzania Act​[23]​ vested the BOT with the powers to regulate, monitor, and supervise the National Payments System, including payments products and clearing and settlement systems products. However, the existing regulations provide limited guidance for the private sector. Besides, Tanzania lacks a broader legislation for payment systems. This is particularly so because the Electronic Payment Scheme Guidelines of 2007 only cover risk management for banks and other financial institutions.​[24]​ The existing legal gap in the implementation of mobile money services did not hinder the BOT initial plans. The BOT progressed with the implementation of services in the absence of clear regulatory framework. 

The BOT borrowed the regulatory approach taken by the Central Bank of Kenya, and planned to take a test and learn approach while applying sufficient safeguards and carefully monitoring developments. It was hoped that as the BOT becomes familiar with the market, it would establish the suitable regulatory framework for mobile money services.​[25]​ In order to apply sufficient safeguards and carefully monitoring developments, the MNOs were required by BOT to partner with one commercial bank to offer mobile money services. Such arrangement allows the BOT to issue ‘letters of no objection’ to the partner bank that granted the MNOs the legitimacy to implement mobile money services.​[26]​
The conditions set in the ‘letters of no objection’ were supplemented by the providers’ operational policies in order to make the services sound and safe for customers. In this context, moral suasion was also instrumental in establishing trusted dialogue between the BOT and the mobile money providers. The letters of no objection were issued independently by the BOT to each operator and partner bank as   an interim solution. Although the letters are not public, their detailed prudential and market conduct requirements are understandably similar in nature for all deployments.​[27]​ The BOT maintained close oversight of the services to ensure the industry was sound and safe for customers, and to develop a better understanding of the business and the operational risk factors and mitigation strategies.​[28]​

The growth of transactions in the payment system, subscribers, usage, volume, and values, necessitated the BOT to modify its regulatory approach for the sake of providing certainty and consistency to all market participants. As such, the BOT had to gradually amplify its operational knowledge of mobile money and was now in a position to draft regulations that would provide more legal certainty to providers.​[29]​  The BOT had to ensure that the regulatory arrangements were in compliance with supporting laws and regulations, such as the AML/CFT​[30]​ regime.​[31]​Similarly the BOT became adequately secure with the act of mobile money and, equipped with the lessons of the market’s early years, started transforming the original set of requirements into a more formal regulatory framework.​[32]​

This clearly signifies that the BOT implemented the test and learn’ approach, to stimulate the development of mobile money services in the country. And the mobile money services in the country went through without specific and comprehensive regulations governing mobile money services. While the BOT is in the process of addressing domestic regulatory solutions on mobile money services, there are increasingly notable development that are taking place on the mobile money services that seem to pose more challenges to the BOT in so far as regulation of the services are concerned. Tigo has for example launched a mobile money transfer service between Tanzania and Rwanda.​[33]​ 

Likewise, Tigo, Airtel and Zantel have struck Africa's first agreement that allows their customers in the country to send money to and across each other on their mobile handsets. Indeed, this is the first agreement in Africa to adopt interoperable mobile money services, whereby one network allows another network's customers to send money to its own clients.​[34]​These innovations and developments invite more discussion on legal and regulatory framework pertaining to international remittances and interoperability.

Cross-border fund transfers in the telecom-centric model pose the greatest regulatory challenges for retail payment systems as bank regulators have no jurisdiction over the actions of telecom firms and customer protections for payments extend beyond telecom regulators; as a result, collective regulatory oversight may provide insufficient governance. Furthermore, the absence of bank participation in telecom-centric business models raises questions regarding responsibility and authority for ensuring customer protections and efficient funds settlement.​[35]​ 

Cross boarder funds transfer can enable criminals to move funds from the jurisdiction where they are created to another where they may be spent to further crime, or be extracted, or be moved once again to another jurisdiction. To be sure, movement across borders hinders law enforcement investigators and may mask the purpose of the transfer.​[36]​ In addition, the increased interoperability among shared carrier networks is facilitating data transmission across geographic borders, whereby information about the parties to the mobile money transaction may go undetected by regulators and central banks of customers in the originating or receiving countries. International roaming and the wireless nature of financial transfers may thus create opportunities for money laundering and other unforeseen financial crimes.​[37]​

1.2   Statement of the Problem
The use of mobile phones to effectuate financial transactions in the country is growing significantly and has proved to be a considerable driver of development and economic growth in the country. In order to stimulate and balance innovations and financial inclusion in the country, the government of Tanzania decided to use the “learn and test” approach before enactment and full implementation of specific laws governing mobile money services in the country.​[38]​ 

In the absence of specific regulations, mobile money service providers are currently operating under Letters of No Objection,​[39]​ which stipulates that they are to hold all funds in a trust account at a commercial bank. While this letter does provide a certain level of control to the BOT, it does not among other things provide for a full range of penalties in the case of fraud or other issues with the operators.​[40]​ The deficit of BOT powers over Mobile money operators has been caused by regulatory limitations that confine its powers over financial spheres. 

Currently, the mobile payment services in the country are regulated by both Bank of Tanzania (BOT) and the Tanzania Communication Regulatory Authority (TCRA). The existing arrangement creates gaps in the regulatory framework because the mobile phone payment services are regulated by two regulators, each with a limited scope of coverage. The Bank of Tanzania focuses on the financial transactions, while the Tanzania Communication Regulatory Authority (TCRA) regulates the communication infrastructure. In considering the importance of developing a precise legal framework for mobile money services in Tanzania, the Bank of Tanzania has signed Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with TCRA which provides a mechanism for regulatory and supervisory coordination between the two regulators.​[41]​However, in the absence of clear and comprehensive regulatory framework the MOU can not address the needs of time. 

Lack of adequate and supportive legal environment exposes consumers to various risks. For example, in an environment in which M-banking becomes a crucial means of storing value or storing payments, questions touching on protection of customers’ interests flourish. They include questions such as; who is responsible when there is an error related to a transaction? To whom should customers turn to address their complaints? What redress mechanisms are in place?​[42]​ Absence of clear legal and regulatory framework that answers clearly such questions jeopardizes the mobile money services. While the achievement of mobile money services facilitates access to payment and banking transactions especially for areas without conventional banking, it also involves various regulatory issues and risks. As mobile commerce gains momentum, spam, malware and outright theft of personal financial information becomes common threat that must be prevented. 

1.3   Literature Review
Few scholars in Tanzania have attempted to discuss the critical issues posed by the development of mobile money services. Therefore, most of the pieces of literature cited in this paper have been generated from other jurisdictions. Since the thoughts and findings of these authors are relevant to this study, they have been incorporated in order to determine the potential legal gaps that form the scope of the present study.
Villasenor, J in his paper, Smartphones’ for the Unbanked: How Mobile Money Will Drive Digital Inclusion in Developing Countries​[43]​ argues that the most commonly articulated regulatory concern regarding mobile money is crime. Like any other system enabling financial transactions, mobile money is sometimes exploited for criminal activity. However, regulatory overreaction (or inaction) that impedes the launch and use of mobile money services in the developing world would make no more sense than overly burdensome regulations impeding people in the developed world from using the Internet, which can also be misused for illicit purposes. In his view, the much better approach is to map the lessons learned from combating crime in the traditional financial system to the mobile money industry in appropriate ways. The key word here is “appropriate.”

Villasenor has not digested clearly issues related to electronic payment system, liability issues and consumer protection which are the realm of this study; however its relevance to this study lies in the fact that it has focused on crime and especially anti-money laundering and terrorist financing which is the concern of this study. Odhiambo, O.J in his Master thesis entitled Convergence between mobile telecommunications and financial services implications for regulation of mobile telecommunications in Kenya ​[44]​; emphasizes that the convergence of mobile telecoms services and financial services has complicated the traditional nature of the telecoms business, and raised significant questions regarding new role of telecoms regulators, policy makers and lawmakers in the business. The thesis proposes a telecoms regulatory framework that promotes innovation and development of mobile financial services, and other converged services, by mobile network operators.

The Odhiambo’s study examines MNO-led mobile financial services, and not bank-led, or hybrid models. The study examines the effects of the mobile financial services on telecommunications regulation, and not financial or other regulation. The study has therefore left a gap on the impact of mobile money services on financial regulations, interoperability of mobile network operators, risks and mitigation strategies on the mobile money. However, its relevance to this study lies on   its focus on the convergence of mobile and financial services which is the thrust of the present study.

Gikandi and Bloor, in their paper, adoption and effectiveness of electronic banking in Kenya​[45]​ provide several factors that have influenced the growth of mobile banking in Kenya. The tremendous increase in number of people adopting M-banking has been attributed to ease of use and high number of mobile phone users. There is also a growing partnership in financial institution and non-financial service providers where consumers through use of e-banking and other e-commerce services such as M-banking can transact and clear utility bills through shared banks’ platforms.

The authors reveal also that the growth of mobile banking is hampered by various factors such as internet security, customer and legal related issues besides technical issues. In particular, the authors conclude that the government of Kenya needs to put in place clear laws to regulate the banking industry in this era of technology and ensure they are adhered to. This study converges with the current study in the fact that for smooth operation of mobile money services the legal frame work is imperative. However, the authors have not digested critically legal challenges and risk mitigation strategies that this research wants to deal with.​[46]​

Argent et al in their article entitled the regulation of mobile money in Rwanda ​[47]​; explains that Know Your Customer (KYC) and reporting requirements, combined with the limits on the size of mobile money transactions are a good, graduated- compromise solutions for AML/CFT. In Rwanda, according to the authors, MNOs are required to respect KYC rules prior to opening accounts and National identification card is required to register for mobile money. This requirement is not strictly adhered in Tanzania due to lack of National identification cards. Other identifications such as voters IDs, passports, Driving Licenses and workers IDs are used for KYC purpose can not sufficiently satisfy the requirements in compromising AML/CFT.

These ideas are very useful information in the intended study especially in the assessment of risks mitigation strategies. However, the authors have not digested widely risk associated issues in the mobile money services. Therefore the intended study will dwell in this area in order to find a proper solution for smooth development of mobile money services in the Country.  
Emmanuel, A in his Master’s thesis entitled Mobile Banking in Developing Countries: Secure Framework for Delivery of SMS-banking Services​[48]​has discusses problems associated with mobile money services in most developing countries particularly in Africa. He observes that internet connectivity and bandwidth in most developing countries are low and the population is not urbanized and averagely poor hence making realization of internet banking services not viable. He notes that in the foreseeable future and given the high diffusion rate of mobile telephony in developing countries, SMS banking​[49]​ is the most viable option for offering affordable remote banking transactions. 

He argues further that based on the current trend in mobile banking, it is obvious that internet banking will remain the most attractive service for developed countries whereas SMS banking will gain more in-roads in developing countries. However, given the limited memory capacity of the current low end mobile phones predominantly being used in our project domain, the exchange of sequence-password list poses a security loophole that can easily jeopardise the system security.The author has looked at the factors that stimulate the growth of mobile banking industry in Africa using Uganda as a case study. In his discussion he has commented on the challenges focusing on weakness of password in security issues. However, given the fact that the penetration of mobile banking in East Africa has not been incorporated in cyber law development, it is the interest of this research to dwell on it in order to provide sound recommendations for the better future of mobile banking industry.

AFI in its paper entitled the African Financial Inclusion Policy Forum scaling up financial services through mobile technology​[50]​ explains that Africa’s mobile phone market has expanded dramatically over the last decade, laying the foundations and potential for an equally sharp increase in financial inclusion. Between 2002 and 2010, the number of mobile phone subscriptions leapt from just 18 million to more than 400 million, equivalent to approximately 70% of the population. However, only 20% of these people have access to formal financial services. The paper explains further that risk mitigation measures such as transaction limits and regular suspicious transaction monitoring can also help satisfy AML requirements. However, regulators and providers are still looking for innovative ways to fulfill KYC requirements such as SIM card registration databases and surmounting requirements for hardcopy documentation to keep costs low.

The study by AFI did not specifically addresses what needs to be done by Tanzania to fulfill the requirement of KYC which is the realm of this study. However, its relevance to this study lies in the fact that it has focused on risk mitigation strategies which is an important component of this study.  Afanu and Mamattah in their paper entitled “Mobile Money Security: A holistic approach”​[51]​  emphasize that with the growing use of mobile money services and new use cases arising, it has become important to research in to the security practices of mobile network operators and users to ensure mobile money is secured, to prevent fraud, and to understand the user perception about the linkages between mobile phone protection and mobile money security. Their research reveals that one of the major causes of consumer driven fraud is PIN sharing. To avoid this, the researchers believe that the MNOs must alert users to first verify from them the authenticity of any suspected request before giving out any information that could make them vulnerable to fraud. 

This thesis is very relevant to the current research as it sheds light on the security issues on mobile financial services. However, the author has concentrated much on technical issues rather than legal measures that can be taken to address the prevailing situation in Tanzania. The reviewed literature therefore leaves room for a further study exploring alternative risk mitigation strategies and regulatory solutions which is the focus of the present study.

1.4   General Objective of the Study
The main objective of this study is to search for an appropriate mobile money services legal framework that promotes innovation and development of converged services between the telecommunication sector and financial sector. 

1.5   Specific Objectives
The research shall be guided by the following specific objectives:
i.	To identify legal gaps in the existing law governing mobile money services with a view to bridging the gaps.
ii.	To examine legal risks associated with the adoption of mobile money services in Tanzania
iii.	To suggest a regulatory framework that promotes innovation and development of mobile money services.
iv.	To evaluate the legal responses to emergent issues in mobile money services operations

1.6   Research Questions
For proper analysis of the research findings, the following research questions have provided a useful guideline.
i.	What are the legal gaps existing in the current laws governing mobile money services in Tanzania?
ii.	Does the existing legal regime adequately address the risks and challenges associated with the mobile money services in Tanzania?
iii.	Which regulatory approach should be adopted to effectively regulate converged services such as mobile money services?
iv.	What has been the reaction of the government to emergent issues in mobile money services operations?

1.7   Research Methodology
The term ‘research methodology’, refers to a systematically way of solving’ the research problem. It is a ‘science of studying how research is done scientifically’. It involves a study of various steps and methods that a researcher needs generally to adopt in his investigation of a research problem along with the logic behind them. It is not only a study of methods but also of explanation and justification for using certain research methods and of the methods themselves. It includes in it the philosophy and practice of the whole research process. In other words, research methodology is a set of rules of procedures about the way of conducting research. It includes in it not just a compilation of various research methods but also the rules for their application and validity.​[52]​

Legal research specifically is ‘a systematic finding’ or ‘ascertaining’ law’ on the identified topic or in the given area as well as ‘an inquiry’ into ‘law’ with a view to making advancement in the science of law.​[53]​ It is the process of identifying and retrieving information necessary to support legal decision-making. It includes in it each step of a course of action that begins with an analysis of the facts of a problem and concludes with the application and communication of the results of the investigation.​[54]​

Legal research may be carried out by utilising one or more of number of different techniques or methodologies. These different methodologies include, inter alia, doctrinal research, comparative law methods, socio-legal methods and philosophical legal methods.​[55]​ In this research, two methods, namely doctrinal research and comparative legal methods have been applied in the analysis of law. Besides, the comparative legal research has been applied to study legislative texts, jurisprudence and legal doctrines of foreign laws relating to regulation of mobile money services.
1.7.1	Doctrinal Legal Research

 Doctrinal research is the most common methodology employed by those undertaking research in law. It entails the use of primary (statutes and case law) and secondary sources of law (reports, journal articles, text books and other forms of publication). Doctrinal research asks what the law is on a particular issue or context. It is concerned with analysis of the legal doctrine and how it has been developed and applied. This type of research is also known as pure theoretical research or black letter research. 

Under doctrinal methodology a researcher’s main goal has been the analysis of statutes, cases, reports, publications and model laws as they relate to the subject matter under scrutiny.​[56]​ This methodology entailed the use of various legal methods such as rules of statutory legal interpretations and legal reasoning both inductive and deductive in order to critically analyse the materials collected against the backdrop of the research questions.

This methodology has been very useful in the present study due to its potential in contributing to the development, continuity, consistency and certainty of law. Employment of this methodology has enabled this study, firstly, to analyse the existing law relating to mobile money services, and secondly, to consider how the law ought to be in order to address the emergent challenges and risks whilst also it promotes innovation and development of the converged services between the telecommunication sector and financial sector. Through legal interpretation and analysis, the methodology assisted the formulation of mobile money guidelines that can be applied in Tanzania. 

1.7.2	Comparative Legal Research 
The study employed comparative legal research in order to study legislative development, jurisprudence and legal doctrines of foreign laws for the sake of stimulating awareness of the legal framework and to gain insights and lessons that could be considered in addressing the challenges and to provide an insight concerning challenges of mobile money services and the way such challenges can be mitigated in the country. 

Since its inception in the 20th Century, comparative law has played significant role in the science of legal interpretation in national courts, legal reforms as well as unification and harmonization of laws.​[57]​ The essence of comparative law is the act of comparing the law of one country to that of another. Most frequently, the basis for comparison is a foreign law juxtaposed against the measure of one’s own law. But, of course, the comparison can be broader: more than two laws, more than law, more than written words. It facilitates better understanding of the functions of the rules and principles of laws and involves the exploration of detailed knowledge of law of other countries to understand them, to preserve them, or to trace their evolution. Accordingly, comparative legal research is beneficial in a legal development process where modification, amendment, and changes to the law are required.​[58]​
The most common comparative legal scholarship is cross jurisdictions comparison of laws of different legal systems. It is typical for researchers who undertake this research to examine the law as it is while at the same time provide ideas and views for future legal development.​[59]​ In this context, the researcher employed this method in examining the development of mobile money services in Kenya which has the most successful mobile money landscape in the world. Other countries such as Philippines, South Africa, India, Uganda, Rwanda, Ghana and Nigeria were compared in order to gain more light on their regulatory frameworks development. 

The researcher has passed through, the international anti-money laundering (AML) and counter-terrorist financing (CTF) standards set by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), E-Money Directive (2000/46/EC), UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce (1996), SADC Model Law on Electronic Transactions and Data Protection, Bank of Namibia guidelines for issuers of electronic money and other payment instruments, Best Practices and Guidelines for Mobile Financial Services. In addition, the researcher has surveyed Global Standards materials from Regulatory Bodies in order to get insights into best practices of regulation of mobile money services. Such regulatory bodies include the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems of the Bank for International Settlements, FATF, G-20, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, International Telecommunications Union (ITU), and the World Trade Organization (WTO).
 
The organizations within this stakeholder group develop global standards and facilitate global coordination and cooperation among financial institutions with respect to payments processes. Their motivations include facilitating financial access and inclusion, international trade, sound banking practices, harmonized AML/CFT practices, and international cooperation among civil supervisory authorities and among criminal enforcement authorities. These organizations provide international best practices that can be used as a benchmark for institutional maturity and good governance when evaluating country-specific financial or payments practices.​[60]​

1.8   Significance of the Research
The study serves to be a catalyst for the government to respond to the legal challenges brought by the development of mobile money services. Dissemination of the information gathered from this research will assist the police, the Directorate of Public Prosecution, Judiciary, TCRA, law reform commission, telecommunication companies, BOT, Academic institutions and banks to gain more knowledge concerning legal implications surrounding mobile money services globally and in Tanzania in particular. In this case therefore, these institutions will be in a position to clearly address challenges surrounding mobile money services in the country. The research will contribute to the growing body of research in Tanzania and globally on the legal and regulatory challenges surrounding mobile financial services. 

1.9   Organization of the Study
Chapter one serves as the introduction to this study. It contains the introduction of this study, a statement of the problem being researched, research objectives, research questions, significance of the study, and organization of the study. Chapter two has offered an overview of money, theories of money and the emergence of mobile money. Chapter three explains about mobile money services and their impacts in monetary policy. Chapter four examines risks, security and regulatory implications of mobile money services. Chapter five provides a survey of legislative development in other jurisdictions, model laws and global standards global standard setting bodies and financial inclusion. The chapter has compared the legal and regulatory regimes in the European Union, Kenya, Philippines, South Africa and other SADC countries.









2.0	THEORIES OF MONEY AND THE EMERGENCE OF MOBILE MONEY
2.1 Introduction 
This part offers a detailed explanation about the meaning, functions, and characteristics of money and the evolution of money. The essence of this chapter is to provide an overview of the concept of money as it has been perceived in different phases of human life. Money has existed for thousands years and different materials have been used as money. Beginning from barter trade to the use of cowries’ shells, whale’s teeth, coinage and paper money, the term has received various perceptions for economists and lawyers.​[61]​ In particular, something may be considered money if it serves as a medium of exchange with which to make payments; a store of value with which to transfer ‘purchasing power’ (the ability to buy goods and services) from today to some future date; and a unit of account with which to measure the value of any particular item for sale.​[62]​

The technological innovations that brought the regime of E-commerce and later M-Commerce gave birth to the digital forms of payments, termed electronic money (E-Money). The introduction of E-Money and especially mobile money (M-Money) services received the highest recognition from the people at the bottom of pyramid who lacked access to traditional bank accounts but owned mobile phone.​[63]​ The lack of infrastructure such as landline phones and limited access to banking encouraged the development of mobile money systems. The M-PESA scheme and other M-Money services received great success in Kenya, Tanzania and several other countries in the world. However, with the entire success story in the platform, the services have introduced new risks and regulatory challenges that need to be resolved while promoting innovations in the payment system. Since the term E-Money and M-Money invites various legal discussions in the existing Tanzanian legislation, it is the interest of this chapter to find out whether the functions, characteristics and theories of money accommodate M-Money and to what extent. Secondly, since the traditional perception of money has been the tangible things, the chapter wants to explore out the factors that have promoted the evolution of money from one form to the next and whether such forces accommodate electronic money.

2.2   The Meaning of Money
The origin and meaning of money is a complex issue in economics, economic history, anthropology and other social sciences.​[64]​ The term has acknowledged diverse meaning depending on the perspective and historical episode of a given society. This chapter traces the origin and meaning of money in different periods of human life in order to critically examine the divergence and convergence meaning and the legal implications involved in variations of the meaning.

The term "money' has originated from the Latin word 'Moneta" which was the surname of the Roman Goddess of Juno in whose temple at Rome money was coined.​[65]​ The origin and perception of money varied and developed in different epochs depending with the nature and economic activities of that time. In the primitive societies, hunters and gatherers used the skins of wild animals as money. In the agrarian regime, the agricultural society used grains and foodstuffs as money. The Greeks used coins as money.​[66]​

In economics money is defined as an asset which functions as an accepted medium of exchange that can be used directly to buy any good. Money is therefore characterised being a fully liquid asset. This is because an asset is entirely liquid if it can be used directly, instantly, and without any costs or restrictions to make payments.​[67]​ The Chartalist​[68]​ school offers a different meaning to that of orthodox theory, where money is perceived as a medium of exchange that arose to restrain the transaction costs of barter. This perception considers money to be neutral, a veil, and a simple medium of exchange, that softens the markets and derives its value from its metallic content.​[69]​ The chartalists view money as a unit of account, chosen by a state for the codification of social debt obligations. More specifically, in the modern world, this debt relation is between the populace and the state in the form of a tax liability. Accordingly, money is a creature of the state and a tax credit for extinguishing this debt.​[70]​ 

Depending with the particular school of thought and specific discipline, there has been no specific definition of money which has suitably covered its functions. Besides, it is argued that money was developed to overcome the hurdles of the Barter System.​[71]​ From this argument, a number of definitions have been examined to lay emphasis on the meaning of money. Paul Samuelson defines money "as the modern medium of exchange and the standard unit in which prices and debts are expressed".​[72]​ Money has also been defined as an asset which is used as a medium of exchange, a store of value and a standard for deferred payment or value. Money is also regarded as anything legally acceptable in the discharge of obligations within a specific jurisdiction, expressed as a multiple of some unit which is regarded as a measure or standard of the value of things in general.​[73]​ 

Money has also been defined as anything which passes freely from hand to hand and is generally acceptable in the settlement of a debt. Lewis E. Davids in his 'Dictionary of Banking and finance defines '" money as any form of denomination of coin or paper currency of legal tender which passes freely as a medium of exchange." In banking operations, money refers to cash and this includes both currency notes (paper money) and coin (metallic money).​[74]​ Messrs, Pierce and Shaw offer two definitions on the concept of money; the first is a conceptual meaning which refers money as a unit of account or the measure of exchange value. The first definition considers money as a common denominator in terms of which the exchange value of all goods and services can be expressed. It is a unit of measurement, just as kilometers measure distance. This gives money an abstract meaning.​[75]​ 
The second meaning of money explains money in its physical form where money designates possibility of ownership which is capable of changing hands and the supply of it is capable of measurement. This explanation is relevant to monetary theory and policy and considers money as a medium of exchange .Money could also be defined as a commodity chosen by common consent to be a medium of exchange, a store of value, a unit of account and a standard for deferred payments among all other commodities.​[76]​

Geoffrey Ingham takes the sociologist’s view of money as;
“… A measure of abstract value and as a means of storing and transporting this abstract value for means of final payment or settlement of debt.”​[77]​

From the economist perspective of money, Milton Friedman’s view:
“Money is whatever is generally accepted in exchange for goods and services – accepted not as an object to be consumed but as an object that represents a temporary abode of purchasing power to be used for buying still other goods and services.”​[78]​

Money is seen also as a primary element, or pivot, of the financial system examining the wider economy that usually defines money in broad terms and primarily reflects its utilitarian or functional role in economies.​[79]​ Another line of argument is submitted by economists who define money in legal language saying that "anything which the state declares as money is money." Such money possesses general acceptability and has the legal power to discharge debts. However, people may not admit legal money by refusing to sell goods and services against the payment of legal tender money. On the other hand, they may accept some other things as money which is not legally defined as money in discharge of debts which may circulate freely. Such things are cheques and notes issued by commercial banks.​[80]​

Economists define the money supply to include a set of assets that are either used to make payments or that can cheaply and easily be converted into something that can be used for payments. This includes currency and coins, as well as bank deposits such as checking accounts that can be used for transactions.​[81]​ A legal inspection of money rests on whether a creditor accepts value in final payment. Besides, Accepted legal views of money encompass commodity-based Orthodox School approach which requires a tangible thing to serve as money. This requirement can be seen in the locus classicus, where money was first defined in law as that which inter alia:
“passes freely from hand to hand throughout the community in final discharge of debts and full payment for commodities, being accepted equally without reference to the character or credit of the person who offers it and without the intention of the person who receives it to consume it or apply it to any other use than in turn to tender it to others in discharge of debts or payment of commodities.”

This requirement for a physical thing for money is also seen in the classic scholarly legal definition of money by FA Mann, who in his magisterial work, The Legal Aspect of Money, refers to money as being:
“...all chattels which, issued by authority of law and denominated with reference to a unit of account, are intended to serve as a universal medium of exchange in the State of issue.’

This definition describes the physical form of money as ‘all chattels are meant to serve as universal medium of exchange in the state of issue’. Coins and banknotes, inter alia, are chattels.

2.3	 Evolution of Money​[82]​
Money has evolved and perceived different meanings in various epochs of human civilization.

2.3.1	Commodity Money 
Various kinds of commodities have been used as money from the origination of human civilisation. Stones, spears, skins, bows and arrows, and axes were used as money in the primitive society. The pastoral society used cattle as money. The agricultural society used grains as money. The Roman used cattle and salt as money at different times. The Mongolians used squirrel skins as money. Precious stones, tobacco, tea, shells, fishhooks, and many other commodities served as money depending upon time, place and economic standard of the society.​[83]​ The use of commodities as money had several defects due to lack of uniformity in quality and standardization thus made pricing difficult. It was hard to store and prevent loss of value in the case of perishable commodities. Some commodities were heavy and difficult to transfer from one place to another. In addition, there was the problem of indivisibility in the case of such commodities as cattle.​[84]​

2.3.2	Metallic Money/Coins
The spread of civilisation and trade relations by land and sea opened the door for metallic money to replace commodity money. Several nations started using silver, gold, copper, tin, etc. as money. Metal was accepted as convenient method of exchange because could be made into coins of predetermined weight.​[85]​ As the price of gold began to rise, gold coins were melted in order to earn more by selling them as metal. This led governments to mix copper or silver in gold coins so that their intrinsic value might be more than their face value. As gold became dearer and scarce, silver coins were used, first in their pure form and later on mixed with alloy or some other metal. Regardless of their advantages in comparison to commodity money, metallic money was heavy and hence impossible to carry large sums from one place to another by merchants. It was also unsafe and inconvenient to carry precious metals for trade purposes over long distances.​[86]​

2.3.3	Paper Money
The growth of trade at the end of the middle Ages hampered the use of coinage. The ‘bankers’ of that time and especially the holders of gold in storage produced a new form of monetary instrument, paper money, to compensate for the shortage.​[87]​ The development of paper money started with goldsmiths who kept strong safes to   store their gold. As Goldsmiths were thought to be honest merchants, people started keeping their gold with them for the safe custody. In return, the goldsmiths gave the depositor a receipt promising to return the gold on demand. These receipts of the goldsmiths were given to the sellers of commodities by the buyers. Thus receipts of the goldsmiths were a substitute for money. Such paper monies were backed by gold and were convertible on demand into gold. This ultimately led to the development of bank notes.​[88]​ 

2.3.4	Goldsmith Receipts
Following King Charles’ compulsory ‘loan’ from merchant money placed in the Tower of London in the mid-17th century, merchants began to leave their monies in the form of gold with goldsmith. Gold and other precious metals soon became a viable alternative method of paying third parties whereby the goldsmith would hold gold ‘deposits’ on behalf of the merchant issuing a receipt useable as a payment instrument payable to a third party willing to accept it.​[89]​ The receipt was in favour of a payee or bearer and was an undertaking by the goldsmith to pay on demand when presented with the receipt. Since many of these receipts or notes passed around for long periods of time without being cashed in for the gold, goldsmiths began issuing more notes as loans in excess of the underlying gold held in their keeping, and so earned interest on the money.​[90]​

2.3.5	Drafts and Cheques 
Goldsmith receipts also produced a new monetary instrument, the draft, which later came to be known as the cheque. This evolution concurred with the emergence in Europe of what became known as private banks that would hold cash or gold on behalf of customers.​[91]​

2.3.6	Banknotes
Since there was likelihood for payee to refuse goldsmith’s receipt or draft, or even the possibilities of liquidation of the goldsmith, an alternative form of money evolved. This resulted in the development of banknotes, whose issuance grew in major mercantile colonies.​[92]​

2.3.7	Near Money
Another stage in the evolution of money has been the use of bills of exchange, treasury bills, bonds, debentures, savings certificates, etc. They are known as "near money". They are alternatives for money and are liquid assets. Thus in the final stage of its evolution money has become intangible. Its ownership is now transferable simply by book entry.​[93]​

2.3.8	Plastic Money​[94]​
The invention of computer technology in the financial sector worldwide changed the methods and style of offering services to customers.​[95]​ Use of plastic money came as a form of convenience to financial institution customers. In travelling and shopping people had to carry huge cash that was unsecured and hence increased the crime rate. The advent of plastic money increased security and reduced the burden of carrying huge cash. However, with all the advantages, the security and secrecy of the data has been the major challenge in the prevention of frauds.​[96]​

2.3.9	Electronic Money
The technological advancement contributed to development of a new direction in the payments system, called the electronic payments system. This new system refers to all transactions which are conducted electronically.​[97]​ Electronic money or E-Money was introduced as a payment instrument more than 20 years ago. The dynamics of the use of E-Money was much slower than expected in the beginning, primarily as a result of the expensive implementation, while at a later stage the introduction of complex regulations for an electronic money institution played an inhibitive role.​[98]​ The term E-Money is often used to refer to a wide variety of electronic payment schemes and thus it may mean different things to different people. But simply, E-Money is monetary value stored in an electronic device that can be used to make payments.​[99]​ It also denotes value paid in conjunction with a wide variety of electronic retail payment mechanisms, often described as “stored-value” products (“SVPs”).​[100]​

Section 3 of the National Payment Systems Act, 2015 of Tanzania,​[101]​ defines electronic money as;
Monetary value as represented by claim on its issuer that electronically stored in an instrument or device, issued against receipt of funds of an amount not lesser in value than the monetary issued accepted as means of payment by persons or entities other than the issuer and can be redeemed in cash.

The Stored value products in this case include hardware or card-based mechanisms (electronic purses or wallets), and software or network based cash (also called digital cash)” .While e-money’s potential to improve efficiencies, reduce transactional costs, and bring new opportunities has long been recognized, transformed interest has been generated with new forms that are transmitted with the aid of mobile phones, or M-Money.​[102]​ M-Money involves services that connect consumers financially through mobile phones. The service allows for any mobile phone subscriber whether banked or unbanked to deposit value into their mobile account, send value via a simple handset to another mobile subscriber, and allow the recipient to turn that value back into cash easily and cheaply.​[103]​

In some African countries, the lack of infrastructure such as landline phones and limited access to banking has encouraged the development of mobile money systems, where monetary value is stored in an account accessible by a mobile handset, a relatively low-cost telecommunication device. The M-PESA scheme has been a great success in Kenya and Tanzania and various mobile money schemes have been introduced in other countries in Africa and Asia. Transfers of monetary balances to other users with Short Message Service (SMS) technology is still the most common use of M-PESA.​[104]​

2.4	 	Theories of Money
2.4.1	Metallism 
During the 16th and 17th centuries, the 'Metallists' and the 'Anti-Metallists' or 'Chartalists' paved the way for successive debates between various schools of thought for centuries to come. The Metallists and Chartalists arrive at markedly different conclusions, primarily as a result of their "different conceptions of the scope and method of economics". Fundamentally, the distinction is one of 'real' versus 'monetary' analysis.​[105]​ The Metallist framework views the origins and the early evolution of money as an unintended consequence of spontaneous individual actions in the context of barter exchange. Here, money emerged via a ‘natural’ process of transaction cost minimization. Notably, money came into being as a commodity with an intrinsic value and special characteristics conducive to its function as a universal medium of exchange (such as gold and silver metals due to their divisibility, portability, homogeneity and durability).​[106]​

The Metallists viewed money as a medium of exchange on the basis of barter, with individuals trucking their goods to the local trading venue and attempting to exchange what they brought for what they wanted. The barter exchange required the double coincidence of wants' so that two-party exchange could only occur if each of two individuals wished to exchange that which they possessed for that which was offered by another.​[107]​ Money is also considered to come up in order to eliminate some of the inefficiencies of barter. Consequently, society agreed upon some means of exchange called 'money' in order to overcome some of the transaction costs associated with barter.​[108]​

The Metallists uphold that society developed metallic currency so that the money would have (intrinsic) value. They believed that money's ability to fulfill the medium of exchange function depended on its being a commodity with an exchange value independent of its form as currency. As a producible commodity, money was not different from other commodity; it only represented the exchange of any producible commodity for any other producible commodity.​[109]​ 

The Metallist theory suggests that problems in coordinating trade within a barter economy naturally led society to settle on precious metals as a medium of exchange. It is not always clear whether the precious metals used in exchange were in an 'unworked' state or whether they had been minted/coined; however, Goodhart notes that exchange using unworked precious metals is more like barter exchange than monetary exchange and that payments in this form have been extremely rare because it would be difficult to 'identify' the quantity and quality of the metal. This 'identifiability' problem usually meant that commodity money required a stamp or guarantee before it could circulate widely.​[110]​ 

Aristotle supports the Metallist theory and provides the following to substantiate his arguments;
"For the purpose of barter men made a mutual compact to give and accept some substance of such a sort as being in itself a useful commodity . . . finally . . . impressing on it a stamp in order that this might relieve them of having to measure it; for the stamp was put on as the token of the amount."​[111]​ 

However, it is not clear as to whether the individuals, institutions or the government or public sector performed this minting function. Goodhart points out that the minting function has most frequently been performed by government. Therefore, the State should have been considered to be an actor of coinage.​[112]​The acceptability of metallic coins as a medium of exchange was supported by their precious metal content that gave them value independent of their form as currency.​[113]​ In other words, metallic coins were accepted because they were themselves valuable commodities with certain properties which made them a convenient medium of exchange. The transition to the use of coins with little or no precious metal content or paper representing contracts between the bearer and a bank or government led Menger​[114]​ to ask why.​[115]​
 "Every economic unit in a nation should be ready to exchange his goods for little metal disks apparently useless as such, or for documents representing the latter". 

The Metallist vision easily adapted to the use of non-'pure' commodity or paper money. It was argued, for example, that non-'pure' metal coins could be substituted for commodity money because their metal backing would imbue them with value. Similarly, bank- or State-issued paper currency, under a metal standard, would be accepted because of its gold or silver backing.​[116]​  Thus, the Metallists retained the basic logical structure of their analysis by maintaining a link between these (fiduciary) currencies and precious metals .When, from time to time, governments suspended convertibility, and paper continued to substitute for commodity money, the Metallists maintained that the currency retained its value because people expected convertibility to be restored.​[117]​

The early Metallists and modern Metallists (or Monetarists) bear important similarities. Both treat money as irrelevant to 'real' analysis. In fact, "'real' monetary analysis derives from 'metallist' or 'commodity' theory". In its modern form (Monetarist), exchange can be analyzed as if it occurred in a simple barter economy where money is neutral, serving only as a lubricant to the exchange mechanism; all that matters are 'real' exchange values derived from highly abstract exchange relations based on rational maximizing behavior.​[118]​

2.4.2	State Theory Of Money/Chartalism 
The Chartalist theory, in its most general form, is perhaps best described in Friedrich Knapp's 1924 work, The State Theory of Money. As the title suggests, the State plays a central role in the development and establishment of money. Knapp's explanation is not easily summarized due to the extraordinarily complex system of terms he invented for his analysis. His fundamental insight, however, is easily conveyed:​[119]​ 
"The money of a State is . . . what is accepted at public pay offices" and "the standard is not chosen for any properties of the metals".

According to Knapp, the State determines the money of the economy by declaring what it will accept in payment to itself. Knapp’s State Theory of Money was clearly written in response and opposition to the “metallistic view” of money advanced by Carl Menger. In Knapp’s own words, his goal was to “replace the metallistic view of money by one founded on Political Science”. More specifically, the political science aspect of Knapp’s approach rests in his underlying proposition that the institutions of money and the state are inseparable. Consequently, any attempts to deduce money and the monetary system “without the idea of a State” are “not only out of date, but even absurd” however widespread these attempts may have been.​[120]​

While the Metallists dis-empowered the State and transferred the power to the market, Knapp argues that the State is the central force in the development of a monetary system. Like Smith's prince, the State can make anything it chooses (metal coins, paper backed by some metal, or inconvertible paper) generally acceptable by proclaiming that it will be accepted at State pay offices. What makes a currency valid as money is a proclamation by the State that it will be accepted at its pay offices; what makes it acceptable to its citizenry is its usefulness in settling these liabilities.​[121]​ The Chartalist framework is therefore in strong opposition to the prevailing Metallist perspective according to which money necessarily emerged as an object with an intrinsic value (such as gold and silver metal). Rather than intrinsic value, it is the unique power of money to extinguish debts and other obligations to the state that gives value and general acceptability to money.​[122]​ 

The defining characteristic of a Chartal means of payment, "whether coins or warrants", is that "they are pay-tokens, or tickets used as means of payment”. The cloak-room token and the stamp, like the money of the State, gain their validity by virtue of proclamation. The cloak-room attendant asserts acceptance of the token in exchange for the coat which has been left in his care; the postal service proclaims acceptance of the stamped envelope in exchange for its carrying services; and the State proclaims acceptance of a specified form of currency in exchange for the elimination of certain liabilities.​[123]​ 

The follower of Knapp, Abba Lerner, has also attempted to summarise this focal point of Knapp’s Chartalism as follows; The modern state can make anything it chooses generally acceptable as money and thus establish its value quite apart from any connection, even of the most formal kind, with gold or with backing of any kind. It is true that a simple declaration that such and such is money will not do, even if backed by the most convincing constitutional evidence of the state’s absolute sovereignty. But if the state is willing to accept the proposed money in payment of taxes and other obligations to itself the trick is done. Everyone who has obligations to the state will be willing to accept the pieces of paper because they know that the taxpayers, etc., will accept them in turn. On the other hand if the state should decline to accept some kind of money in payment of obligations to itself, it is difficult to believe that it would retain much of its general acceptability.​[124]​ 

2.5	Functions and Characteristics of Money
The uniqueness of what constitute as money depend somewhat on the level of development and complexity of the society. A relatively simple economy, with relatively few goods and services, few producers and consumers, and few transactions, may be able to function with a form of money that would not work in a more complex society. Today, shells or furs wouldn’t work particularly well as money in Tanzania. At an earlier time, in a simpler economy, they could and did.​[125]​ Nevertheless, there are some general characteristics that are usually important for whatever serves as money in a modern economy.

2.5.1	General Acceptability​[126]​
Everybody must be prepared to accept the money in use. This is the most important quality of money. People accept a thing as money which is used by everybody as a medium of exchange. Gold and silver are considered good money materials because they have alternative uses and are generally accepted. Paper notes are accepted as money when they are issued by the Central Bank and electronic money is accepted by the government and general public in various transactions.

2.5.2	Durability
Money in circulation must be sensible durable so that it lasts when handled and does not deteriorate when being held as a store of value. Animals and perishable commodities are not good money materials because they do not possess durability. In this sense, gold, silver, alloy, brass etc. are the best materials which are used as money. Paper notes are less durable than these metals but they are money because they are legal tender.​[127]​

2.5.3	Portability
Money must be portable or easily transferred from one person to another, to make the exchange of money for products easier. It should contain large value in small bulk. Gold and silver possess this quality because they are good money materials. However, they involve risk in carrying or transferring them from one place to another therefore, paper is considered as a better material and is used in the form of notes.​[128]​

2.5.4	Cognizability​[129]​ 
Everybody must easily recognize it by sight or touch as it the money in use. Coins and currency notes of different denominations in different designs and sizes meet this quality of good money.

2.5.5	Divisibility​[130]​
Money should be easily divisible into a range of denominations in order to ensure that goods of different prices can be purchased with the exact money or that change can easily be given where money of a higher denomination is offered. Try to visualize the challenges you would encounter to purchase a product that had a price of 1/50th. 

2.5.6	Scarcity
What serves as money must not be easily reproduced by people and should be relatively scarce. We could use chestnuts as money because they’re relatively scarce and last a long time. But, if we did, people would start growing chestnut trees, and we wouldn’t be able to control the supply.​[131]​ Soon there would be so many chestnuts in use and prices would be bid up so high, that you’d need a truck to carry the chestnuts to pay for bread and milk. We could use stones but everyone can simply pick up stones from all over the place. Once again, we wouldn’t be able to control the supply and we would face a similar problem to our chestnut story. Money like almost everything else loses its value whenever there is too much of it, a major problem for most types of commodity money.​[132]​

2.5.7	Stability
Money should be stable in value because it has to serve as a measure of value. Gold and silver possess this quality because they are not available in abundance. They are neither very scarce because being durable, they can be easily stocked. Their supplies can thus be increased or decreased when required. So they act as a store of value because their value is stable. But governments prefer paper money to gold and silver because it is cheap and easily available. Its value is kept stable by keeping control over its issue. It is another thing that the central bank of a country is seldom able to exercise complete control over its issue which makes paper money unstable in value.​[133]​

2.6	Functions of Money
Money performs both primary and secondary functions which not only remove the difficulties of barter but also lubricates the wheels of trade and industry in the current world. Money can be any substance that serves as a medium of exchange, a measure of value and a store of value. A substance that satisfies these three functions can be accepted and used by everyone in a society.​[134]​

2.6.1	Primary Functions
The two primary functions of money serve as a medium of exchange and as a unit of value.

 2.6.1.1  Money as a Medium of Exchange or Means of Payment
The primary attribute of money is that it is used as a means of payment. By serving as a medium of exchange, money gets rid of double coincidence of wants and the inconveniences and difficulties associated with barter. The introduction of money as a medium of exchange decomposes the single transaction of barter into separate transactions of sale and purchase thereby eliminating the double coincidence of wants. This function of money also separates the transactions in time and place because the sellers and buyers of a commodity are not required to perform the transactions at the same time and place. This is because the seller of a commodity buys some money and money, in turn, buys the commodity over time and place.​[135]​

When money acts as a medium of exchange it is generally acceptable and affords the freedom of choice. With money, we can buy various goods and services and purchase the best and also bargain in the market. Thus money gives an economic independence and stimulates the market by increasing competition and widening the market. According to Prof. Walters, money serves as a 'factor of production', enabling output to increase and diversify. When acting as the intermediary, it helps one good or service to be traded indirectly for others.​[136]​

2.6.1.2	 Money as Unit of Value 
The second primary function of money is a unit of value. Money is the standard for measuring value just as the ruler or tape measure for measuring length. The monetary unit measures and expresses the values of all goods and services. The monetary unit expresses the value of each good or service in terms of price and money as a unit of value also facilities accounting. ​[137]​ Money is the common denominator which determines the rate of exchange between goods and services which are priced in terms of the monetary unit. There can be no pricing process without a measure of value. The use of money as a standard of value eliminates the necessity of quoting the price of apples in terms of oranges, the price of oranges in terms of nuts, and so on. Unlike barter, the prices of such commodities are expressed in terms of so many units of dollars, Naira, francs, pounds, shillings etc., depending on the nature of the monetary unit in a country.​[138]​ 

2.6.2	Secondary Functions
Money performs three secondary functions: (i) as a standard of deferred payments,(ii) as a store of value, (iii) as a transfer of value.

2.6.2.1	 Money as a Standard of Deferred Payments 
The third function of money is that it acts as a standard of deferred or postponed payments. All debts are taken in money, thus was easy under barter to take loans in goats or grains but difficult to make repayments in such perishable articles in the future. Money has simplified both the taking and repayment of loans because the unit of account is durable. Money links the present values with those of the future. It simplifies credit transactions and makes possible contracts for the supply of goods in the future for an agreed payment of money. It simplifies borrowing by consumers on hire-purchase and from house-building and cooperative societies.​[139]​ 

Money facilitates firms and businessmen to borrow from banks and other non-bank financial institutions. The buying and selling of shares, debentures and securities is made possible by money. By acting as a standard of deferred payments, money helps in capital formation both by the government and business enterprises. This function of money develops financial and capital markets and helps in the growth of the economy. However, there is the danger of changes in the value of money over time which harms or benefits the creditors and debtors.​[140]​ 

If the value of money increases over time, the creditors gain and debtors lose. On the other hand, a fall in the value of money over time brings losses to creditors and windfalls to debtors.​[141]​To overcome this difficulty, some of the countries have fixed debt contracts in terms of a price index which measures changes in the value of money. Such a contract over time guarantees the future payment of debt by compensating the loser by the same amount of purchasing power when the contract was entered into.​[142]​

2.6.2.2	 Money as a Store of Value
Money is also an asset which can serve as a store of account. If money is to be precious for transactions, it needs to be able to retain value over time. The good chosen as money is always something which can be kept for long periods without deterioration or wastage. It is a form in which wealth can be kept intact from one year to the next. Money is a bridge from the present to the future. It is therefore essential that the money commodity should always be one which can be easily and safely stored. Money as a store of value is meant to meet unforeseen emergencies and to pay debts.​[143]​ 

Keynes placed much emphasis on this function of money. According to him, to hold money is to keep it as a reserve of liquid assets which can be converted into real goods. It is a matter of comparative indifference whether wealth is in money, money claims, or goods. In fact, money and money claims have certain advantages of security, convenience and adaptability over real goods. But the store of value function of money also suffers from changes in the value of money. This introduces considerable hazard in using money or assets as a store of value.​[144]​

2.6.2.3	 Money as a Transfer of Value
 Since money is a generally acceptable means of payment and acts as a store of value, it keeps on transferring values from person to person and place to place. A person who holds money in cash or assets can transfer that to any other person. Moreover, he can sell his assets at Dar es Salaam and purchase fresh assets at Arusha. Thus money facilities transfer of value between persons and places.​[145]​

2.7 Conclusion 
The analysis of the above mentioned functions and characteristics of money reveal that e-money fulfill all the criteria of money.​[146]​ It is a unit of account as the existing official currency such as Tanzanian shillings. It is also Divisible because value can be programmed at demand. Moreover, it has been accepted by a good number of People who are now using it immensely in urban and rural areas. The acceptability and recognition of e-money as money is supported by Knapp's exposition in state theory of money as follows;
"The money of a State is . . . what is accepted at public pay offices" 
According to Knapp, the State determines the money of the economy by declaring what it will accept in payment to itself.​[147]​ In this case therefore, the recognition of the government in using electronic payment system in various governmental activities such as bill payments justifies that the government has accepted it as a form of money. Though the meaning of "electronic money", distinguishes it with conventional money such as coins and banknotes, its functionality gives it a room to survive. 







3.0	THE USE OF MOBILE MONEY  AND ITS  IMPLICATIONS  ON CENTRAL BANKING CORE FUNCTIONS
3.1 Introduction
The laws that regulate banking and financial institution services business in Tanzania  are the Bank of Tanzania Act 2006 (‘the BOT Act’), the Banking and Financial  Institutions Act 2006 (‘BAFIA’) and the Companies Act 2002. The regulatory and licensing authority for banks and financial institutions in Tanzania is the Bank of Tanzania (‘BOT’). Prior to being licensed by the BOT, banks and financial institutions must first be incorporated as limited liability companies under the Companies Act.​[149]​ The BOT Act, 2006​[150]​ has given the Bank of Tanzania the power to formulate and implement monetary policy; to provide for the supervision of banks and financial institutions and to provide for other related matters.
Section 5 (1) of the Act has provided for the Principal functions of the Bank as follows; 
the principal functions of the Bank shall be to exercise the functions of a central bank and, without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, to formulate, implement and be responsible for monetary policy, including exchange rate policy, to issue currency, to regulate and supervise banks and financial institutions including mortgage financing, development financing, lease financing, licensing and revocation of licences and to deal, hold and manage gold and foreign exchange reserves of Tanzania.


Section 6(1) of the Act provides for the regulatory and supervisory functions of the Bank with respect to clearance and settlement systems, in this case the Bank shall;
(a) Regulate, monitor, and supervise the payment, clearing and settlement system including all products and services thereof; and
(b) Conduct oversight functions on the payment, clearing and settlement systems in any bank, financial institution or infrastructure service provider or company.

Although the BOT has been given such supervisory roles, the introduction of M-Money services has caused the convergence of two distinct entities and bring legal dilemma in the core functions of central bank. The regime of M-Money services has caused legal challenges and contradictions that were not anticipated. Those of particular relevance to central banks relate to their oversight function for payment systems, seignior age and the operation of monetary policy.​[151]​

The growth of M- Money services has raised complex questions for regulators on how to differentiate a ‘payment’ from a ‘deposit’, and what differentiates the business of providing payments from that of deposit taking. The spread of mobile phones has accelerated the use of M-Money as a source of funds for payments; however, a key policy question is whether non-banks can issue E-Money and, if so, on what basis.​[152]​ In order to critically digest this part on legal implications of M-Money services on monetary policy, the chapter has provided an overview of mobile money and mobile money services, the players in the platform and discusses the extent to which the convergence of telecommunication sector and financial sector through M-Money services has affected the traditional role of Central bank.

3.2 	Defining Mobile Money and Mobile Money Services
3.2.1	 Mobile Money
“Mobile money” (M-Money) is a term that can be defined in different ways as it covers a broad range of applications. Generally, the term covers all the services that allow electronic money transactions over a mobile phone. It can be described also as mobile financial services, mobile wallet and mobile payment. Mobile money is a broader term that includes all types of monetary transactions executed via mobile phones.​[153]​These financial transactions and services are sometimes referred to as mobile financial services.​[154]​ As a form of electronic money, “Mobile money” or “M-Money” offers a wide range of financial services through mobile phones. It connects mobile phone subscribers whether banked or unbanked to various financial services promptly and in reasonably cost.​[155]​

The involvement of mobile technology in financial services is not a new concept in the telecommunication industry. The Mobile network operators began the study in 2000 with little success. However, the recent innovation in mobile technologies gave birth to the former idea.​[156]​Mobile money services are being deployed rapidly across emerging markets as a key tool to further the goal of financial inclusion. There have been some notable successes in this platform shown by M-Pesa in Kenya, Telesom ZAAD in Somaliland, Dialog eZ Cash in Sri Lanka, Econet EcoCash in Zimbabwe, SMART Communications SMART Money in the Philippines, and Globe Telecom GCASH in the Philippines.​[157]​ 

In Tanzania, various telecommunication companies and financial institutions are offering mobile money transfer services. These are Tigo Tanzania Ltd, Vodacom Tanzania, CRDB Bank, and National Microfinance Bank (NBC) whereby the services offered are Tigopesa, M-Pesa, Ezy-Pesa, Airtel Money, TTCL and NMB Mobile respectively.​[158]​ The companies are in competition with each other and the entire sector is open to further investment be it local or foreign. The value of mobile (SMS) banking transactions has increased to (94.36%) in year 2013, whereas the value of internet banking transactions has increased up to (28.05%) in year 2012. This increase is attributed to the increase of the number of banking institutions offering mobile (SMS) and internet banking namely: Equity Bank (T) Ltd, NIC Bank (T) Ltd, Barclays Bank (T) Ltd, Citibank (T) Ltd, CRDB Bank Plc, NBC Bank Ltd, Standard Chartered Bank (T) Ltd, FBME Bank Ltd, Bank M (T) Ltd, United Bank for Africa, Stanbic Bank (T) LTD, Amana Bank Ltd, Azania Bank Ltd, Diamond Trust Bank (T) Ltd , Commercial Bank of Africa Ltd.​[159]​ 

These achievements address different banking needs for both the banked population in developed markets and the unbanked population in developing economies. In developed markets, the service is at the initial stage and is seen as a convenience that does not generate high revenues, but one on which to build value-added applications. In emerging markets, the huge rural populations grant a perfect base to tap the unbanked group with no bank account but a mobile phone.​[160]​ The rise of mobile technology worldwide has been a revelation to a great number of poor people who could not afford formal banking services. As a result, all classes of society can now access financial services through mobile-money system.​[161]​ Mobile money services address two important questions at the same time. The services have afforded financial inclusion for poor population that was excluded with traditional banking services. It has also amplified the room for financial institutions to offer various services at low cost and reach the poorest segment of society living in remote areas.​[162]​ The growths of mobile financial services have been contributed by the effort of mobile network operators (MNOs) that have invested heavily in telecommunication infrastructures both in urban and rural areas.​[163]​

Mobile money services have grown rapidly in developing countries, where it functions as a key driver of financial inclusion.​[164]​ In the past few years, financial inclusion has been recognised as “one of the main pillars of the global development agenda” and a crucial factor in boosting productivity and growth in developing countries and reducing poverty and inequality.​[165]​ The innovation in mobile technology that brought mobile money services has opened the room for rural dwellers to access financial services in a friendly way.​[166]​ 

About 4 billion people in the developing world that are mobile phone subscribers can now take the advantage of the technology and enjoy various services, including mobile transactions and payments without visiting financial institutions.​[167]​ While the platform addresses such achievements, there is no clear legal and regulatory framework in place that facilitates M-Money services while protecting the integrity and stability of the financial system. International best practices illustrate the needs for regulatory instruments that are balanced and tailored to the risks involved in various types of mobile money transactions.  

The available instruments that support the platform in the country are Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that has been signed between Bank of Tanzania (BOT) and Tanzania Communication Regulatory Authority (TCRA) with the intention of sharing regulatory and supervisory information.​[168]​ Also, Tanzania is the member of Alliance for Financial Inclusion (AFI), which recently has issued a guideline note for Supervision and Oversight of Mobile Financial Services to its members (SOMFS).​[169]​

3.3	Mobile Money Services
Mobile money services can be broadly categorized into three groups:​[170]​

3.3.1	M-Transfers
These services involve transfer of money from one user to another without exchange of goods or services. These services are also termed Person-to-Person (P2P) transfers and may be domestic or international.​[171]​Domestic M-transfers dominate mobile money platform across EAC and Tanzania in particular. East Africans are now using mobile money platforms to move cash equivalent to a third of the value of goods and services produced in the region, the latest industry statistics showed that Consumers in Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda and Tanzania transacted $45.75 billion through their mobile phones in 2014. The transactions conducted through mobile phones amounted to 32 per cent of their combined gross domestic product.​[172]​Most of these transactions are conducted by people in urban areas who support their relatives in rural areas.​[173]​The mobile money has replaced traditional informal methods of sending money by bus or taxi and Churches, NGOs, political parties and various organisations are now utilizing the platform to solicit contributions. 

3.3.2	M-Payments
In this category, money is exchanged between two users with an accompanying exchange of goods or services. The targeted entities in this type include utility companies that receive frequent payments from diverse customers like (e.g. power, water, sewage, and Pay TV) and those that make bulk payments (e.g. salaries and school fees). Many of these services were launched as free promotional offers to help build the business-case and prove their utility to the consumer.​[174]​

Several companies and Public entities in the country are using this service for the reason that it is a simple avenue to collect dues from customers on a regular basis. M-Payment is thus commonly used by entities like TANESCO, DAWASCO, TRA, and the recent developments of traffic fines. However, the largest M-Payment beneficiaries are the MNOs themselves through the sale of airtime or credit and internet bundles directly to consumers. This avenue of selling airtime enables the MNOs to make significant savings as they do not have to incur costs for printing and distributing scratch cards. This means that the MNOs also do not have to incur expenses through payment of commission to scratch card dealers and their agents.​[175]​Incidentally, this development seems also to be environmental friendly. It serves production of scratch cards which would later on find their ways on the streets and hence expenses incurred for disposing them off.​[176]​

3.3.3 M-Financial Services
With this service, mobile money may be linked to a bank account to offer customers series of transactions (e.g. savings and credits) that they would customarily access at a bank branch or ATM. Varieties of financial services like insurance and micro-finance are now accessible through mobile phones and permit customers to access bank account and transfer money to another bank account holder or mobile money wallet without an accompanying exchange of goods or services. This entails both M-transfers and M-financial services.​[177]​ Currently, mobile money transactions are conducted both locally and beyond the jurisdiction of the country. International money transfers by Western Union in partnership with M-PESA are an example of the latter.​[178]​

While banks did not consider the importance of mobile money at the beginning many of them have now recognized its potential. As a result, some of the banks have even signed up as super agents for mobile money services. It is now possible for mobile money users to withdraw money from ATMs instead of visiting a mobile money agent. While this approach guarantees more liquidity, it only works in urban settings where ATMs are common.​[179]​ In addition, some banks have teamed up with MNOs to offer integrated M-financial service products like Iko Pesa (Orange and Equity Bank) and M-Kesho (Safaricom and Equity Bank) in Kenya. In Tanzania, the National Microfinance Bank (NMB) offers a mobile application, “Pesa Fasta,” which allows its customers to use their mobile phones to send money to any person in Tanzania, who does not have a bank account.​[180]​

3.4	Mobile Money Services Models
Mobile money services in Tanzania are offered under different models. However, the selection of a model that a company can use in delivering services depends on the country’s financial laws, regulations and flexibility of the financial regulators.​[181]​ Other Nations have strict regulations that limit the financial service providers to offer a particular kind of M-Money services. Other countries require a particular model to be adopted or necessary changes in the legislations to be effected in order to allow M-Money services.​[182]​ 

In Tanzania, the non-bank model has dominated the market to a great extent and has proven to be more successful than bank led model in terms of subscription rate, penetration and financial inclusion. This fact is supported by the study of Economides, N & Jeziorski, P​[183]​ that states that;
In Tanzania, mobile banking has significant adoption, that is, almost thirty-five percent of households have at least one M-Money account. Thirty two percent of the population use exclusively M-Money as a provider of financial services and only 2% have an active traditional bank account.

Since the largest population does not have bank account in the traditional banks, they were easily trapped by the non-bank led model. However, the process of service convergence in Tanzania has resulted into the creation of the following M-Money services models. 

3.4.1	Bank-Based Model
This is a pure bank model whereby the bank, or any other licensed financial services institution such as a micro-finance institution (MFI), is the main institution licensed to provide mobile financial services. It is a model pictured under the Banking and Financial Institutions Act, 2006 of Tanzania. The model connects bank services with a mobile phone and the banks enter into an arrangement with a mobile operator to offer financial services through text messaging or other applications.​[184]​

This model allows customers to conduct various financial transactions without having to go to a physical bank facility. A customer establishes a direct contractual relationship with a licensed and supervised financial institution. The use of this model offers banks the potential to increase their services and catch new customers who were excluded with traditional banking services. In either case, customers can access their bank accounts and other financial services through their mobile device.​[185]​ The customers may also extend their relationship with the financial institutions through the use of agents, who are the extension of the bank. The agents offer various services such as customer service, keeping records, handling cash and managing liquidity. The Agent can thus play a role in a broad range of services including account opening, cash-in and cash out services including disbursement of bank approved loans and person to person transfer services.​[186]​

Bank-based model is considered “additive,” meaning that mobile money services are targeted to existing bank customers. The primary assumption is that the customers are typically comfortable with technology and want a convenient method in addition to such other services as credit cards, ATMs, and the Internet to manage money without having to handle cash.​[187]​ As M-banking services develop and more companies want to get involved, there are varied arrangements of the bank-based model that are emerging. Some banks opt not to have an exclusive arrangement with one mobile operator but allow their M-banking services to be used by any customer of any mobile operator. For example, one of Pakistan’s largest commercial banks UBL began offering services in 2009. 

It has no arrangement with a designated mobile operator. Rather, it follows a “one to many” model. It has built its own agent network under the brand “Omni” and can serve customers of any mobile operator, or none, with an account that can be accessed via phone or card. Similarly, mobile operators are not limiting themselves to working with just one bank to offer M-banking services.​[188]​

3.4.2	Non-Bank Based Model
Under this model a formal bank only serves as a holder of deposits and other financial services are conducted by a non-banking entity. This model evades strictly banking regulations that prevent banking businesses to be conducted by non-bank entity.​[189]​ It allows mobile service providers to offer mobile financial services as Value Added Services (VAS) under telecommunications license. The model enables its subscribers to transfer funds and make payments in the form of electronic money to each other and transactions are settled through the MNO's established agent network.​[190]​ 

The advantage of this model for rural residents is that the payment transactions occur entirely within the MNO’s network, and do not require the subscriber to have a bank account.​[191]​ This is the model that Safaricom,​[192]​ Airtel, Telkom Kenya and Essar Telecom have adopted, as a means of circumventing the regulatory and compliance requirements for mobile banking under the Banking Act and the Central Bank of Kenya Prudential Guidelines and other regulations. This approach has also been taken in Tanzania by MNOs as a means of increasing financial inclusion in the country and a strategy of evading legal compliance under the Banking and Financial Institutions Act, 2006.

There are various schools of thoughts concerning the operations of MNOs in financial services as to whether constitute banking business. However, the leading term in defining banking business lies in the term deposit. The funds in transit paid in by the remitter but not yet withdrawn by the recipient are in principle on deposit in a separate trust account with one or more banks and are therefore not deposits in the context of banking business. MNOs make use of the banking facilities, in the form of trust accounts. This requirement is part of the authorization and licensing conditions spelt out by the Bank of Tanzania.​[193]​

The services conducted by MNOs possibly do not constitute "banking business"​[194]​ as defined under Section 3 of the Banking and Financial Institutions Act No. 5 of 2006 of Tanzania. As such, they do not require the extent of regulatory oversight required for deposits that are used in banking. The depository bank has no involvement in or responsibility for payments through the MNO system.​[195]​ Non-bank based models are typically “transformational” because the M-banking services are primarily targeted to the unbanked. This may include poor or remote populations living in informal or cash economies that have limited or no access to formal banking institutions.​[196]​
3.4.3	Hybrid Model
Since the inception of mobile financial services by MNOs, there has been increased competition between the banks and MNOs in the provision of mobile banking and mobile money transfer services respectively. In addition, there has also been competition within the banking industry, and also between the mobile network operators on the other hand.​[197]​This has resulted in innovative integration of mobile banking and mobile money transfer and payment services. The innovative integration is meant to add value to the services offered by banks and MNOs respectively to their banking customers and subscribers. This integration has resulted into evolution of a hybrid type of mobile financial service model. In this model, banks, MNOs and/or other third parties’ partners offer mobile financial services that combine mobile banking services and mobile money transfer services. International money transfers by Western Union in partnership with M-PESA are an example of the model.​[198]​

3.5	Actors in the Mobile Money Ecosystem
A typical mobile money platform involves several players and stakeholders who play different roles or derive diverse benefits from the whole ecosystem. These include:​[199]​

3.5.1	Customers/Consumers 
Customers are the key players in mobile money platform and enjoy varieties of services using their mobile devices. With the assistance of technology, customers can utilize services available on the mobile money platform. After registering and creating an account, the customer’s personal information is associated with their mobile phone number at the processing server. This record constitutes a mobile money account commonly referred to as an “e-wallet” or “e-money” account.​[200]​ Customers derive benefits by getting cheaper and more efficient means of transferring or paying money to other people or businesses within the network.​[201]​

3.5.2	Mobile Network Operators (MNOs)
Mobile Network Operators (MNOs) play a crucial role in the mobile money platform through the creation of potential infrastructure services. An MNO ensures compliance with telecommunication regulations and policy within the country. In Tanzania, many MNOs have a recognisable brand that has been cultivated through extensive marketing and service provision. MNOs benefit from mobile money services by increasing and maintaining the number of customers, reducing the cost of airtime distribution and by generating new revenue.​[202]​

3.5. 3	Agents
Agents are nonbank entities such as retailers that handle customer registration and liquidity needs for the mobile money users, on behalf of the MNOs. The essential role of an agent is to receive and dish out cash and conduct other services as described in the terms of service. The agents serve as branches for the mobile network operators and act as the point of sale for the customer relationship.​[203]​ 
Agents assist customers to enjoy financial services within their surroundings. For the unbanked with fairly low literacy rates, distribution agents play a critical role in helping them perceive and build an understanding of the mobile money solution. They drive the entire ecosystem by providing the primary contact through which customers can build up competencies. Agents provide customer service functions including informal training sessions to customers on how to use the service.​[204]​ 

Agents link the MNOs and the consumer and are also responsible for account opening, customer due diligence, and Know-Your-Customer (KYC) program compliance.​[205]​ Agents provide liquidity with funding from other business activities including selling airtime in addition to other merchandise. They receive commissions for transactions and hold balances on their own mobile phones. These mobile airtime balances and cash on premises are the critical elements of the agents’ liquidity management system. Agents also report suspicious transactions in accordance with Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorist requirements as stipulated by the MNO they are attached to. The agent is therefore the MNOs, interface between the cash flow and the consumer.​[206]​

3.5.4	Merchants
The merchants represent individuals, entities or institutions (such as vendors, utilities etc) that are frequent recipients of fund transfers. Their integration into the mobile money application interface greatly simplifies the payment process by creating a direct channel. For example, the mobile money application running on client devices may include an option to directly pay for TV subscriptions, Utilities (power, water) etc.​[207]​

3.5.5	Banks
Banks serve as a key player in the conversion of mobile money virtual currency to real money and vice versa by maintaining trust accounts to store and retrieve the customer mobile money cash deposits. Bank branches also serve as an aggregation point for distribution agents. They offer deep integration with the processing servers for automated account monitoring and also a platform for merchants to receive their mobile money payments. Under some circumstances, the banks may be invited to provide financial advisory services to the MNOs in running the entire ecosystem.​[208]​

The banks’ role in the mobile payment value chain is important as the mobile payment system in exchange for e-float is deposited in bank accounts held by the mobile network operator. In efforts to diversify their risk, MNOs hold such deposits in different banks. These accounts are regular current accounts where MNOs have no restrictions of access.​[209]​In turn, the banks face no special reserve requirements with regard to the MNO’s’ deposits. Similarly, there are no explicit requirements for the MNO to give notice of their intention to withdraw “large” quantities of cash at a given point in time, which shows that these trusts are treated as any other current account deposit in terms of regulatory policy by the Central Bank. This then shows the vulnerability that exists within the framework which mobile payments is currently operating under as there are no legal obligations between the MNOs and the banks and if there are any these obligations are one of the banks and account holders.​[210]​

3.5.6	Regulatory Authorities
The regulators perform functions critical to the sustainability of the mobile money ecosystem. They develop guidelines and policies that cover the areas of value creation, efficiency, innovation, and also oversee the enforcement of compliance. They may also adjudicate in situations of competition within the ecosystem.​[211]​ The key regulators in Tanzania include Bank of Tanzania for the financial sector and Tanzania Communication Regulatory Authority for the communications sector.​[212]​ However, the convergence of telecommunication services and financial services has complicated the traditional nature of both industries, and raised significant questions regarding the role of telecommunication regulators and financial regulators over mobile money services. The main question in this aspect is whether the mobile financial service segment of an MNO’s operations can be regulated by telecommunication regulators or the financial regulators can have the mandate over the MNOs?

Lack of unified legal framework in M-Money services has complicated the converged services environment. However, Bank of Tanzania has signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with TCRA with the intention of sharing regulatory and supervisory information. And the member of Alliance for Financial Inclusion (AFI) has issued a guideline note for Supervision and Oversight of Mobile Financial Services to its members (SOMFS).​[213]​  Although M-Money services are not considered to be banking business in the perspective of Banking and Financial Institutions Act, 2006, their activities have legal implications in the core functions of Central bank in various aspects. In order to shade more light in this area the paper has provided the central bank role on monetary police and the extent to which the operations of M-Money services have affected the core functions.

3.6	Central Bank Role on Monetary Policy
3.6.1	Central Bank Role
A Central bank or a monetary authority is an institution whose primary function is to issue currency, formulate and implement monetary policy. Other duties include managing a country’s foreign exchange reserves and acting as a lender of last resort to governments and banks.​[214]​ It may also have supervisory powers, to ensure that banks and other financial institutions do not behave recklessly or fraudulently.​[215]​ In cooperation with other authorities, central banks play a major role in the oversight and development of the financial system. 

Central banks have performed a multitude of other tasks, several of which remain part of the central banks’ functions in many countries. They often supply banking services; asset and debt management services for governments; and they sometimes provide analysis and advice regarding economic and development policies. In the course of implementing monetary policy, a central bank controls supply of money for the purpose of attaining price stability and promoting economic growth.​[216]​  By virtue of their ability to exert influence over money supply process, central banks achieve this objective by regulating the quantity of money in circulation as well as the level of credit to the economy.​[217]​ During a period of financial stress, central banks emphasis naturally shifts to safeguarding the stability of the financial system as a whole, consistent with their role as regulators and providers of liquidity to the banking system.​[218]​

Central banks have long played a critical role as payments intermediaries. In particular, central banks have long performed the function of “. . . providing banks with deposits and a means of transferring them to make interbank payments,” a function Jeffrey Lacker, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, has called “. . . the fundamental core of central banking. . . .”​[219]​

Stephen Millard and Victoria Saporta, in their background paper to the Bank of England’s May 2005 Conference on “The Future of Payments,” observed that:
“Central banking and payment systems – systems consisting of a settlement asset, credit arrangements, infrastructure and rules over which monetary value can be transferred – are inextricably linked. In a number of countries, central banking institutions evolved naturally or were imposed by the state to provide the ultimate settlement asset at the apex of the payment hierarchy.

In 2001 an article on the Federal Reserve’s role in the payment system, Ed Green and Dick Todd noted that “. . . historically, central banks have been chartered to perform two functions:”
One is to be an intermediary between the government and its lenders, enabling the government to obtain credit by ensuring that implicit default through inflation will occur only in genuine national emergencies. The other is to serve broad public interests as the trustworthy and neutral apex of a hierarchy of banks that, in turn, provide the nonbank public with accounts used to settle financial, business, and personal payments by transfer of balances.​[220]​

Central banks are concerned in payment, clearing and settlement in different ways. They act as operators and providers of settlement services in central bank money, as participants in or users of such systems, oversight authorities and as promoters of efficiency in the payment system as a whole. The involvement of central bank in financial issues has contributed considerable expertise regarding the functioning of payment, clearing and settlement systems and the risks involved.​[221]​ Jeffrey Lacker offers a basis for understanding the importance of that role based upon the insight that “issuing, clearing and settling payment instruments are essentially communication and record-keeping activities.” In payment systems, as in other communications arrangements, Lacker argues:
“Efficient communication arrangements often take the form of networks in which many paths connect through a central node. A clearinghouse can be viewed as a natural club arrangement for such centralized settlement activity. A central bank then represents a nationalized central settlement node for interbank payments. Contemporary legal restrictions more or less compel most banks to settle through the central bank.​[222]​

Lacker’s explanation for the position central banks occupy at the apex of the payment system appears to be consistent with the historical development of central banks, as described by Millard and Saporta:​[223]​
“Historically, the evolution of central banking can be traced back to the market’s natural demand for an efficient way to make payments. This natural demand led to the development of a hierarchy or pyramid in payments with the liabilities of a proto central bank at its apex, as the ‘settlement asset’ of choice. In other words, central banks can emerge naturally from their payments role.

This description connects the two components of the central bank’s role as the provider of “the ultimate settlement asset at the apex of the payment hierarchy.” Lacker’s network analysis explains why the payment system is configured as a hierarchical structure, with a payments facilitator (either public or private) at the apex. Millard and Saporta connect that structural position to the role played by a settlement institution as the provider of a settlement asset. That role can be performed either by a private-sector bank or a central bank.​[224]​

In their role as payment intermediaries, central banks typically function as hubs, with spoke-like connections (account relationships) to all of the nodes (private-sector banks that have accounts at the central bank) in the system, forming a network (the interbank payment system) that is sometimes described as a star.​[225]​Governments around the world have given natural monopolies to the CBs over three core monetary policy imperatives, although this monopoly is fast being eroded by new forms of monetary instruments such as electronic representations of money and transfer of wealth.​[226]​ Overall though, many national or supra-national governments give their CBs general monopoly rights to many fiscal ecosystems, including interest rates, the creation of policy for money supply, legal tender issuance, banknotes, and the oversight of the integrity of national payment systems where these exist. These are clearly all important roles that assist stable economies.​[227]​

The preservation of monetary, financial and payment system stability entails the reduction of ‘systemic risk’ in the financial sector of a country, because one disruption within a bank could trigger or transmit further disruptions among participants or within the banking and payments sector.​[228]​This set of rights is usually a comprehensive and unquestionable endogenous banking monopoly which results in the total regulation of the issuance and use of the national currency, the oversight and maintenance of payment and settlement systems, the supervision of banks, and in some countries, a monopoly on cheque clearing.​[229]​

The money issued by the CB is also called ‘Outside Money’ and usually includes all bank balances or ‘inside money’ denominated in that currency. While technology and novel monetary instruments may chip away at this monopoly by providing an alternate means to transfer wealth and settle debts inter parties, some have argued that the provision of money should be left as a government monopoly because it is a public good whose production is best left to the CB, and by implication, the state. Notes and money, it is generally thought, represent a very homogeneous category good. Fundamental to this role as financial overseer, the CB will have oversight over payment mechanisms, and mediate a centralised interchange of payments in settlement of debt between banks.​[230]​

Central banks’ functions in the area of payment, clearing and settlement systems are very closely related to their functions in the areas of monetary policy and financial stability. In general, monetary stability supports sound investment and sustainable growth, which in turn are conducive to financial stability and support the smooth operation of payment systems.​[231]​In payment, clearing and settlement systems, central banks aim mainly to: (i) prevent systemic risk, thereby maintaining financial stability; (ii) promote the efficiency of payment systems and instruments; (iii) ensure the security of and public trust in the currency as the settlement asset; and (iv) safeguard the transmission channel for monetary policy.​[232]​ The discussion has provided clearly the powers of Central Bank on financial matters; however, the regime of M-Money services has affected its oversight role.

3.6.2	Implication of Mobile Money on Central Banking core Functions
The development of information technology and the emergence of new innovations in the area of retail payments known as electronic money (E- Money) and specifically mobile money have brought major repercussion in the banking industry.​[233]​ These innovations have challenged the predominant role of cash for making small value payments and retail transactions easier and cheaper for consumers and merchants. They have also raised a number of policy issues for central banks because of the possible implications for central bank and monetary policy and because of central banks' general interest in payment systems.​[234]​The widespread use of M- Money today has major impacts in areas such as monetary policy, banking supervision, supervision of the payment system, and the stability of the financial system. The main concern of central bankers today is security. A security breach and counterfeiting of a digital money product widely used could severely disturb the financial system.​[235]​

For banking supervisors, the main issues are whether institutions, other than banks, should be allowed to issue digital money, and whether traditional regulations, such as reserve requirements and capital regulations, should be extended to issuers of digital money products. In addition, there is concern that digital money could facilitate money laundering, fraud, and tax evasion. Widespread use of digital money could facilitate illegal activities because, in contrast to debit card and credit card transactions, some forms of digital money allow users to remain anonymous.​[236]​  In addition, there is concern that if electronic money is going to function anonymously it could facilitate money laundering, tax evasion, and fraud. In order to critically analyse the implications of mobile money for the conduct of monetary policy by central banks, the following issues need to be given much attention.

3.6.2.1	 Seigniorage​[237]​ Revenue
The most agreed upon effect of electronic money is the loss of “seignorage” income. The interest savings the government earns by issuing non-interest bearing debt in the form of currency. This money is used to run the central bank and therefore the loss of it could cause central banks to suffer financially. This money is also used to fund the budget deficit and other government programs and the loss of this could hurt the government. This loss could be combated by treating electronic money balances similar to demand deposits and enforcing reserve requirements.​[238]​When individuals shift to electronic money and 'load-up' the cards and software with purchasing power instead of holding cash, the seigniorage is earned by the issuer of the digital money instead of the central bank.​[239]​ 

3.6.2.2	  Control of Central Bank Over Money Supply
Decreasing the central bank’s control of money supply depends on the degree of substitution of currency in circulation with E-Money. The currency in circulation is part of monetary aggregates, and if it is decreased as a result of wider use of E-Money, it will produce difficulties in measurement of monetary aggregates and of the control of money supply by the central bank.​[240]​ 

3.6.2.3	  Velocity of Money​[241]​ 
 The development of E-Money as a substitute for paper money may lead to the crush of demand for money issued by central banks and threatens the central banks role in monetary policy. E-Money could lead to shifts in the velocity of money which might temporarily reduce the usefulness of the monetary aggregates, especially narrower ones, for countries that relying on them as targets or indicators.​[242]​

3.6.2.4	  The money Multiplier​[243]​
The money multiplier is directly affected by the increased use of electronic money as a replacement for conventional currency. “When electronic money is introduced, currency decreases and deposit money increases as the private tendency to retain cash goes down. Therefore, the currency ratio is reduced, the money multiplier becomes s larger, and the volume of money supply created from the supply of fixed reserve money is amplified”. This shows that electronic money will directly affect the money multiplier through the currency ratio​[244]​ The conversion of central bank currency into digital money balances would affect the money multiplier through two channels. Obviously, a substitution of central bank currency would affect the multiplier most directly through a reduction of the stock of central bank currency. A conversion, however, would also change the reserve position of banks, and eventually, the size of deposits.​[245]​

3.6.2.4	  E-money Reserves
If reserve requirements are placed on E-Money balances, there is no change, because it is assumed that currency will decrease by the same amount that electronic balances increase. However, this assumes that reserve requirements can be set on all E-Money balances. This is not the case when private institutions are liable for the smart cards and network money.​[246]​ If the central bank takes corrective action, it can limit the inflationary effects of increased money. This will not be a problem as the changes will be slow and measurable, therefore allowing central banks to adjust appropriately. If this assumption is overly optimistic about the central banks abilities, it can be seen that the central bank could in fact lose control, and inflation could result from increased use of privately issued E-Money.​[247]​

3.7 Conclusion
This chapter has tried to examine the legal implications coupled with the adoption of mobile money (M-Money) services globally and Tanzania in particular. The chapter has started by analysing the power vested to the Bank of Tanzania (BOT) on prudential oversight to the national payment and settlement systems and financial markets operations. The BOT has legitimate interest in ensuring that banks and financial institutions operate in a safe and sound manner. This implies that the power vested on it covers only banking and financial institutions carrying banking business. Since MNOs carrying M-Money services are not banks and hence not covered under the prudential oversight of BOT, it is obvious that its regulatory role in non-bank led model is too remote.

















4.0	RISKS AND REGULATORY ISSUES IN  MOBILE MONEY SERVICES
4.1	Introduction
The convergence of telecommunication services and financial services in promoting financial inclusion and the introduction of non-traditional actors into payments system has led to the need for a balanced global regulatory framework that can shape and inform the mobile financial services sector. These innovations in the financial services have brought new opportunities and risks to financial providers, carriers and the financial system generally.​[248]​ As adoption of M-Money services increase, financial regulators worldwide are also paying attention to the specific risks brought by the use of the mobile technology. Currently policymakers and regulators in various countries are drafting regulations for the era of mobile money. However, the challenge in this area is the mechanism of synchronizing financial regulations and telecommunication regulations for the betterment of M-Money services.​[249]​

There have been several attempts in the regulation of M-Money services including the distinction between bank-based model and non-bank based model. However, whether a telecommunication company or a bank is leading the effort, sheds little light on the precise risks associated with a particular mobile money scheme.​[250]​ This chapter presents a comprehensive and practical discussion about risks and regulatory issues brought with the adoption of M-Money services worldwide and Tanzania in particular. 
4.2	Risks in Mobile Money
The convergence of telecommunication sector and financial sector that gave birth to M-Money services, have brought in place risks that have affected both bank led model and non-bank led model.  The risks that were traditionally affecting traditional banks apply now to mobile banks. However, there are differences in the extent to which an exacting risk is applicable across conventional banks generally and in mobile money activities in particular.​[251]​ In retail payment system​[252]​, certain risks may arise between the initiation of a transaction and its final settlement. Such risks include fraud, operational, legal, settlement and systemic risks. They may arise irrespective of whether the services are provided by banks or non-banks. However, possible regulatory differences between banks and non-banks may lead to differences in risk mitigation measures. Hence difference on the likelihood that risks will materialise and their potential impact.​[253]​

As mobile financial services grow, there are issues that need to be considered for proper management of the risks that mobile money services may introduce. Such risks in the platform may be created by participants in the mobile payments, their agents and the technology vendors. In addition, there are other risks that are more unique to telecom firms and regulators in the financial sector lack experience in detecting and monitoring such risks.​[254]​ 
4.1.1	Operational Risk
Operational risk has been regarded as the risk of technical failures such as a computer break down or faulty software. However, this interpretation has been recognised too narrow and need to be expanded. In this case an internationally recognised definition that is widely used within the financial services industry was introduced in the context of the Basel II framework. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision defines operational risk as “the risk of losses resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems or from external events”.​[255]​

The Bank of International Settlement (BIS) Glossary gives the following definition of Operational Risk:
“The risk that deficiencies in information systems or internal controls could result in unexpected losses”

A similar definition of Operational Risk appears in the Federal Reserve System Trading Activities manual. It reads:​[256]​
“...the risk of human error or fraud or that systems will fail to adequately record, monitor, and account for transactions or positions.”

Operational risk can be caused by customer misuse, poorly designed systems or from the loss due to significant deficiencies in system reliability or integrity. Many of the specific possible symptoms of these risks apply to both electronic banking and electronic money.​[257]​ Operational Risk whether in traditional banks or in mobile banking arises in the following areas within Payment Systems, in the Processing, Authorization, and Computational.​[258]​ For example, whether a bank handles a payment transaction manually or via a computer system (or a combination of both), there is a risk that it will not reach its intended destination either within an acceptable timeframe or at all.​[259]​

Frauds are among the risks that surround mobile money and conventional banks. The money could be fraudulently stolen in the system through various illegal means.  For example, account information can be stolen and customer’s account be debited. Other fraudulent activities include phishing for a PIN code to gain access to an e-wallet or using a false identity to obtain remote access to a front end provider’s server.  Fraud may happen on a large scale because of data security breach at a payment provider or party that stores payment information anywhere along the payment chain.​[260]​

4.1.2	Credit Risks
Credit risk is the risk that counterparty will not settle an obligation for full value, neither when that obligation becomes due nor at any time thereafter. It is the risk of losing part or all of the value of a transaction in the event that the seller of a financial asset delivers but does not receive payment or the buyer pays but does not receive the asset in question.​[261]​ These kinds of risks are amplified by the growth of electronic banking and mobile banking that expand their market beyond traditional geographic boundaries. Besides, poor measures to determine the creditworthiness of borrowers applying for credit via remote banking procedures enhance credit risk. Banks that employ computer technology may face credit risk if a third party agent fails to carry out its obligations with respect to payment. Banks that purchase electronic money from an issuer in order to resell it to customers are also exposed to credit risk in the event the issuer defaults on its obligations to redeem the electronic money.​[262]​

Credit risk has a number of elements. The first one is the direct risk of losing the funds held with the intermediary. For example, in “2008, the economic turndown resulted in many retailers filing for bankruptcy. Consumers found themselves holding worthless gift cards”.​[263]​This risk may be greater (for example) with smaller phone companies compared to mainstream banking institutions. A second element is the risk of consequential non-performance resulting from the insolvency.​[264]​

4.1.3	Reputational Risk
Reputational risk is the risk of significant negative public opinion that results in a critical loss of funding or customers. Reputational risk could involve actions that create a negative public image of overall bank operations, such that the bank’s ability to establish and maintain customer relationships is significantly impaired. Reputational risk may take place if the actions taken by the bank cause a major loss of public confidence in the bank’s ability to perform functions critical to its continued operation. Reputational risk may be caused by the actions of a bank itself or in response to actions of third parties.​[265]​ Increased reputational risk can be a direct effect of heightened risk exposure, or problems, in other risk categories, particularly operational risk.​[266]​

4.1.4 	Transactional Failure
This is the risk that the service as a whole functions properly but in particular transactions the payment does not take place as intended or the unauthorised payments occur.​[267]​ In the situation that does not guarantee clear allocation of liability for unauthorised and unsuccessful payments the customer faces serious challenge. It is therefore very important for the legal system of a country to lay down the liability of either party in case of a default or transactional failure. 

4.1.5	Legal risk
Legal risk is the risk of a loss being incurred on account of the unexpected application of a law or regulation, or because a contract cannot be enforced. This often manifests itself in an unforeseen interpretation of either the system’s contractual basis or the legislation on which the contracts between the parties are based.​[268]​Given the relatively new nature of mobile money services in the country, rights and obligations of parties to such transactions are, in some cases, uncertain due to lack of clear legal frame work.​[269]​ 
A sound legal basis for payment system should either defines or provides a framework that allows relevant parties to define the rights and obligations of operators, participants and regulators. Most risk management mechanisms are based on assumptions about the rights and obligations of parties to transactions, and it is therefore essential that these rights and obligations be established with a high degree of legal certainty so that those mechanisms function predictably when called upon in times of stress.​[270]​

4.1.6	Systemic Risk
Systemic risk is the risk that occur when one participant fail to discharge its obligations in a system that causes other participants not to fulfill their obligations when they become due. This could result in significant liquidity or credit problems spilling over into other systems or markets, thereby threatening the stability of the financial system.​[271]​ According to Booz, et al​[272]​ in their paper entitled  “Mobile financial services risk matrix,”  Systemic risk is defined  as a risk that could cause collapse of, or significant damage to, the financial system or a risk which results in adverse public perception, possibly leading to lack of confidence and worst case scenario, a "run" on the system.​[273]​  

Systemic risk can also be defined as a systemic event that affects a considerable number of financial institutions or markets in a strong sense, thereby severely impairing the general well-functioning of the financial system. The well functioning of the financial system relates to the effectiveness and efficiency with which savings are channeled into the real investments promising the highest returns.​[274]​

The convergence of telecommunication services and financial services through mobile money services has invited systemic and fraud risk into a country’s financial system. In mobile money platform and especially in non bank-led model, MNOs are required to deposit customer’s funds in trust accounts in large commercial banks, leading to a concentration risk of the account. In both the case of derivatives and mobile financial services based transactions, there is a tendency to create few and large institutions by virtue of the nature of the transactions, and those undertaking the transactions, which increases the inherent risks of the transactions themselves. This can lead to systemic risk within the broader economic context in which the mobile financial services take place if the risk concentration is high.​[275]​

A possible incident that could attract systemic risks in the financial platform is provided by O’Driscoll (1988):
The mechanism for this domino effect may be either direct or indirect. It is direct if, for example, the failed bank served as a correspondent bank for other banks, and their losses lead to their insolvency. The mechanism is indirect if the first bank’s failure causes fearful depositors to withdraw their funds from other solvent but illiquid institutions. This ‘contagion’ effect involves a classic banking panic, in which widespread depositor runs on banks occur. In this case, the payments mechanism itself is threatened. If a contagion effect exists, it would be a prime example of the possible third-party effects of a bank failure.​[276]​
In the financial ecosystem, Systemic risks can be contributed by the absence of government actions necessary to create a framework for a stable payments market.  Lack of rules, regulations or standards that ensure a stable and compliant operation of payment providers expose the financial system to risks. In addition, regulatory uncertainty over the treatment of different payment methods can inhibit market entry or growth. This can undermine trust in the payment provider and the financial system and cause the system to fail.​[277]​ 

Besides, the systemic risk can persist if national regulators are unable to effectively investigate fraud or criminal activity due to lack of operational support systems and human capacity, regulations intended to protect consumers and the financial system will go unsupervised.​[278]​While most governments provide some level of insurance on bank deposits there is generally no such standard requiring insurance for deposits in mobile banking systems. If a mobile payment provider collapses, user funds may be at increased risk.​[279]​ The mitigations for systemic risk with regard to electronic and mobile payments are quite similar, and also related to regulation and payment system oversight. 
The role of government in developing mobile money ecosystems cannot be overstated. Government regulators are responsible for providing environments that enable ecosystem development to happen. Regulators can create the space for experimentation and, as experience accumulates, build the policy frameworks needed to undergird further growth. This is, of course, not an easy exercise, with disparate and sometimes competing objectives that need to be reconciled.​[280]​

Finding this balance and determining the right degree of legislative or supervisory government involvement is the major challenge in developing a viable framework for regulating electronic and mobile forms of payment. Understanding that payment systems oversight is the best mitigation of systemic risk for electronic and mobile payments, the G20 has adopted regulatory guidelines that will support the effort to increase financial inclusion through regulation. It can be summarized by the following: 




The regime of mobile money services has opened a considerable room for financial services to extend beyond the geographic reach of banks and customers. Such market expansion that extend beyond national borders, attract also certain risks. Although banks currently face similar types of risks in international banking, it is important to note that these risks are also relevant to the cross-border conduct of electronic banking and electronic money.​[282]​ Mobile money platform may face diverse legal and regulatory requirements when dealing with customers across national borders. There may be uncertainties about legal requirements in some countries and there may be jurisdictional ambiguities with respect to the responsibilities of different national authorities. Such considerations may expose the platform in to legal risk associated with non-compliance with different national laws and regulations, including consumer protection laws, record-keeping and reporting requirements, privacy rules, and money laundering laws.​[283]​

Complexity in screening service providers in another country can also jeopardize the platform. Financial institutions are facing risks as they engage in the provision of electronic banking and electronic money activities across borders. Banks dealing with foreign-based service providers, or with foreign participants in electronic banking or electronic money activities, are subject to country risk to the extent that foreign parties become unable to fulfill their obligations due to economic, social, or political factors.​[284]​ Mobile money services may also be exposed to credit risk due to challenges facing the system in evaluating the applications for credit from customers in other countries. Banks accepting foreign currencies in payment for electronic money may be subject to market risk because of movements in foreign exchange rates. ​[285]​

4.1.8	Security Risks
The development of information and communication technologies (ICTs) generally and the emergence of mobile money services in particular have gone hand in hand with the  emergence of new types of vulnerabilities  and threats. In mobile money environment, four main areas of security and possible compromise are at risk: the radio link over the mobile network; the data sent over the mobile network; access to security keys or PINs on the handset; and internal fraud.​[286]​

For the mobile money services to succeed the assurance of the platform’s security is imperative. If customers are not assured of their services, they are likely to leave the platform and risk the reputation of the industry as a whole.​[287]​ Security concerns are paramount for mobile network operators in order to ensure data integrity, connection reliability and customer privacy. However, the leading threat to mobile money services remains data theft through fraud or malware.​[288]​ As the technology expands and customers become familiar with the mobile money platform, there is a wide chance for cybercriminals to exploit the opportunity.​[289]​

 Mobile payments are used for payments of utility bills, school fees, and taxation and for online purchases. In order to ensure proper mobile money services, any customer who accesses service in mobile money account must first be authenticated. Every customer who own mobile money account must be verified to determine his/her ownership.​[290]​The FATF requirements contribute to this trend by requiring user identification and transaction recording, meaning that mobile phones become directly linked to financial accounts and rich data sets, increasing the desirability for hackers.​[291]​
In this environment, the user might lose more than just personal information, but notably money, and be susceptible to other forms of crime through exposure via his mobile device. The FATF requirements therefore are generally beneficial for security issues considering their focus on the serious threats associated with terrorism, money laundering, and weapons proliferation.​[292]​





 Malware or malicious software is among the common security threats that can hamper mobile money services. Is software that can be installed in a computer to perform unwanted task. It can harm a mobile device or cause damage to the owner without the owner’s consent. Examples of malware are viruses, worms, spyware, Trojan horses, etc.​[295]​ 

Malware can pose threats to the device and its applications by exploiting one of those interfaces via internet downloads, messaging services and Bluetooth communications. Examples of malware are intercepting SMS messages which contain TAN (Transaction Authentication Numbers) codes, which are used to authenticate internet banking transactions or hijacking the mobile device and ask payments in order to make the device work again.​[296]​

4.2.8.1.2 Eavesdropping
A mobile device communicates over a wireless network typically a Wi-Fi​[297]​ or 3G data connection. The confidentiality and integrity of the communication can be compromised by the means of eavesdropping (e.g. usernames and passwords) and man in the middle attacks since the communication goes over the air. In case of spoofing the integrity of the communication is also compromised.​[298]​ The information in the mobile money services can be stolen through the injection of malicious codes in the system. The third party application or device operated by the so called ‘man-in-the-middle’ can intercept and take control of Near Field Communication (NFC) functionality to steal user access credentials. The man in the middle can be a human who take advantages of vulnerability of information or pretending to be representatives of an MFSP.​[299]​

Perlman​[300]​ has the same observation in this aspect;
A serious and perennial challenge to any technology is its vulnerability to unlawful eavesdropping and access, also known as ‘hacking’. Entire industries have sprung up to secure financial and telecommunications technologies from being compromised. In a mobile environment, four main areas of security and possible compromise are at risk: the radio link over the mobile network; the data sent over the mobile network; access to security keys or PINs on the handset; and internal fraud.

4.2.1.3	Denial of Services
A denial of service attack is an attack that floods a device so that all the resources are consumed and normal operation is made impossible. A denial of service attack can be launched against a mobile device which can cause the battery to drain or consume its limited resources. The devices that can be affected include CPU, memory, available port numbers or bandwidth. An example of a denial of service attack is the flooding of the IP-address of the device with a large number of connection requests which the device cannot handle in a timely fashion. Denial of service attack could compromise the availability of a mobile device and affect customer’s ability of doing banking on their mobile device.​[301]​

4.2.1.4	Unauthorized Access
Unauthorized access to the mobile device or its applications can be achieved through bypassing the authentication credentials or through guessing the pass code. The modern mobile technologies have touch screens which are easily smudged. The smudges can be used to interpret passwords in order to gain access. An attacker could compromise the confidentiality of the private information and gain access to the M-Money services and perform certain transactions.​[302]​

4.2.1.5	Phishing
Phishing is the process of obtaining sensitive information such as usernames, passwords, and credit card details for malicious reasons through dishonesty tactics. A user is conned and reveals his banking account and access password details through the use of sophisticated web pages or emails that resemble financial institution website.​[303]​ An attacker can claim to be an authority or religious leader in order to earn a victim’s trust. Through such faith, a victim may give away sensitive information, pay sham invoices or do anything else that the attackers ask for. In such incidences, an attacker can claim to have a problem that need prompt attention. Common ways to perform this remote attack is to use email or SMS, but several others way, for example letters, are also possible.​[304]​

4.2.1.6	Device or Application Malfunction
There are two types of malfunction that can be experienced in ICT environment. There are malfunction caused by mistake of the user or wrong configuration and malfunction of the application due to incompatibility between the application and platform. Malfunction of the applications can be caused by several factors including flaws in the application itself, flaws in the API’s (Application Programming Interface) of the development platforms and flaws in the protocols used (e.g. weak cryptographic implementation). ​[305]​Malfunction on mobile device and application level could compromise the confidentiality and integrity of the private information.​[306]​

4.2.1.7	Loss, Theft or Improper Disposal of Devices
Loss, theft or improper disposal of devices can cause a huge amount of information to be disclosed. Information disclosure can also occur when a customer disposes of the device in a non- secure manner, for example by selling the mobile device without properly wiping its contents.​[307]​ The confidentiality of the private information on the mobile device can also be compromised when losing a mobile phone. The private information stored on the device can be easily accessed and exposed. Furthermore, since the device is no longer in possession of the user, the availability of the device and thus the application required to gain access to the private information is no longer available.​[308]​

4.2.1.8	  Platform Alteration
Users can sometimes jeopardize the security of the device through alteration of the platform by rooting or jail breaking a device. Rooting a mobile device gives the user much more possibilities than originally intended by the manufacturer or that can be offered by the applications. It removes the security precautions implemented by the manufacturer and gives greater control to the user. When security precautions are removed, malware can take advantage of the lack of controls.​[309]​ Alteration of the platform affects the confidentiality and integrity of the device and endangers the application and the private information contained on the device. A mobile device where the platform has been altered is much more susceptible to attacks by malware since a security layer has been removed.​[310]​

Telecommunications carriers and manufacturers have combined efforts to create standardized security initiatives to prevent fragmentation of protection within the transactional process. In developed markets, telecom manufacturers, including Ericsson, Motorola, and Nokia, have been part of harmonization efforts to create a common framework for industry security requirements.​[311]​ However, developing markets have struggled to create a cohesive security structure due to various new players in the mobile banking space, which have affected the security in end to end transactions.​[312]​ Standardization of security protocols are imperative for MFIs and their consumers, as the entire transactional system is reliant on the integrity of the mobile banking platform. Therefore, the security strategies should encompass a harmonized effort between all stakeholders from telecom manufacturers and carriers, financial institutions (banks and MFIs), and consumer advocates.​[313]​
 
Security of customer data and privacy are often regulated in the consumer protection context. Industry regulators act in concert and are charged with overlapping oversight with mobile banking security measures. However, in certain jurisdictions, security protocols and customer data is governed under the purview of the telecommunications regulator. In Tanzania, the Electronic and Postal Communication Act mandates equipment standardization and security protocols.​[314]​ 

These standards are administered by the Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority. Whereas in the Philippines, the financial regulator, Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), requires banks and non-banks engaged in issuing e-money to have “appropriate security policies and measures intended to safeguard the integrity, authenticity and confidentiality of data and operating processes” in place.​[315]​ Failure to comply with the minimum-security protocols permits the central bank from imposing sanctions on the offending institution. These examples serve to illustrate the methods employed to minimize systematic risk by industry regulators to combat security challenges within the mobile banking context.​[316]​

4.3  Regulatory  Issues in Mobile Money Services
Mobile money services have brought legal and regulatory challenges that could not be anticipated before. The services have converged the two independent sectors of regulation most notably, the telecommunications and financial sectors.​[317]​ As a result of their convergence, serious legal challenges have erupted that need the development of an effective legal and regulatory framework. The overlap has considerably raised the risk of coordination failure, where legislation or regulatory approaches are inconsistent or contradictory. In turn, this has created considerable uncertainty about the appropriate regulatory response that must be established and also what supervisory regime applies to the various activities involving banks and non-banks.​[318]​

The growths of the mobile money services alongside other ICT innovations have created the need for a nexus between the financial services regulator and the telecommunications regulator. This change arose from the fact that some of the services offered by Mobile Network Operators such as mobile financial services fall under the financial services sector, telecommunications and therefore the financial services regulators and policymakers have had to consider a converged approach to regulating the MNOs in their provision of these cross-sectoral services.​[319]​

4.3.2.1	  Convergence of Telecommunications and Financial Regulators
The convergence of telecommunications and financial sector has brought new challenges that need for the development of an effective and healthy legal and regulatory framework. This convergence has enabled inter-platform competition for a wide variety of services and applications that were not previously possible.​[320]​ The key roles for the telecommunications regulator in the financial system were to ensure the reliability and security of the communications infrastructure that connected financial institutions to their customers as well as to each other. Although the rise of M-Money and M-Payment services does not change this role, certain additional issues come into play with the development of M-Money services. In this regime, mobile service providers are playing integral role in the transmission and/or storage of funds and therefore distort a clear boundary between regulation of telecommunications services and regulation of financial services.​[321]​

Depending on the business model employed by the service providers, telecommunications regulators are facing questions regarding their responsibility for the supervision of these emerging services.​[322]​For example, in the case of nonbank based M-Banking or M-Payment systems, which may not fall under the regulatory purview of financial sector regulators, does the telecommunications regulator bear any responsibility for ensuring the safety and accessibility of E-Money?​[323]​ Financial regulators are also facing several questions regarding their role in the regulation and oversight of M-Money services. Financial regulators are empowered to supervise banking services carried out by a financial institution and to issue appropriate banking licenses. A key consideration is that only banks are authorized to take deposits, and thus the protection of deposits is a key component of banking regulation.​[324]​

 The question of whether M-banking services and their providers are subject to banking regulation depends upon what constitutes a banking business and the etymological definition of a bank. Thus the financial sector regulator can play a significant role in determining whether M-Banking and M-payment activities require separate licenses from a mobile operator license. If a separate license is required, what type of licenses needs to be obtained and more generally whether the M-Money service provider will be subject to the same financial regulation as traditional banks.​[325]​ 

In Tanzania for example, mobile companies are regulated by the Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority Act (TCRA Act of 2003). The Act has been established for the purpose of regulation of telecommunications, broadcasting, and postal services; to provide for allocation and management of radio spectrum, covering electronic technologies and other Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) applications and to provide for its operation in place of former authorities and for related matters. In this aspect, banking activities have not been included in the Act.

Under the Electronic and Postal Communication Act (EPOCA), 2010,​[326]​ the Act has described types of licenses that may be offered under the Act,​[327]​ nevertheless, operation of mobile money services has not been included and such activities can not be interpreted ejusdem generis with banking activities. However, under the banking and Financial Institutions Act, Cap 342 R.E.2002 in section 3(i) and (ii), the power of doing business of receiving funds from the general public or any other activities customary recognized as banking have been vested to the Bank of Tanzania (BOT). Furthermore, other financial institution will be authorized to carry on banking business upon the grant of license.
The serious question that surrounds the operation of mobile money transactions by the telephone companies is as to whether telephones companies can be regarded as banks or financial institutions under Cap. 342 or their activities are incidental or ancillary acts under companies Act Cap. 212 R.E.2002 of Tanzania? Financial regulators are the key players in anti-money laundering (AML) activities and combating the financing of terrorism (CFT) efforts. The introduction of M-Banking and M-Payment services, while having the beneficial effect of expanding banking services to the unbanked, also provide new avenues for criminal or terrorist actors to move money in service of less desirable goals.​[328]​

Financial regulators bear responsibility for implementing appropriate AML/CFT mechanisms, often through the use of Know Your Customer (KYC) requirements imposed on financial institutions. In the case of M-Money services, financial sector regulators need to determine the appropriate balance between rigid KYC requirements that may limit access to banking services and more relaxed requirements that will make it easy for more people to sign up, but that may be less effective for combating money laundering and terrorism.​[329]​

4.3.2.2   Regulatory Issues in Electronic Transactions
The quick expansion of information technology in the financial sector has brought exceptional influence on the life of millions of people around the globe and Tanzania in particular. Various activities that were previously handled manually are now electronically driven. These developments have brought the regime of mobile commerce (M-Commerce) whereby various transactions are conducted through mobile phones. These transactions involve the bill payment services, fund transfers and purchases of various items.

Like all transactions, electronic transactions involve electronic records or “data messages” and signatures that are created, communicated, and stored in electronic form. The transactions can be initiated manually via the automated processing of computers or through human interaction with a computer.​[330]​ Electronic transactions are communicated via an electronic medium, such as the internet or a private value-added network, and they are typically stored on a computer-readable medium, such as a disk, tape, CD-ROM, or DVD-ROM. In this aspect, an evidence of electronic transaction never exists on paper, unless there is a need to provide a copy or to introduce evidence to a court.​[331]​

 A contract is basically an agreement that is enforceable between parties by a court of law. An electronic contract or ‘e-contract’ can simply be described as a contract that has been formed through the use of electronic communications. Under the general law, the following basic elements must be present before a court enforces a contract.​[332]​ An offer, Acceptance of the offer, Certainty of the terms, intention to create legal relation consideration, free consent and lawful object.​[333]​ These basic principles of contract law have been developed over the years through the judicial decisions of the courts. The current judicial trends indicate that these principles apply to all contracts whether have been formed electronically, orally or through paper based communications.​[334]​

One of the awkward areas regarding electronic contract is concerning the acceptance of an offer. The main reasons why it is important to determine the precise point in time that an electronic construction contract has been formed, is that once an offer has been accepted it becomes irrevocable. Under general contractual principles, it is an established rule that the acceptance of an offer is effective at the time it is communicated to the offeror. When communication takes place, it is said that at this point in time there is a ‘meeting of the minds’ of the parties as they have reached agreement or consensus upon the terms of the contract.​[335]​ However, there is an exception to this general rule known as the ‘postal acceptance rule’.​[336]​ The postal acceptance rule generally applies where the post is used as the method of communication between the parties. If the rule applies, then the general position is changed such that the acceptance of an offer becomes effective at the time the acceptance is posted, rather than at the time the acceptance is communicated to the offeror.​[337]​

The Law governing Contract in Tanzania applies postal rule for the communication and revocation of offer and acceptance as laid down in the case of Adams v. Lindsell​[338]​ and House Fire Insurance v. Grand.​[339]​The general position of Common Law is that where the communication is made by post the contract arises on the date the letter of acceptance is posted in due course. Signer L.J argued that: 
 the acceptor in posting the letter has put it out of his control and done an extraneous act the matter and shows beyond all doubt the each side is bound.

 Section 4(2) of Tanzania Law of Contract Act provides that communication of acceptance is complete: (i) as against proposer, when it is put in the course of transmission to him as to be out of the power of the acceptor . (ii) Acceptor when it comes to the knowledge of the proposer.​[340]​ There has been varying judicial statement about whether or not the postal acceptance rule will apply to email or other recent communication technologies. In Chwee Kin Keong v Digilandmall.com Pte Ltd.​[341]​  The judge did not give any definitive views about how this important issue should be determined. However, the statements made by the judge in this case appear to suggest that in the case of emails, it may be inappropriate for the postal acceptance rule to apply. 

Legal issues regarding contract formation in an online environment are wide and so critical. For example, Consensus ad idem is an essential element in the law of contract in Tanzania, however, in an online environment, establishing the necessary consent in the form of consensus ad idem between the parties may be problematic.  There are other several issues that may invite a critical legal interpretation in order to establish the validity of a contract. Issues regarding the contractual capacity of e-agents​[342]​ and whether such agents can form the necessary intention to form an enforceable contract need to be considered. Whether marketing on a website constitutes an offer or an invitation to treat, the choice of law and the jurisdictional issues are key issues to be considered in order to establish a harmonized legal environment.​[343]​

Another contradictory issue is on the relationship between the principal and an agent in the traditional law. The question is whether an e-agent can form the necessary intent, and whether the traditional legal framework can still sufficiently establish a convincing link between them and the persons on whose behalf they are presumed to act?​[344]​The cardinal principle in the law of contract is that the parties must intend to be bound by the agreement. What is the legal position if the offeree uses an e-agent to communicate the acceptance to the offeror? Will that e-agent be regarded as a duly authorized agent for the offeree?​[345]​ 

The growth of mobile commerce and especially international remittances has opened up new legal issues concerning applicable law and jurisdiction in the event of dispute. Because the internet allows an owner of a website to conduct transactions with consumers and businesses from anywhere in the planet it is convenient for the owner to know where he can rightfully sue and be sued.​[346]​  The question over where a contract should be litigated is a question of private international law, or the conflict of laws.​[347]​ There is a clear international trend to unify these rules, in order to reach an agreement of worldwide scope regarding international jurisdiction and recognition and enforcement of judgments. 

Agreement is not yet universal, but there are significant regional instruments regarding jurisdiction in civil and commercial matters, in particular in Europe.​[348]​ The Brussels regulation on Jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in Civil and Commercial matters is the appropriate starting place for any contract formed over the internet with a European element. ​[349]​ This means that if the court is in a State that is a party to any of the conventions it will determine its jurisdiction of the case by applying these common rules. But if it is in a State that is not a party, it will determine its jurisdiction in accordance with its internal rules.​[350]​ 

4.3.2.3	  Consumer Protection in Mobile Financial Services
Consumer Protection in Tanzania is derived from the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, 1977 under article, 11, 14 and 18, all of which recognize consumer rights and seek to protect them. Other legislation that deal with consumer protection include the Fair Competition Act, 2003, The Merchandise Marks Act, 1963, The Weights and Measures Act, 1982, The Standards Act, 1975 (now the Standards Act, 2009) and The Tanzania Food, Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 2003.

Although Tanzania doesn’t have an independent consumer protection policy, it has the Fair Competition Act (No 8 of 2003) that operates as the parent consumer protection legislation in Tanzania.​[351]​ However, the available laws do not seem adequate to address unique features of e-commerce regime. The rapid development of the Internet, the growth of mobile services and other technological innovations have presented new challenges that require consumer policy makers to not only keep up with developments, but also find ways to address ongoing and emerging issues.​[352]​

 The available traditional measures are not sufficient to address these problems arising in E-Commerce and electronic transaction (e-transaction) as the online environment is a different environment from the offline one with new features and characteristics.​[353]​Consumer protection laws belong to different legislative areas such as competition, telecommunications and banking, and cover a range of specific processes like protection against fraud and the transparent flow of information.​[354]​ The principle purpose of consumer law is to prevent the abuse of superior bargaining power by the sellers and suppliers of goods and services, and to regulate the inequality of bargaining power between them and the consumers.​[355]​

Section 2 of the Fair competition Act of Tanzania​[356]​defines the term Consumer as;
“consumer” includes any person who purchases or offers to purchase goods or services otherwise than for the purpose of resale but does not include a person who purchases any goods or services for the purpose of using them in the production or manufacture of any goods or articles for sale.

While the Fair competition Act has provided a general definition on consumer, the Electronic Transaction Act, 2015 of Tanzania has tried to be very specific with digital world. The Act defines consumer as any person who enters or intends to enter into an electronic transaction with a supplier as the end user of goods or services offered by the supplier.​[357]​ In order to provide a smooth platform in the electronic transaction, customers need to be protected with varieties of malpractice behavior in the internet. Consumer protection is necessary to enhance the trust that consumers have in e-commerce. Increased trust will, in turn, lead to benefits such as increased competitiveness and an increase in the volume of electronic transactions.​[358]​

 The problems facing consumers on-line are not much different from transactions concluded off-line, but it cannot be denied that online-consumers have special needs; e.g. the issue of privacy poses a greater risk in cyberspace. Unlike the off-line environment where consumers get an opportunity to inspect potential purchases and to judge for themselves the trustworthiness of a seller, in the on-line world, consumers are forced to proceed on faith, knowing very little about the seller, to whom they are entrusting a variety of information, including credit card in-formation.​[359]​ 
Legal environment in mobile money services should clearly address risks that mobile transactions introduce to consumers, including lost payments through faulty transmissions, fraudulent transactions, identity theft, or criminal activity in the part of the mobile operator, agent, or other payment service provider. Security issues are major source of concern for everyone both inside and outside the banking industry.​[360]​

Although the Electronic Transaction Act​[361]​ of Tanzania has started its operation recently, it is not certain whether enough protection is offered in the mobile money services. For example, according to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) guidelines for consumer protection, Consumers who participate in electronic commerce should be afforded transparent and effective consumer protection that is not less than the level of protection afforded in other forms of commerce.​[362]​ In this context, Governments, businesses, consumers, and their representatives should work together to achieve such protection and determine what changes may be necessary to address the special circumstances of electronic commerce.​[363]​ However, the practice in the field does not afford such protection due to lack of clear legislative collaboration among the institutions dealing with mobile financial transactions in the country.

Privacy and data protection is another area of concern linked to consumer protection policies within E-Commerce and telecommunications, as well as certain practices in financial regulation. In the case of mobile money transfers between different parties, privacy is of great concern. For M-Money services, data may include payer and payee IDs, their geographic location, time of day, purchased items and their value and transaction value. Imagine a business that can link its back-end systems to a mobile money system to capture such transactional data.​[364]​

This could also be used to manage business inventory more efficiently, indicating when to reload stock and so on. All mobile money platforms do not currently support this kind of direct integration. In addition, transfers create a data trail that could be used for various purposes, good and bad.​[365]​In the English case of R v Brown,​[366]​ Lord Hoffman lucidly captured the thrust of the problems associated with data protection in e-commerce as follows: 
Vast amounts of information about everyone are stored on computers, capable of instant transmission anywhere in the world and accessible at the touch of a keyboard. The right to keep oneself to oneself, to tell other people that certain things are none of their business is under technological threat. 


Mobile money environment involve the transmission of electronic data from the suppliers or producers of goods and services to the buyers, and vice versa. In view of the openness and accessibility of the internet the protection of such data has been a constant source of concern for mobile money users and consequently has remained a threat to M-commerce.​[367]​ Various jurisdictions have tried to put in place protective legislation in order to rescue the situation; however, in most cases the legislations have not been comprehensive enough. In 1995, the European Union enacted the Data Protection Directive in order to harmonise member states’ laws in providing consistent levels of protection for citizens and ensuring the free flow of personal information within the European Union.​[368]​ 

The Directive arose from the sense that European citizens were losing control over their personal information and that they had a fundamental right to privacy. It furthermore imposed its own standard of protection on any country within which personal information of European citizens might be processed. Articles 25 and 26 of the Directive stipulate that personal information should only flow outside the boundaries of the Union to countries that can guarantee an “adequate level of protection” (the so-called safe-harbour principles).​[369]​ In order to ensure that the right to privacy is guaranteed and personal data are protected four models have been identified worldwide, depending on their application; these models can be complementary or contradictory. In most countries several are used simultaneously. In the countries that protect privacy most effectively, all the models are used together to ensure information protection. ​[370]​These models are as follows;

a)	Comprehensive laws 
In many countries around the world, there is a general law that governs the collection, use and dissemination of personal information by both the public and private sectors. An oversight body then ensures compliance. This is the preferred model for most countries adopting information protecting laws and was adopted by the European Union to ensure compliance with its information protection regime. A variation of these laws, which is described as a co-regulatory model, was adopted in Australia. Under this approach, industry develops rules for the protection of privacy that are enforced by the industry and overseen by the private agency.​[371]​

b)	Sectoral laws 
Some countries, such as the United States, have avoided enacting general information protection rules in favour of specific sectoral laws governing for example, video rental records and financial privacy. In such cases, enforcement is achieved through a range of mechanisms. A major drawback with this approach is that it requires that new legislation be introduced with each new technology, the situation that causes protection to lag behind.​[372]​

c)	Self regulation 
Information protection can also be achieved in theory through various forms of self-regulation, in which companies and industry bodies establish codes of practice and engage in self-policing. However, in many countries, especially the United States, these efforts have been disappointing, with little evidence that the aims of the codes are regularly fulfilled. Adequacy and enforcement are the major problem with these approaches. Industry codes in many countries have tended to provide only weak protection and lack enforcement. This is currently the policy promoted by the governments of the United States and Singapore.​[373]​
d)	Technology 
The current wave of technological development and especially the commercially available technology based systems have moved information protection into the hands of individuals. Data subjects using the Internet employ a range of programs and systems that provide varying degrees of privacy and security of communications. These include encryption, anonymous remailers, proxy servers and digital cash.​[374]​ Although the right to privacy is guaranteed by the constitution of United Republic of Tanzania, however, there is no precisely Data Protection Act. The customer protection is afforded in various legislations in some sections. For example, the EPOCA​[375]​ regulations on consumer protection provide the following information;
6.-(1) a licensee may collect and maintain information on individual consumers where it is reasonably required for its business purposes.
(2) The collection and maintenance of information on individual consumers shall be– (a) fairly and lawfully collected and processed; (b) processed for identified purposes; (c) accurate; (d) processed in accordance with the consumer’s other rights; (e) protected against improper or accidental disclosure; and (f) not transferred to any party except as permitted by any terms and conditions agreed with the consumer, as permitted by any permission or approval of the Authority, or as otherwise permitted or required by other applicable laws or Regulations.

The information that clearly defines who can get access to a mobile money trail, and how, when or under what conditions such access may be obtained are not available. Micro-Finance Institutions (MFIs), for example, could benefit from such data and ultimately put it to good use to expand the range of savings and loan offerings available to small businesses. Some of these offerings could themselves be based on systems around mobile money. In this context, simple and transparent mechanisms are needed through which users can authorize an entity to access this kind of information.​[376]​

Proper data protection laws need to integrate mobile money data or other information emanating from electronic money transfers and ensure that such data are not used for undesirable activities in the framework of general legislation on data retention and privacy. In addition, the privacy regulations that apply to banks in respect of customer financial records do not extend to MNOs. While MNOs report having instituted internal controls to minimize unauthorized access to consumer information, consumers simply have to trust the MNO to ensure that these are observed. Currently, the licensing requirements for communication services mandate MNOs to provide access to user phone records in response to a legal court order, but this does not explicitly cover mobile money records. As a result, who can access an individual’s mobile money records, when and for what purpose is not clear.​[377]​

4.3.2.4	  Cybercrimes
The developments of ICT and M-Money in particular have also not been spared with cyber related crimes. Many countries face difficulties in addressing issues arising from cyber crimes, because they lack a concrete definition of computer crimes and how such crimes differ from traditional crimes.​[378]​

Cyber Crime is the threat caused by the criminal or irresponsible actions of computer users who are taking advantage of the widespread use of computer networks. It poses serious threats to the integrity, safety and quality of most business information systems, and thus makes the development of effective security methods a top priority. In general cyber crime is the use of computer resources to engage in unauthorised or illegal acts.​[379]​

Many Computer crimes involve criminal activities that are traditional in nature, such as theft, fraud, forgery, defamation and mischief, all of which are subject to the Tanzanian Penal Code. Cyber crime may be said to be those species, of which, genus is the conventional crime, and where either the computer is an object or subject of the conduct constituting crime”. Computer crimes encompass a broad range of potentially illegal activities such as Data Alteration or Theft, Unauthorized access to computer systems or networks/ hacking, Data diddling etc.​[380]​Nevertheless, for the interest of discussion several cybercrime offences that are taking place worldwide will be discussed in order to build a comprehensive picture.

4.3.2.4.1  Unauthorized Access to Computer Systems or Networks
This kind of crime is generally referred as hacking. Hacking is a computer crime in which the criminals break into a computer system to access computing facilities for which they have not been authorised. Following the development of computer networks this crime has become a mass phenomenon. Examples of hacking offences include breaking the password of password-protected websites and circumventing password protection on a computer system.​[381]​

4.3.2.4.2  Data Interference
Computer data are very important for various uses in private dealings, businesses and administrations, all of which depend on the integrity and availability of data. Lack of access to data can result in considerable damage including financial damage. Offenders can violate the integrity of data and interfere with them by deleting, suppressing or altering computer data. One common example of the software that can be fixed in to interfere with computer data is computer virus.​[382]​ Computer data are not usually seen directly by users, malicious people can make programs serve as vehicles to access and change data and other programs.​[383]​

4.3.2.4.3  Data Alteration or Theft
The term Data Alteration or theft means making illegal changes or stealing data. There have been a growing number of cases of data alteration or theft over the past few years. Many measures are adopted in many organization with laws been set up.​[384]​

4.3.2.4.4  Fraud and Computer Related Fraud
Computer fraud is an act of using computers, the Internet, Internet devices and Internet services to defraud people, companies, or government agencies the revenues or Internet access. Activities such as Phishing (​http:​/​​/​www.computerhope.com​/​jargon​/​p​/​phishing.htm​), social engineering (​http:​/​​/​www.computerhope.com​/​jargon​/​s​/​socialen.htm​) and viruses (​http:​/​​/​www.computerhope.com​/​jargon​/​v​/​virus.htm​) are employed to disrupt service or gain access to another's funds. Computer fraud enables the offenders to use automation and software tools to mask criminals’ identities.​[385]​ Although these offences are carried out using computer technology, most criminal law systems categorize them as ordinary fraud. The main distinction between computer related and traditional fraud is the target of the fraud. If offenders try to influence a person, the offence is generally recognized as fraud. Where offenders target computer or data processing systems, offences are often categorized as computer related fraud.​[386]​

4.3.2.4.5  Data Diddling
Data diddling is the performing unauthorized modifications to data stored within the computer system. Examples include forging or counterfeiting documents used for data entry and exchanging valid disks and tapes with modified replacements.​[387]​

4.3.2.4.6  Salami Attacks
This kind of crime is commonly taking place in the financial institutions with the intention of committing financial crimes. This approach gets its name from the way odd bits of meat and fat are fused together in a sausage or salami. In the same way, a salami attack merges bits of seemingly inconsequential data to yield powerful results.​[388]​ For example, programs often disregard small amounts of money in their computations, as when there are fractional pennies as interest or tax is calculated. Such programs may be subject to a salami attack, because the small amounts are shaved from each computation and accumulated elsewhere as the programmer’s bank account. Since the shaved amount is so small the accumulation can proceed unnoticed.​[389]​
4.3.2.4.7	Identity theft

The term identity theft describes the criminal act of fraudulently obtaining and using another person’s identity. These acts can be carried out without the help of technical means as well as online by using Internet technology. The advent of electronic transactions has brought challenges for people participating in social and economic interaction due to complexity of face-to-face identification.​[390]​ The E-Commerce regime has been dominated with non face-to-face transactions, such as payments with cards or online purchasing.​[391]​ Lack of physical interaction in business dealings has motivated to a great extent the identity theft. 

4.3.2.4.8  Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Combating the Financing of Terrorism (CFT)
‘Money laundering’ refers to the methods through which illegally sourced funds are hidden and re-processed before being re-introduced into the financial system. The laundering process aims to make it difficult for authorities to trace the movement and proceeds of illegal funds and connect them to the original criminal activity. AML regulations serve to combat such conversion of illegal monies, and to play an important role in national, regional, and international security and crime prevention frameworks. There is a direct connection between AML and Counter-Financing of Terrorism (CFT), since laundered funds are often linked with terrorist organisations and activities.​[392]​

Money laundering is most commonly associated with financial and banking sector activity. Since mobile money is increasingly used as a form of money transfer and is linked to finance and banking as well as the non-financial telecommunications sector, it poses a risk that AML regulations must address. At the same time, regulators in countries where strong AML frameworks do not yet exist and where a significant percentage of the population lack access to traditional banking services should bear in mind that overregulation may inhibit the growth and associated benefits of mobile money. As mobile money ventures grow more prominent in such economies, it is important for regulatory authorities to identify a middle ground that appropriately balances risk-mitigation with industry growth.​[393]​

AML regulation has two main aims: First, to prevent money laundering activities; and secondly, to have an adequate enforcement mechanism in place should such activities be detected. Prevention is promoted through due diligence and reporting requirements on the part of industry and supervision and sanctions from regulators. Enforcement is achieved through a system that establishes the legal basis for what actions satisfy the threshold for investigation into money laundering and why this is a crime, how to investigate such actions, how to prosecute such actions, as well as how affected funds will be treated post-investigation, prosecution and conviction.​[394]​

No comprehensive AML regulatory framework exists at EAC regional level, and national regulation on monitoring the proceeds of crime and AML is at different stages of implementation.​[395]​ AML requirements often take the form of due diligence/ KYC procedures and documentation/audit trails. For an MNO to receive central bank clearance for cash-in/out transactions, it has to address AML and CFT regulations. Normally these take the form of KYC procedures performed during customer registration or during cash-in/out transactions. From a regulatory perspective, uniform and risk-commensurate KYC procedures should be mandatory for all MNO customer registration activity. Agents responsible for performing these functions therefore also need to be regulated. In Kenya, bank agents are currently regulated and plans are underway to cover mobile money agents, although the regulations are still in draft form.​[396]​

The convergence of the banking and telecommunication sector brings new challenges regarding on how to effectively cooperate to provide oversight for mobile money transfers. The amalgamation of these two previously distinct sectors requires a new cooperative regulatory environment across industries and geographical jurisdictions to employ risk-based and proportionate oversight.​[397]​ As telecom firms engage in financial services across shared networks in cross-border jurisdictions, the benefits of mobile payments, ubiquity, and rapid settlement may also increase the risk of money laundering in mobile transfer services. With potential gaps in regulatory oversight, rogue actors may find it possible to evade detection by dividing a large transfer of funds into small ones using multiple mobile phones and accounts. This new landscape may require a service-based risk analysis by regulators to determine new approaches to the oversight of money laundering risk.​[398]​

4.3.4.9	  Agency Banking
The common element across transformational branchless banking models is the use of agents to reach customers who are either unable or unwilling to take advantage of financial services delivered through traditional bank branches.​[399]​ The ‘agent’ is a central theme in mobile money services. The agent can be characterized as an intermediary or facilitator in delivering financial services to enhance financial inclusion. The agent is perfectly situated to deliver services in remote areas and to the unbanked segment of the population due to their proximity within the community, and existing relationships. The agent relationship can be manifested through various business models, such as between the MFI and the bank, or the MNO and the MFI, or the MFI on behalf of a bank. These business configurations bear a myriad of regulatory variables in regulating banking agents.​[400]​

These entities have contractual agreements with formal financial service providers and only serve as a conduit for the transactions. They do not take any risk associated with financial transaction.​[401]​ Agent-banking is an arrangement by which licensed institutions engage third parties to offer certain banking services on their behalf.​[402]​ Various Traditional banks and mobile banks across the globe are increasingly using agents​[403]​ to provide financial services to customers. In Brazil, for example, banks use approximately 160,000 agents many with multiple outlets to provide financial services to all 5,564 Brazilian municipalities.​[404]​ In the same context, the number of agents involved in the network in Kenya and Tanzania, maintained a momentum growth and reached 97,613 in 2012 in Tanzania and 76,912 in 2012 in Kenya.​[405]​

Many jurisdictions have developed legislative measures to address the eligibility and requirements of agents, however, there has not been any global guidance to supervisors that directly addresses how best to supervise such use and whether and how to supervise agents themselves. The Reserve Bank of India permits the use of two categories of agents (1) business correspondents and (2) business facilitators as ‘agents.’ Business facilitators, however, serve as administrators and cannot engage in any banking activities. These business facilitators may assist in financial literacy initiatives, collect data, and assist in collecting loan applications.​[406]​

 Financial entities are permitted to use business correspondents to ‘outsource’ certain functions to these agents. This includes allowing business correspondents to provide small value credit and remittance services, in addition to all administrative functions required to provide financial services.​[407]​ In India, post offices, MNOs, shop owners, and retired teachers are allowed to be agents. However, for-profit MFIs, which are registered as nonbank finance companies, are not permitted to be agents. Furthermore, in India, business correspondents additionally serve as microfinance recovery agents; their recovery methods have become controversial as a result of the 2010 microfinance crisis in Andhra Pradesh.​[408]​ 

This prompted the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) and the state government to issue directives in employing due diligence in selecting business correspondents. Conversely, in Kenya, only for-profit institutions are permitted to be agents. The underlying policy of disallowing non-profit entities to perform banking agent duties is based on ensuring that nonprofit institutions only engage in social operations. Therefore, these examples of agency models, suggest that an NGO-MFI in Kenya cannot be an agent of a financial institution, but may hold that role in India.​[409]​

In Tanzania, agency banking is governed by guidelines on Agent banking for banking institutions, 2013 made under Section 71 of the Banking and Financial Institutions Act, 2006. Section 2 of the guideline provides as follows;
“These guidelines shall apply to all banking institutions and their agents”

The above provision therefore includes only banking and financial institutions and excludes non-banking entities. The international best practice allowed the adoption of a light-touch approach to the regulation of agents, in exchange for placing obligations on mobile money providers (whether banks or nonbanks) to ensure the integrity of agents.​[410]​A more flexible system is a provider-oriented regulatory model, which imposes regulatory obligations on mobile money providers rather than on agents and in return allows providers to appoint and manage agents at their discretion.​[411]​ The use of retail agents has introduced new risks for policy makers and regulators. For example, agents present a variety of operational risks to the provider and, in particular, reputational risk given that the agent is the public face of the provider. Moreover, the use of agents adds a special dimension to the challenge of satisfying AML/CFT norms and to consumer protection.​[412]​

In traditional bank regulation, agency banking services are covered by banking regulation. In this relationship, principals may contract with agents to carry out functions on behalf of the principal. The regulatory treatment will be dependent on that of the principal and if the principal does not perform functions which require prudential regulation then nor do agents. By the same token, agents may need to be covered by special regulations when this is required for the function they fulfill on behalf of the principal. ​[413]​

The CGAP focus note of 2008 has revealed that, agents banking is conducted in various countries but there is great diversity as to which functions and services agents may perform, what types of entities are permitted to be used as agents, who is responsible for the actions of agents, how agents may be compensated, and more. Brazil, India, and Kenya provide illustrative examples of the range of current regulatory practice with respect to the use of agents.​[414]​ 

In Kenya, the mobile phone-based M-PESA stored value accounts are carefully structured so as not to constitute a “banking activity” under the Kenyan Banking Act. This leaves M-PESA’s provider, Safaricom (jointly owned by the Government of Kenya and Vodafone, a large international mobile telecommunications firm) free to choose its agents based on its business judgment alone.​[415]​

Both Safaricom and Vodafone have their own reasons to choose and manage agents carefully, given the potential reputational risk to their core telecommunications business. In fact, the fine print in the M-PESA account holder agreement states specifically that Safaricom bears no responsibility or liability for any default or negligence on the part of agents providing M-PESA services.​[416]​The mobile money operations in Tanzania is conducted in the same style as in Kenya and therefore issues related to agency banking have not been addressed in any document and  cannot be said that can be interpreted ejusdem generis in agency law. 

Although the general absence of regulation in the nonbank-based model of branchless leaves freedom for mobile companies to innovate in agent selection and management, it also exposes the platform in several risks such as operational, technological, legal/compliance, reputational, and other risks.​[417]​The use of agents precipitates the issue of liability between stakeholders. Agent liability is imposed by common law, contract law or statutory enactment. Brazil and India impose liability on banks for the use of agents. Liability in mobile banking can arise as a result of misdirected funds, transmission errors, forgery or fraud, and negligence. Agency theory, therefore, provides redress as a mechanism.​[418]​ 

Licensed MFIs, who are using agents in delivering mobile banking services, may be liable for the acts or omissions of their banking agents; or conversely, MFIs, acting as agents on behalf of banks, may be alleviated from any liability. The imposition of bank liability on financial institutions gives “regulators the comfort” in permitting the use of agents as it fosters prudential regulatory policy.​[419]​

 MFIs, regulated by the financial regulator, in selecting agents may then opt for less risky partnerships by considering the solvency, durability and market participation of the agents to minimize liability. Proponents for financial inclusion argue that the imposition of bank liability may in fact be an impediment to financial access, as costs associated with mitigating risks will be incurred by the service provider, which will impact the customer. Consequently, it is argued that regulators impose only limited liability on financial institutions with respect to the agents’ provision of financial services in order to reduce overall costs. Indemnification clauses in agency agreements are encouraged by stakeholders, whereby agents have a duty to indemnify financial institutions, and/or preclude agents from holding themselves out as a bank.​[420]​

Microfinance institutions can shield themselves from liability by engaging in low risk arrangements and ensuring that their partnerships facilitate secure and reliable mobile banking services. In conjunction with ensuring that providers of mobile banking services are subject to regulatory oversight, national regulators have attempted to ensure that access to payment systems are not compromised by new market entrants.​[421]​Liability allocation with respect to fraudulent use or impermissible transactions is critically important to microfinance institutions in regard to risk management.​[422]​ 

The underlying inquiry is based on whether the financial institution (MFI) or the telecommunications carrier bears the risk of loss of a failed mobile banking transaction. Unless the contractual partnership between the two entities specifies the allocation of liability, the answer is dependent on the regulatory structure of the jurisdiction. In India for example, the central bank, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), has imposed liability on banks for customer losses; now, this liability has been extended to mobile carriers.​[423]​  In Nashua Mobile (PTY) Ltd. vs. GC Pale CC t/a Invasive Plant Solution,​[424]​ the South African High Court in considering a ‘phishing’ case where the Plaintiff brought a negligence action against the mobile provider based on the mobile contractual relationship.​[425]​The Court held that the defendant is not the proximate cause for the plaintiff’s loss, as the mere duplication of a SIM card did not result in the fraudulent transfer.​[426]​ 

The plaintiff failed to establish how the perpetrator could determine the plaintiff’s PIN number and profile information as “no access can be gained to the plaintiff’s account via the internet through SIM card alone.”The Court further noted that it was unclear whether the plaintiff or her employees clicked on an e-mail link, or whether “the fraudster received a helping hand either inside the bank or inside the plaintiff from someone or people who had that information.”​[427]​ 

4.3.2.10    Legal issues in Electronic money 
Technological developments in the field of communications in modern decades have expanded the methods of contract formation as well as payment methods to include new ones such as electronic money.​[428]​ E-money can be defined as any amount of monetary value represented by a claim issued on a prepaid basis, stored in an electronic medium and accepted as a means of payment by undertakings other than the issuer, predominantly for small-value transactions. In common with banknotes and coins, e-money is ‘fiduciary money’,​[429]​ deriving its value not from its intrinsic worth but, instead, from the bearer’s expectation that it can be exchanged for its underlying value. ​[430]​However, unlike other forms of fiduciary money or existing single-purpose prepaid card schemes, e-money payment instruments are the result of an exchange of token into electronic money, intended for use as multipurpose payment instruments.​[431]​

Economists define money as anything that is widely accepted in payment for goods, used as a medium of exchange, and expressed as a standard unit in which prices and debts are measured. Such a concept was received in Moss v. Hancock,​[432]​ in which “money” was defined to mean “that which passes freely from hand to hand throughout the community in final discharge of debts … being accepted equally without reference to the character or credit of the person who offers it and without the intention of the person who receives it to consume it …”.​[433]​

According to Mann, the economic definition of money is not satisfactory to lawyers’ perspectives. The economic definition is broad enough to cover mere bank account balances, which is unacceptable to the lawyer. For Mann, “in law, the quality of money is to be attributed to all chattels which, issued by the authority of the law and denominated with reference to a unit of account, are meant to serve as universal means of exchange in the State of issue”. E-money is not a chattel, and if for this reason alone it will not fit into Mann’s definition.​[434]​ Regarding the contemplation of E-Money be considered money, several principal objections are raised. First, E-Money does not provide a distinct unit of account. Second, payment with e-money may not be anonymous since the third party obligor may keep a record of each transfer. Third, E-money may be created other than by withdrawal from a reserved deposit with a commercial bank so as to undermine the central bank’s hold on monetary policy. Fourth, E-money cannot constitute “legal tender”.​[435]​

4.3.2.11 Interoperability
Mobile Network operators are offering mobile money services as independent scheme in their own independent platform.  In this case, the services are offered under independent operating rules and independent networks of agents and customers. As each mobile money scheme is operated independently, typically, money transfers from one scheme cannot be made to another. The ability to make a money transfer transaction from one scheme to another signifies interoperability of schemes.​[436]​ 

In other way interoperability can be defined as “the possibility to transfer money between customer accounts at different mobile money schemes and between accounts at mobile money schemes and accounts at banks”.​[437]​ Interoperability should not be confused with interconnection, which is the ability to technically connect with another network. However, interoperability for mobile money can mean a number of different things; in addition to transaction interoperability, it may include agent sharing and retail point of sale compatibility.​[438]​ Section 6(2) of the National payment system Act, 2015 defines interoperability as a seamless transfer of payment instructions or funds from an account of one payment system provider or user to another payment system provider’s or user’s account of a different services provider. Interoperability therefore, refers to account-to-account (A2A) transfers between customer accounts at different mobile money schemes and between accounts at mobile money schemes and accounts at banks. Here, the expectation is that money transfers are between accounts owned mainly by individuals and small businesses.​[439]​

Interoperability offers the ability for customers to transact with users in other schemes, increasing the size of the overall payments network. This aspect is considered important because of its potential effects on consumers, businesses and the economy. In mature markets and where scale has been achieved, interoperability can help businesses to manage costs, increase efficiencies through shared infrastructure and to increase transaction volumes. Customers benefit from network effects and ideally from reduced transaction costs. Governments believe that interoperability can help advance financial inclusion due to reduced transaction costs and can also lower the cost of printing and managing cash.​[440]​

In 2014, Tanzania became the first Nation to effectively build up and put into practice standard business rules for interoperable MFS transactions. Participants in MFS platform can receive and send money directly to one another’s wallets under rules developed at the industry level. It is the first phase of a longer term vision of interoperability across the entire MFS ecosystem.​[441]​ By December 2014, bilateral pricing agreements have been signed between Tigo, Airtel and Zantel in accordance with the wallet to wallet interoperable rules. The companies have implemented and launched the services. While Tigo and Airtel launched their services in September 2014, Tigo and Zantel effected the services in December 2014. Vodacom has recently concluded its bilateral commercial negotiations with Tigo.​[442]​

The Bank of Tanzania has been a progressive institution in facilitating the achievements of mobile money services. The bank applies ‘Test and learn’ regulatory approach to allow innovation to enter the market. In the MFS interoperability process, BOT has been clear that it does not see its role as dictating how interoperability schemes should be defined or what sort of technical architecture must be in place, but rather to support the process through the setting of overarching objectives, mitigate systemic risk and champion consumer protection.​[443]​ Through frequent communication and transparency with the industry, BOT has successfully fostered a positive environment where the MFS industry is encouraged to take the lead within regulatory parameters. This approach has helped to foster the second largest mobile money market in the world.​[444]​

While the BOT has achieved positive developments for mobile money interoperability, there are also various risks that need to be managed jointly by the participants. The participants are required to adhere to the same standards to maintain the integrity of the system. Also, if imposed prematurely in the early stages of business development or channel expansion, interoperability can dampen investment. It is more suitable for a market that has already reached scale.​[445]​

Interoperability may complicate settlement of complaints and fraud issues, as it may prove difficult to identify the responsible network. Prompt settlement of complaints is important in establishing the liability and credibility of a network. In the current system, there is only one network that can be accountable in the case of a complaint, and MNOs have strong incentives to deal with these. In a system with interoperability, disputes relating to cross-network transfers may be challenging to deal with.​[446]​

4.3.2.12 Legal Implications  in Taxation
A tax is a financial charge or other levy imposed upon a taxpayer (an individual or legal entity) by a state or the functional equivalent of a state such that failure to pay, or evasion of or resistance to collection, is punishable by law. Taxes are also imposed by many administrative divisions. Taxes consist of direct or indirect taxes and may be paid in money or as its labour equivalent.​[447]​ The rapid development of mobile commerce that has been influenced in great deal with technological development of mobile phones has brought legal challenges in the area of taxation. These challenges have been actuated by the blurring distinctions between traditional commerce and commerce involving digitized products. The root of the problem is that the Internet and new communication technologies have introduced a new channel through which sales may occur. It is a matter of debate, however, as to whether these new channels create new products. Some believe that delivery through these channels alters the character of a product to such a degree that it must be considered a wholly new product, distinguishable from that delivered through traditional channels, and therefore treated as unique for tax purposes.​[448]​

Historically goods were physical, the production, distribution and consumption of these goods was easily traceable and therefore easily taxable. Physical goods were produced at a manufacturing plant, shipped off to wholesalers and boxed on to retailers the final consumer walking away with a paid for product. Tax collection was in the hands of the retailers who would charge the consumer VAT or sales tax and then remits this to the taxing authorities. However, e-commerce makes the cross-border movements in goods, capital and labour less transparent allowing companies and individuals to exploit tax differences between countries, or even to evade taxation at all.​[449]​ 

The Challenges of E-Commerce and M-Commerce particularly are diverse. Some of the legal challenges brought by mobile electronic transactions are how to characterize income and the approach towards residence-based​[450]​ and source-based taxation​[451]​ approaches. The worldwide nature of ecommerce transaction confuses the issue of ‘jurisdiction’ which is a principle tenet of taxation.​[452]​ 

E-transaction activities challenge traditional company tax rules for the reason that businesses can sometimes exist in cyberspace, with communication tools being used to carry out interactions with directors or shareholders. The challenges are so critical in determining when, where and how taxation can be applied in an era where local markets are being transformed into global markets.​[453]​

The unregulated nature of the Internet and the anonymity which it provides simplifies avoidance and evasion of income tax on profits earned on electronic transactions. The simplicity of conducting electronic commerce increases the number of simple attempts to avoid paying tax. Avoidance may also be made easier as the use of smart cards, electronic money, electronic wallets and Internet banking with foreign banks all grow and flourish.​[454]​Besides, the mysterious nature of payments made using software based systems make the task of tax collections challenging for National authorities. 

The complexity of taxation in M-Commerce services is caused by principles of taxing legislation which is concerned with the bottom line; the profits of a company or the annual income of an individual. It is not concerned with the details of individual transactions nor the form that a company’s asset may take from time to time. The precise method used to calculate profits is largely a matter of accountancy practice, given that almost all businesses are subject to tax on an accruals basis.​[455]​However, such principles cannot easily be applied in the digital age since is very challenging to identify taxpayers engaged in E-Commerce and determine their taxing jurisdiction and how to ensure that appropriate records are created for business conducted in the electronic environment.​[456]​

4.4 Conclusion 
Mobile money services present a new set of risks and regulatory challenges involving players that were not traditionally within the purview of central banks. Some of the issues that are of concern include the role of financial and telecommunication regulators in the regulation of M-Money services and how the agents should be regulated. The experience of mobile money in emerging markets provides guidance on important regulatory questions that Tanzanian regulators may face. Issues related to privacy and data protection, money laundering, interoperability, money laundering, identity theft and cybercrimes need a careful approach in order to balance mitigation strategies and innovations. In order to adjust existing banking rules in mobile money services it is important to determine how the driving forces of banking differ from mobile money environment. 

In order to preserve the integrity and safety of mobile payments within and outside the jurisdiction there is a need for stakeholders, policymakers, and regulators to cooperatively share information about service developments and consider potential gaps in regulation. Consumer protection regulation should clearly mark out which service provider is responsible and whom to contact when a transaction is improperly executed.
 
















5.0	INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS AND FOREIGN LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS ON MOBILE MONEY SERVICES
5.1	Introduction 
Financial inclusion and especially mobile money (M-Money) service is currently affecting the financial policy and regulations of several countries in the world. In order to address these challenges in developing and developed countries, the multi-year Financial Inclusion Action Plan approved by G-20 leaders at the November 2010 Seoul Summit called on “international relevant Standard Setting Bodies (SSB) to consider how they can promote financial inclusion, consistent with their mandates”.  Since then, steps have been taken to convene relevant Standard Setting Bodies (SSBs), engage developing and emerging countries in a dialogue on global standards, and raise issues specific to the mandates of each SSB.​[457]​ 

However, one of the obstacles to more effective and widespread mobile money services is that the international standards that guide the delivery of financial services were originally conceived for financially advanced developing countries. Yet the practical realities in developing countries, which are home to more than 90 percent of the word’s unbanked or financially excluded, are often quite different than those of their more financially sophisticated peers.​[458]​ Moreover, many developing countries are pioneering innovations in the field of financial inclusion such as mobile money that are not always clearly addressed by the international standard setting bodies.​[459]​ 

In spite of that weakness, the recommendations provided by international standard setting bodies are very useful for the development of comprehensive legal framework in the area of mobile money. For example, The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) has created a framework for regulatory principles that, although designed for international remittances, provides useful and relevant guidance for mobile money as well.​[460]​ In order to address clearly the legal gaps in mobile money services in the country, the research surveyed legislative developments of other jurisdictions in order to gain insights and lessons that could be considered in addressing the challenges of mobile money services and the way such challenges can be mitigated.  

Countries, such as Kenya, South Africa, Philippines and Nigeria have been surveyed in order to critically examine their legislative path. It is the interest of this chapter therefore to start by conducting a survey on the Standard Setting Bodies (SSBs) notably the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS), the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision (BCBS), Alliance for Financial Inclusion (AFI), and Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), in order to find out their contribution in the legal and regulation of mobile money services.

5.2	 International Standard Setting Bodies
5.2.1	Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS)​[461]​
A payment system is an arrangement which facilitates the transfer of funds between participants in the system and includes a set of payment instruments, regulations, rules, standards, procedures, infrastructure and institutions related to clearing and settlement of funds. It therefore incorporates the methods for transmitting payment messages between members, the means to settle claims among members and agreed rules and procedures.​[462]​ 

Section 3 of the National payment systems Act, 2015​[463]​ of Tanzania, defines Payment system as a facility consisting of payment instruments, banking and transfer of money procedures, interbank funds transfer systems or payment system provider’s systems that ensure the circulation of money. The Act has vested much power to the central bank regarding payment system. Section 5 of the Act​[464]​ provides this regarding payment system;
A person shall not operate a payment system without a payment system licence issued by the bank in accordance with this Act

In this view, Central Bank’s oversight of payment and settlement systems is consequently one aspect of its broad responsibility for monetary and financial stability. According to the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) Core principles for Systemically Important Payment Systems (SIPS), “payment system oversight is a public policy activity principally intended to promote the safety and efficiency of payment systems and in particular to reduce systemic risk’’.​[465]​ Since 1996, the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS) has actively monitored developments in innovative retail payments, in particular electronic money products. Its main focus has been on providing central banks with information that might assist them in monitoring the growth of electronic money and in assessing its possible consequences.​[466]​

Tanzania is not a CPSS member country, however, the Bank is a member of various regional corporation bodies such as Southern Africa Development Corporation (SADC) and East Africa Community (EAC). In these bodies a number of harmonised payment systems that have originated in CPSS have been agreed upon. The Bank has been keen in implementing such harmonization initiatives.​[467]​ In 1999, the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems published the "Green Book", which covers the countries of the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC). The Green Book was produced by the SADC Payment System Project Team under the auspices of the SADC Committee of Central Bank Governors (​http:​/​​/​www.sadcbankers.org​/​​).​[468]​

The SADC Green Book is based on the Red Books published by the Bank for International Settlements. Minor changes to the usual Red Book format have been made to reflect issues that are unique to the SADC situation, the main addition being section seven of each country chapter which reflects the important influence of the infrastructural environment on the development of payment services in the SADC region.​[469]​

In the process of creating a robust regulatory framework for the National payment system which is capable of supporting and creating conducive environment for the operations and regulations of payment systems, the Bank of Tanzania Act, 1995 was amended in April 2003 by the Financial Laws (Miscellaneous Amendment) Act, 2003, for the purposes of empowering the Bank with explicit powers on the national payment system.  These powers include inter alia, powers to oversee, supervise, establish and regulate the payment, clearing and settlement systems.​[470]​ The efforts of these international instruments have put in place the National payment systems Act, 2015. 

5.2.2	International Association of Deposit Insurers (IADI) 
IADI provides a forum for international cooperation among deposit insurers, central banks, and international organizations on issues related to financial stability, deposit insurance, and resolution activities. IADI’s Core Principles were developed and approved jointly with Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) in June 2009, reflecting the fact that deposit insurance is part of an effective financial “safety net” that also includes robust prudential regulation and oversight.​[471]​

 Public awareness in countries that have explicit deposit insurance systems can play a significant role in ensuring that low-income depositors are informed about safe methods of storing their money. Effective systems of deposit insurance can also potentially increase public trust in institutions holding insured deposits, encouraging greater participation by financially excluded poor households in the mainstream banking system.​[472]​  

In 2010, IADI formed the Financial Inclusion and Innovation Subcommittee (FIIS) to study issues related to financial inclusion and deposit insurance. FIIS is currently conducting a survey of IADI members to identify the range of practices among its members on issues related to financial inclusion and deposit insurance. While it is premature to anticipate the future work streams that FIIS may pursue, some countries may be giving thought to the challenges of extending deposit insurance coverage to nonbank deposit-taking institutions and “deposit-like” products, such as e-money, that have demonstrated potential to reach financially excluded customers.​[473]​ However, the first challenge for emerging market and developing economy countries interested in expanding deposit insurance to nonbank deposit-taking institutions has been the establishment of strong and independent supervision of those institutions, a precondition for inclusion in effective deposit insurance systems.​[474]​

Tanzania is among 80 member countries that have a deposit insurance system and have been approved for membership in the Association.​[475]​ The Deposit Insurance Board of Tanzania (DIB) was established in 1991 under the Banking and Financial Institutions Act (BFIA) as part of the First Generation Financial Sector Reform. The Act was revised in 2006 (BFIA 06) and its sections from 36 to 42 deal with the DIB. At the moment, there is no separate law on deposit insurance in Tanzania.​[476]​

The BFIA governs not only the regulation and supervision of the Savings and Credit Cooperative Societies, but more broad regulation of banks and financial institutions. The law is aimed at enhancing the stability of the financial system by minimizing the risk of loss for depositors. The main objective of the deposit insurance system is to protect depositors against the risk of losing all or part of their deposits in the event of a bank or financial institution failure, and thus, maintain public confidence in the financial system. However, given the current deposit insurance system, it is hard to say that this objective is being achieved effectively in the spirit of the law.​[477]​

Regarding the development of mobile money services in the country, there are several legal issues that need a critical intervention on deposit insurance scheme. The BFIA covers all banks and financial institutions licensed by the BOT to carry out banking business and therefore mobile companies conducting mobile money services have been excluded by the Act. Section 2(2) of the Act​[478]​ provides this;
The provisions of this Act shall apply to all banks and financial institutions, and where there is a conflict between this Act and any provision of any law establishing a bank or financial institution, the provisions of this Act shall prevail.


In most countries where M-Money is growing, policy makers are facing challenges to regulate funds protection for M-Money solutions in the non-bank led model. Under this pattern, taking money from the public, even for the purpose of making payments rather than for saving, is close to accepting public deposits, something that has almost been always reserved for prudentially regulated finance institutions.​[479]​

Unlike banks and other financial entities, mobile network operators are neither prudentially regulated nor supervised by financial oversight bodies and as such not subject to strict liquidity and capital requirements. Therefore, concerns have been expressed about the safety of customer’s funds and the protection mechanisms that can be put in place in case M-Money service provider goes bankrupt.​[480]​ There is also a contradictory situation in bank-led model when a bank goes bankrupt and the customer funds kept in bank account exposed to risks. The 2008 crisis has precisely shown that funds held in prudentially regulated institutions are not risk-free. In this context, can e-float funds be covered by a deposit insurance scheme? There is indeed diverging views as to whether electronic money is a deposit. In many countries, e-money is not a deposit and thus not eligible to a safety net mechanism.​[481]​

The issue of deposit is complex because deposits insurance is funded by premiums paid by participating financial institutions, which typically pass these cost along their customers. Thus, putting e-money under a deposit insurance umbrella may make it more expensive, especially in developing countries where, affordability has been a determining factor for success. This could, in turn, negatively affect financial inclusion.​[482]​

5.2.3	The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) recommendations
The FATF is an intergovernmental body that lay down global Anti-Money Laundering (AML), counter-terrorist financing (CTF) and Proliferation Financing (PF) standards. The FATF includes 36 members​[483]​, representing most major financial centers in all parts of the sphere. Apart from setting AML/CFT standards, the FATF promotes and evaluate compliance and, when necessary, coordinates diplomatic pressure and countermeasures through its member governments. Through a combination of technical expertise and political and economic vigor, the FATF has been unique among international bodies in its ability to take strong, effective multilateral action to prompt positive change in strengthening jurisdictional AML/CFT regimes worldwide.​[484]​

The FATF 40+9 Recommendations, together with their interpretive notes, present the international standards for combating ML and TF globally. The standards outline acts that every country should criminalize to meet the FATF objectives, and the client due diligence (CDD) measures that financial institutions should adopt to mitigate and counter to risks of money laundering (ML) and terror financing (TF) abuse.​[485]​These CDD measures include identifying and verifying the identity of every client, monitoring the client’s transactions for extraordinary or suspicious activities, and reporting this information to a national financial intelligence unit.​[486]​ However, there has been some information that FATF- based rules and the conservative mindset of regulators were hampering innovative financial services models and channels. Transformational mobile money models, for instance, require a regulatory framework that allows accounts to be opened via mobile phones without contact with the service provider’s employees. Non-face-to-face engagement gives rise to identity fraud risks. These risks are higher in developing countries that lack national identification frameworks or other means to verify the identity of customers easily and securely.​[487]​ 

Furthermore, mobile money channels rely on large networks of agents, third-party service deliverers, and ATMs to provide cash-in and cash-out points. This introduces ML/FT risks and complicates the reporting of unusual and suspicious transactions. Regulators in many countries reacted with unease to proposed business models, concerned that the FATF may glare on the level of risk that such a model introduced. These concerns slowed down the design of appropriate regulatory frameworks for mobile money.​[488]​

The FATF’s 2003 Recommendations allowed countries and financial institutions to implement Risk Based Approach (RBA) in relation to certain aspects of the AML/CTF framework. ​[489]​ In 2012, FATF Recommendations were revised in order to effect radical changes and clarifying the existing Recommendations, strengthening their consistency and address issues that lowered compliance levels of countries. The RBA is now mandatory feature of the 2012 Recommendations and is a key aspect to mobile money and other financial inclusion initiatives.​[490]​ 

While various issues covered in the FATF Recommendations and new guidance have a bearing on financial inclusion, four key areas are most relevant—particularly to the types of innovation with the greatest potential to be used by massive numbers of households that are currently financially excluded or underserved. These are CDD practices, record-keeping and monitoring, remittances and other money transfer services, and issues relating to agents playing roles in AML/CFT compliance.​[491]​

Tanzania is not FATF member and no longer subject to FATF’s monitoring process under its on-going global AML/CFT compliance process. However, it has established the legal and regulatory framework to meet its commitments in its action plan regarding the strategic deficiencies that the FATF had identified in October 2010.​[492]​Besides, Tanzania is a member of Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG) that has adopted 40+9 FATF Recommendations and Methodology.​[493]​

5.2.4	The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems of the Bank for International Settlements
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) is a committee of banking supervisory authorities that was established by the central bank (​https:​/​​/​en.wikipedia.org​/​wiki​/​Central_bank" \o "Central bank​) governors of the Group of Ten (​https:​/​​/​en.wikipedia.org​/​wiki​/​Group_of_Ten_(economic)" \o "Group of Ten (economic)​) countries in 1974 and now comprises of 25 members.​[494]​ It offers a forum for regular cooperation on banking supervisory matters. Its objective is to enhance understanding of key supervisory issues and improve the quality of banking supervision worldwide. The Committee frames guidelines and standards in different areas. Some of the better known among them are the international standards on capital adequacy, the Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision and the Concordat on cross-border banking supervision.​[495]​

It lays down standards and offers guidance to be applied by many countries in the regulation and supervision of both banks and other deposit-taking institutions. The 2010 BCBS report “Microfinance activities and the Core Principles on Effective Banking Supervision” offers a useful starting point for considering proportionate application of the Basel Core Principles (BCPs) to enable a broader financial inclusion agenda.​[496]​m Although Basel standards and guidance were originally developed with a focus on internationally active banks in developed countries and their existing customers, they are now widely applied in BCBS member countries and nonmember countries alike, to banks large and small, as well as nonbank deposit-taking institutions.​[497]​

Tanzania is not a member of Basel committee; however the Bank of Tanzania has endeavored to keep itself at international standards in regulating and supervising banks and financial institutions. Most of these standards are those issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. In 1988, this Committee issued capital adequacy standards, which are now commonly known as Basel I. The Committee came up with a framework establishing minimum levels of capital for internationally active banks, which also incorporated off balance sheet exposures in the risk weighted system.​[498]​ In 2004, the Committee issued similar standards known as Basel II but which are more comprehensive than those of Basel I. The Bank of Tanzania has embarked on working on the prerequisites for the full implementation of Basel II.​[499]​

5.2.5 	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
The OECD is a Paris-based international organization that serves as an outlet for reform efforts in a number of policy areas, including international taxation, for its thirty member countries.​[500]​ The organization is one of the world's largest and most reliable sources of comparable statistical, economic and social data. In recent years the OECD has moved beyond a focus on its member countries to offer its analytical expertise and accumulated experience to developing and emerging market economies.​[501]​ The OECD has been on the forefront of addressing the challenges of E-Commerce for the tax systems.​[502]​

In 1997, the OECD members conducted a discussion on cross-border E-Commerce tax challenges at a meeting held in Turku, Finland and issued a brief report setting out an agenda to confront these challenges. In October 1998, an OECD ministerial meeting on global E-Commerce was held in Ottawa, Canada, where the Ottawa Taxation Framework was designed and approved. The leading principle of this framework is as follows:
The taxation principles that guide governments in relation to conventional commerce should also guide them in relation to e-commerce.… Existing taxation rules can implement these principles. The application of these principles to e-commerce should be structured to maintain the fiscal sovereignty of countries, to achieve fair sharing of the tax base from ecommerce between countries and to avoid double and unintentional non-taxation.​[503]​

In the meeting the members reached agreement on two important documents relating to the taxation of international E-Commerce. First, the Committee on Fiscal Affairs endorsed a set of principles that would guide the OECD in its reform efforts with respect to the taxation of international E-Commerce.​[504]​ The Ottawa Taxation Framework noted that traditional international tax principles should be applied to the new commercial environment promoted by the Internet and the increased sale of digital goods and services.​[505]​The OECD members and industry representatives signed a document that advocated the use of traditional international tax principles in the formulation of any new rules for the taxation of E-Commerce. These two documents were an important step toward developing consensus on international tax principles.​[506]​ Although, developing countries are not part of OECD agreement on internet taxation, they can use the principles and rules agreed upon as a basis for adjusting their own legislation. In addition, developing countries will attempt to use tax legislation, as they have in the past to attract Private Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).​[507]​

5.2.6	Alliance for Financial Inclusion (AFI) guideline notes
Mobile financial services policy and regulatory issues have been given priorities for policy work within the AFI network. AFI was established as a peer learning platform, and its members believe that knowledge sharing and peer learning can significantly contribute to creating effective policy and regulatory frameworks for mobile financial services.​[508]​ The Bank of Tanzania joined the Alliance for Financial Inclusion in 2009, where the regulators are provided with a platform to share experiences and knowledge relating to financial inclusion initiatives.​[509]​

Malawi has issued mobile payment guidelines and drafted regulations on agent banking after a series of AFI knowledge exchange visits to Kenya, Tanzania, Colombia, and Mexico. The mobile payment guidelines allow MNOs to provide services and address consumer protection, awareness and redress mechanisms. They also provide a reduced, risk-based KYC process for MFS that makes use of transaction limits to mitigate risks. MNOs customers are allowed to use voting cards or a letter from a local government administrator to access MFS.​[510]​

The AFI experience has helped Tanzania to gain capacity and share its experiences with other AFI members and take several steps to promote mobile financial services (MFS) as one of the potential technological innovations for financial inclusion. Tanzania has hosted two AFI events in Zanzibar, in 2011 and 2012 that led to the creation of the African Mobile Phone Financial Services Policy Initiative (AMPI).​[511]​
The Maya Declaration​[512]​ has also boosted efforts toward implementing interoperability solutions for enhancing efficiency and affordability and already a market-based interoperability project is experiencing good progress. The country continues with its efforts on consumer protection and financial literacy initiatives. The Maya Declaration led to the bank’s implementation of agent banking in the first quarter of 2013. Already commercial banks have taken up agency banking in the country and National financial inclusion framework has been developed.​[513]​

5.3 	Model laws
5.3.1 	UNCITRAL Model Law
The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) was established in 1966 by the United Nations General Assembly to further the progressive harmonization and unification of international trade law. The Commission has prepared texts that have been enacted to regulate not only international but also domestic trade. The work of UNCITRAL is particularly interesting for mobile payments because the Commission has prepared texts both in the field of electronic communications (of which mobile communications are a subset) and in the field of (international) payments.​[514]​

The UNCITRAL has dealt with the law of “electronic commerce” since the 1980s and has prepared uniform legislative texts that have been adopted in numerous jurisdictions. The UNCITRAL texts are widely considered as global standards and the essential principles underpinning them are universally accepted as the core elements of modern electronic commerce law.​[515]​ UNCITRAL has prepared three legislative texts applicable to both domestic and cross-border electronic transactions, the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce, the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signatures, and the United Nations Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in International Contracts.​[516]​The UNCITRAL texts on electronic communications provide a comprehensive set of rules. The definitions of “data message” and “electronic communication” contained therein including communications exchanged via mobile devices.​[517]​

While the model laws aimed at facilitating the electronic compliance of national commercial transactions, the Convention aimed in achieving across the board harmony of ecommerce rules. The model laws that have been developed by UNICITRAL have been adopted and implemented with several countries around the world.​[518]​ The model laws provide extensive jurisprudential base for the interpretation of provisions, based on judicial and arbitral decisions from various jurisdictions where they are being utilised. The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea 2008 provides for the use of electronic transport records as alternative to paper documents if the carrier and the shipper agree on this.​[519]​

Although the UNCITRAL Model Law on E-Commerce and the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signatures are not legally binding in South Africa, they were influential in the drafting and formed the basis for the Electronic Transactions and Communications Act of 2002 ( ECTA).​[520]​ Kenya Information & Communications Act is the substantive law governing electronic transactions (borrowing from the 2001 UNCITRAL model law on electronic commerce).​[521]​Tanzania ratified the UNICTRAL Model law on 13th October, 1964 and the law entered in to force on 11th January, 1965. The state applies the convention only to recognize and enforce awards made in the territory of another contracting state. Tanzania is also a party to the New York convention, 1958.​[522]​ In adherence to that, the Electronic transaction Act, 2015 has adopted UNCITRAL model laws.
5.3.2 	EU E-Money Directive (2009)

The deliberations on the regulation of electronic money by EU countries started in 1994. The discussion aimed in addressing two problems, namely the soundness of the issuers of E-Money products and the soundness of E-Money as a method of payment. The EU insisted on proper approach and procedure to regulate the issuing of E-money products.​[523]​ In 1994 the European Monetary Institute proposed a regime based on the bank-issuer model for the issuing of E-Money with regard to prepaid stored-value smart cards. Its suggestion for this "bank only approach" was to reserve the issuing of E-Money for banks.​[524]​

The debate gave birth to the regulation and harmonisation of the law regulating E-money institutions in Europe. The EU Commission’s efforts to regulate the issuing of electronic money brought about a "three-track regulatory" regime consisting of banks, the introduction of payment institutions, and the launching of a new E-money institution. ​[525]​ It resulted in the regulation of these institutions under the Banking Directive 2000/12/EC, the Payment Services Directive 2007/64/EC86 and the E-money Directive 2000/46/EC.

The EU enacted the Directive 2009/110/EC in order to encourage the growth of the electronic money market.​[526]​ The Directive brought new definitions and softened requirements for e-money institutions. The new Directive was implemented in the UK on 1 May 2011 through the Electronic Money Regulations 2011.​[527]​ The Directive brought developments with regard to the position of credit institutions as issuers of E-money.​[528]​The E-money Directive 2009/110/EC provides that the issuance of E-money does not constitute a deposit-taking function provided by credit institutions in terms of the repealed Banking Directive 2006/48/EC.​[529]​ 

The EU’s legal framework has offered a technology-neutral approach that serves to achieve one of its objectives without hampering technological innovations.​[530]​ A wait-and-see approach has been adopted to avoid stiff regulation which could hamper development and the introduction of new technologies. The basis of this approach is to sustain innovations in the products and their development.​[531]​ This approach has also been incorporated in mobile money services in Tanzania in the name of test and learns approach in order to encourage financial inclusion for the people at the bottom of the pyramid.

5.3.3	SADC Model Law on Electronic Transactions
The SADC Model Law on Electronic Transactions and E-Commerce offers a comprehensive tool to be used by member States in creating a more secure legal environment for electronic transactions and E-Commerce. The model has adopted the best practices and collective efforts of Member States to address the legal aspects of E-transactions and E-Commerce. It is expressed in a technologically neutral style so that it can be functional to the current technologies and in future ones to be developed.​[532]​The SADC Model Law addresses two key issues, electronic commerce and data protection. It is derived on existing legislation in the region and the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce. The Model Law has been adopted by SADC and is in the process of being updated for implementation in the SADC region.​[533]​ The SADC Model Law follows the UNCITRAL approach and thus endorse the principle of non-discrimination between media (or media neutrality), and functional equivalence as between paper documents and electronic messages.​[534]​ Tanzania is a SADC member country and has adopted the SADC model laws on data protection, cyber crime and electronic transactions in the enactment of Electronic transaction Act, 2015. ​[535]​

5.4	A survey of Legal and regulatory development in other Jurisdictions
5.4.1	Introduction 
The evolution of mobile money services in both high and low-income countries has revolutionised traditional notions of ‘banking’.  In low-income countries in particular, M-Money services is regarded as prospect to bring financial services to the unbanked poor who have been excluded from formal financial services for a long time.​[536]​ The hope and assurance of this platform is facilitated by the availability of simple and inexpensive technology such as mobile phone that can be applied by poor uneducated individuals dwelling at the bottom of pyramid. However, the development of this platform in most countries around the world has not been accompanied by legal and regulatory framework that could provide a smooth and conducive environment for its operation.

The success of Kenya’s M-PESA raised different questions on how best to effectively regulate mobile money services. As it has been pointed by Tarazi and Breloff​[537]​ in their paper Nonbank E-Money Issuers: Regulatory Approaches to Protecting Customer Funds that,
Taking redeemable money from the public is very close to accepting public deposits - an activity almost always reserved for prudentially regulated financial institutions, such as commercial banks. Funds kept with such banks are protected by strict prudential requirements (and related supervision) to ensure systemic stability and deposit security, and these same requirements would typically apply to electronic value issued by banks in exchange for deposited funds. In contrast, nonbanks are rarely subject to the kind of prudential regulation that applies to banks, so when nonbanks issue e-money, regulators are understandably concerned about ensuring adequate protection for customer funds.

As policy makers around the world recognize the potential for nonbank E-money issuers to significantly promote financial services among low-income populations, a number of regulations have been approved, permitting nonbanks to contract directly with customers for the issuance of E-money. For instance, in Cambodia and Kenya the approach has been to act on an ad hoc basis through “no objection” letters and conditional approvals of M-banking services. From Afghanistan to the Philippines, West Africa to the European Union, jurisdictions around the world have adopted regulation that enables a leading role for nonbanks - while mitigating the risks presented by the involvement of a service provider that is not subject to full prudential regulation.​[538]​

It is therefore the interest of this work to present the international experiences of M-Money regulation in the leading countries such as Kenya, India, Philippines, Singapore, Brazil and Nigeria,​[539]​ in order to draw a wealth experience that will assist the development of comprehensive legal framework in the country.

5.4.2	Legal and Regulatory Development in Kenya
The history of M-Money services in Kenya can be traced back in 2007 when the Mobile Network Operators (MNOs) partnered with banks to deliver mobile financial services to unbanked and underserved segments of the population. The Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) adopted a progressive ‘test and learn’ approach to enhance innovations.​[540]​ However, there was a concern from the Kenyan banking community that M-Pesa could not meet the risk management requirements associated with a large payment system network and that it was dangerous for any institution to operate on that scale outside of regulation.​[541]​

Non-banks were allowed by CBK to conduct mobile money services without regulatory burden that is imposed on the banking industry. While banks were prohibited from using agents, the M-Pesa services relied on using agents for deposit and withdraw of cash.​[542]​ In order to strengthen the services, the Central Bank issued guidelines in 2010 to enable banks to offer a broad range of banking services through agents. This framework differs from that for payment agents, which is currently guided by requirements set by telecommunication companies.​[543]​As Kenya’s mobile money market evolves, the CBK continues to anticipate and address challenges as they arise, and has recently formulated a regulatory framework to guide market conduct and consumer protection. 

5.4.2.1	  The Current Kenya’s Mobile Money Regulatory Framework
Kenya had no National Payment System Act until 2010 when the CBK proposed a draft regulation for electronic retail payments. In 2011, Kenya’s Parliament passed the National Payment System (NPS) Act, but the notice of commencement was not officially announced until March 2014.The CBK has adopted a functional rather than institutional approach to regulation, which permits both banks and non-banks, including mobile operators, to provide mobile money services. Under the NPS Regulations, mobile money providers may be designated as either payment service providers or E-Money issuers.​[544]​ 

In offering the services, customer funds must be held in trust with a ‘strong’ rated prudentially regulated bank, and lending or investment of these funds is not permitted. The funds are isolated from the service provider’s funds and protected from the claims of its creditors. Service providers can appoint agents and are responsible for the actions of agents. The CBK’s oversight, inspection, and enforcement duties are formally recognised. The Regulations validate existing mobile money business models and reinforce the AML/CFT compliance regimes practiced by mobile money providers .​[545]​ Interoperability has not been mandated under the NPS Regulations. Rather, payment service providers are permitted “to enter into interoperable arrangements”. The NPS Regulations define interoperability as;
 “Commercial interconnectivity between providers of different payment systems or payment instruments including the capability of electronic systems to exchange messages and ‘interoperable’ shall be construed accordingly”.​[546]​

Apart from the NPS Regulations, the Parliament passed in December 2012, the Consumer Protection Act 2012 (the “Act”) into law. Prior to the enactment of the Act, Kenya did not have a specific law that governs consumer protection.​[547]​In 2010, the Communication Commission of Kenya (CCK) issued the Kenya Information and Communications Consumer Protection Regulations. The regulations outline the rights and responsibilities of consumers and contain specific provisions that define the obligations of service providers related to complaint handling, information disclosure, billing practices, data privacy, and other issues.​[548]​

5.4.3	 Regulation of M-Money in South Africa
5.4.3.1	  Introduction
South Africa has a vibrant and sophisticated financial sector, the strength and stability of which have provided the foundation for over 10 years of uninterrupted economic expansion. During apartheid regime, a good number of people were excluded from banking services. Following the post-apartheid transition, the new government placed increasing emphasis on financial inclusion and consumer protection, while maintaining strong financial sector stability. The government committed itself through amendment of regulations that hindered the extension of financial access by private financial institutions.​[549]​ 

In November 2009, the National Payment System Department of South African Reserve Bank (SARB) issued a Position Paper on Electronic Money that restated its position that only South African banks are permitted to issue electronic money. The paper defines E-Money as;
“monetary value represented by a claim on the issuer” that “is stored electronically and issued on receipt of funds, is generally accepted as a means of payment by persons other than the issuer and is redeemable for physical cash or a deposit into a bank account on demand.” 

The paper indicated that to facilitate the development of E-money products, SARB will “participate in initiatives aimed at providing secure payment instruments for the general public, including the unbanked and rural communities of South Africa and the South African region.”

5.4.3.2	  Mobile Money in South Africa
South Africa is one of the developing countries with the largest percentage of banked customers accessing banking services through their mobile phones.​[550]​Mobile money services are offered by large retail banks as an additional access channel for existing bank accounts managed on traditional bank systems. The emergence of WIZZIT in the platform is considered as the basis for the development of mobile money services in South Africa.​[551]​   The services are offered through partnership between biggest commercial banks​[552]​ with mobile technology companies and retailers. For example, Ned bank and mobile operator Vodacom teamed up to launch M-PESA, a solution that enables person-to-person money transfers via mobile phone, even between persons without bank accounts. This followed the Standard Bank’s launch of a similar product, called “Instant Money,” a joint venture between the bank and local retailer Spar.​[553]​ 

Standard Bank also has a joint venture company called “Oltio” between itself and pan-African mobile network operator MTN, which, through its “payD” platform enables customers to purchase products and services online and use their debit cards to pay for the purchase while making use of their mobile phones to enter their personal identification numbers (PINs). First National Bank also entered the fray, launching its “e-Wallet” mobile money transfer solution, which allows customers to send money to anyone in South Africa with a valid mobile phone number.​[554]​

With the increasing usage of mobile money and in particular, payments by means of mobile phones, there have been subsequent impacts from a legal and regulatory point of view. While the penetration level of South Africans with mobile phones is increasing, yet the regulatory framework is not entirely conducive to greater financial inclusion.​[555]​

5.4.3.3	  South African Legal and Regulatory Framework
The legal and regulatory framework regarding mobile money services in South Africa comprised of the following, South African Reserve Bank Act (Act 89 of 1990), National Payment System Act (Act 78 of 1998), Banks Act (Act 90 of 1994), Exchange Control regulations (if cross-border), Financial Intelligence Centre Act (Act 38 of 2001) and South African Reserve Bank Position Paper on Electronic Money.​[556]​

The South African Reserve Bank, oversee and supervise the National Payment System. Section 10(1)(c) of the South African Reserve Bank Act enables the Reserve Bank to establish, operate, oversee, and regulate payment, clearing, and settlement systems. This power is reaffirmed in Section 2 of the National Payment System Act.​[557]​Besides, the general powers of oversight in terms of Section 10(1) (c) of the Reserve Bank Act as mentioned above, the Reserve Bank has the power to issue directives, in consultation with the payment system management body and other stakeholders.​[558]​

5.4.4	Regulation of M-Money in Philippines
5.4.4.1   Introduction
The Philippines is widely considered to be a leading jurisdiction for mobile money globally. In 2014, the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) named the Philippines as the top country in East and South Asia and the third in the world, with the most conducive environment for financial inclusion.​[559]​ The country is home to two of the world’s best known and earliest mobile financial services, Smart Money and G-Cash. By 2008, these two services together reported almost eight million registered users, or well above one in ten of the adult population. In addition to these two transformational models, a number of Filipino banks offered additive mobile banking as a supplement to their existing electronic channels.​[560]​
 
Several factors have been suggested to account for the pioneering nature of the mobile money market in Philippines. The high coverage and penetration of mobile telephony, and in particular, the widespread usage of SMS from an early stage stimulated easy adoption of mobile money platform. In addition, Filipino subscribers were sending hundreds of millions of SMS or text messages per day and seemed entirely comfortable with this low cost approach to communicating, earning the Philippines the title of ‘text message capital’ of the world.​[561]​ Being a nation that comprised of hundreds of islands, the Philippines faced significant challenges in extending the reach of its banking system away from urban centers to more remote rural regions.​[562]​

5.4.4.2	  Regulation of Mobile Money Services 
The Philippines was an early adopter of E-Commerce legislation, having passed the Electronic Commerce Act in 2000. The law has been complemented by administrative orders in areas such as electronic evidence, E-Consumer protection, digital signatures, E-banking and E-payment in government.​[563]​ However, the launching of mobile money services in Philippines took place before the development of a formal legislative licensing and regulatory framework for mobile money. In this case, ‘letters of no objection’ were issued by central banks as an interim means of permitting mobile money services to operate. The Central Bank (BSP) allowed non-bank companies to provide M-banking services. However, companies were compelled to obtain prior approval from the BSP before offering such services.​[564]​

In 2009 the government issued E-Money regulatory framework that recognizes that E-Money is neither a deposit nor booked as a liability, and does not earn interest and not covered by deposit insurance. This approach enabled the country to exercise a lighter supervisory and regulatory touch to E-Money issuers (EMIs) and retain prudential regulation for entities that are deposit-taking.​[565]​The Philippines protected customer funds through prohibiting nonbank issuers from engaging in the extension of credit and ensured that customer funds are not endangered through intermediation by an entity that is not fully prudentially regulated.​[566]​

In ensuring that the government adheres strictly to FATF recommendations, the policy makers managed to tighten AML/CFT regulation and enforcement sufficiently to get the country removed from FATF’s blacklist of noncompliant countries and regions. At the same time, they arrived at regulatory accommodations that permitted the launch of both the bank-based (Smart) and nonbank-based (Globe) models of branchless banking. This included mechanisms that enabled CDD/KYC to be conducted by agents, a key characteristic of both Smart’s and Globe’s mobile banking models. They also allowed a multiplicity of formal identity documents to be presented for verification purposes.​[567]​

The Philippines does not have dedicated consumer protection legislation for E-Commerce. However, a section in the Electronic Commerce Act 2000 provides some recognition of the need for consumer protection in the electronic environment.​[568]​It has a comprehensive privacy law in place and data protection. This is one of the most modern privacy laws in the region, incorporating a mix of guidance from the European Union, APEC and OECD.​[569]​ The Electronic Commerce Act, 2000 has some provisions that punish cyber crime offenses such as hacking, cracking, or unauthorized access using a computer in order to corrupt, alter, steal or destroy electronic data.​[570]​ An institutionalized system for alternative dispute resolution has been created in the Philippines by the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act 2004. The Act also creates an Office of Alternative Dispute Resolution whose objective is to promote and expand the use of this method of settling disputes among the public and private sectors.​[571]​
5.4.5 	The regulation of mobile money in BRAZIL
5.4.5.1	  Introduction
The Brazilian banking industry is generally regarded as one of the most technologically advanced in the world. Brazil is a bank-centric economy, with most of financing and payments streaming from the 156 banks operating in the country. However, only approximately 30 percent of the adult population has bank accounts. Over 90 percent of the total noncash bank retail payment transactions in 2008 were processed via electronic channels, with increased use of the card as a payment instrument.​[572]​ 

On the telecommunications side, the number of active mobile accounts reached 245 million in January 2012. Out of the total number of accesses via mobile phones, 81.62 percent were pre-paid.​[573]​In April 2012 the Central Bank and the Ministry of Communications jointly created a working group aimed at proposing guidelines for mobile payment regulation in the country.​[574]​

5.4.5.2	 Enabling regulations
Brazil is known for having a banking industry which accounts for an advanced technological platform, and has, for more than a decade, provided overnight clearing of checks, real-time electronic transfer of funds, and other state-of-the-art facilities.​[575]​
Brazil has no specific M-Money regulation, and there is uncertainty within the Central Bank over whether it has the power to regulate M-Money. The business of collecting, intermediating, or investing funds from third parties is reserved for Banco Central do Brasil (BCB), licensed, regulated, and supervised entities .Thus, nonbanks are prohibited from issuing E-Money or other stored-value instruments, such as electronic accounts stored in mobile phones.​[576]​

Several laws govern AML/CFT (Law 9.613 criminalizes money laundering, Law 10.701 of 2003 amends Law 9.613 of 1998 to include the financing of terrorism).The Financial Intelligence Unit (Conselho de Controle de Atividades Financeiras), centralizes and analyzes reported transactions and suspicious transaction reports related to all sectors covered by the AML/CFT Law. MNOs are currently not covered by the AML/CFT Law.​[577]​

The AML/CFT Law establishes the legal framework governing money laundering by defining relevant offenses, setting forth preventive measures, outlining a reporting system, and contemplating procedures for international cooperation. It also includes a non-exhaustive list of predicate offenses, such as terrorism and its financing. The contents of such legislation is consistent with a number of international initiatives, such as the Vienna Convention, Palermo Convention, U.N. Convention against the Financing of Terrorism, U.N. Convention Against Corruption, the FATF 40+9 Recommendations, and others.​[578]​

In the Brazilian Public Administration, anti-money laundering relies on the Council for Control of Financial Activities (Conselho de Controle de Atividades Financeiras, “COAF”), which is a central authority in charge of providing financial intelligence for the system, and on sector-specific authorities and is responsible for supervising all entities in the banking and financial sectors.​[579]​Supplementary Law No. 105 of January 20, 2001, authorized COAF’s access to data protected by banking secrecy, and Federal Law 10.701 of 2003 has established a national registry of bank accounts.​[580]​

The applicability of Consumer protection laws and regulations do not distinguish between branchless banking clients and branch clients. The requirements and principles apply in the same way to branchless banking as they do to traditional channels. However, given the singularity of the agency business, which involves third parties and their staff, CBB has issued specific regulations to deal with and clarify some consumer-focused issues.​[581]​Regarding banking agents, the Brazilian regulation, holds financial firms “fully responsible for services provided by agents.​[582]​”

The country has neither specific statutory regulation governing data transfers nor specific data protection authority but the Brazilian Constitution provides Brazilians with some rights with regard to data collection. There are also laws governing protection in specific areas (e.g., bank secrecy, medical ethics, consumer protection, credit, and telecommunications).​[583]​

Article 5 of the Brazilian Constitution provides that the 
“Privacy, private life, honor and image of persons are inviolable, and the right to compensation for property or moral damages is ensured.” 

The country has no regulation addressing the provision of money transfer services Pursuant to the Banking law, international and domestic transfers require the involvement of a CBB and licensed institutions. The postal service has a special dispensation to operate in foreign exchange without a license.​[584]​ The Civil Code of Brazil provides for recognition of electronic signatures while digital certificates are issued by certifying authorities licensed by a Root Certification Authority. However, the E-signature Law does not expressly establish criteria for validation of authenticity and integrity of electronic documents. Instead, each certifying authority sets its own standards.​[585]​

5.4.6 	Regulation of mobile money in India
5.4.6.1   Introduction
The Indian telecommunications industry has shown high growth in the mobile business, not just in urban areas, but also in rural India where mobile penetration rate is at 40%. The Indian financial services sector has accepted this opportunity to achieve higher financial inclusion and provide services without the need of in-person service delivery. India has a population of 1.2 billion, of which 52% of them are unbanked. This corresponds to a huge untapped market of 620 million people without access to formal financial services. According to a World Bank study, it is anticipated that a 20% increase in financial inclusion could lead to employment growth of 1.4%.​[586]​

5.4.6.2	Enabling Regulations
The Information Technology (IT) Act was enacted in June 2000 to integrate the technological development that was taking place globally. The enactment amended the Indian Penal Code, the Indian Evidence Act, the Bankers’ Books Evidence Act, and the Reserve Bank of India Act. The enactment of the IT Act, gave legal recognition the electronic information, digital signatures and electronic contract became legally binding.​[587]​ The importance of the IT Act lies in the point that two distinct set of rules were provided by the Central Government. In addition, the Central Government notified two distinct kinds of Rules. These rules are The Information Technology (Certifying Authorities) Rules, 2000 and the Cyber Regulations Appellate Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 2000. The Information Technology (Certifying Authorities) Rules, 2000 detail various aspects and issues concerning to Certification Authorities for digital signatures. 

The rules specified the manner in which information has to be authenticated by means of digital signatures, the creation and verification of digital signatures, licensing of certification authorities and the terms of the proposed licenses to issue digital signatures. The rules stipulated security guidelines for certification authorities and maintenance of mandatory databases by the said certification authorities and the generation, issue, term and revocation of digital signature certificates. The said rules further mandate the audit of the operations of the Certification Authority and classify various kinds of information.​[588]​ 

In 2011, India reported rules under Section 43A of the IT Act titled “Reasonable practices and procedures and sensitive personal data or information Rules, 2011” which provided a framework for the protection of data in India (“Data Protection Rules”).​[589]​ Payment systems, both traditional and electronic in India are regulated by the Payment and Settlement Systems Act, 2007 (“PSS Act”). The PSS Act empowers the Reserve Bank of India (“RBI”) to govern payment systems operational in the country.​[590]​ 

The Consumer Protection Act 1986 (“CPA”) governs the relationship between consumers and service/goods providers. There is no separate consumer protection law that is specific to and regulates online transactions. Liability under the CPA arises when there is “deficiency in service” or “defect in goods” or occurrence of “unfair trade practice”. The CPA specifically excludes from its ambit the rendering of any service that is free of charge.​[591]​

All customer complaints regarding mobile money services are covered under the Banking Ombudsman scheme 2006 (as amended up to May 2007). The customer protection Act, 1986 defines the rights of consumers in India and is also applicable to banking services.​[592]​ Banks are therefore responsible for their customers on account of unauthorized transfer through hacking, denial of service n account of technological failure.​[593]​

Mobile money services security issues have also been addressed in the Information Technology Act, 2000 in section 3(2). The section provides for a particular technology as a means of authenticating electronic record. In this context, a bank faces several business and legal issues when they fail to establish the identity and make enquiries about the integrity and reputation of the prospective customer.​[594]​Jurisprudence in India with respect to issues relating to jurisdiction and enforcement issues in E-commerce is at embryonic stage. Local statutes provide for a ‘long arm jurisdiction’ whereby the operation of such local laws have extra-territorial application if an act or omission has resulted in some illegal or prejudicial effect within the territory of the country.​[595]​

Section 3 of the Indian Penal Code of 1869 (IPC), provides that; 
“Any person who is liable, by any Indian law, to be tried for an offence committed beyond India shall be dealt with according to the provisions of the IPC for any act committed beyond India in the same manner as if such act had been committed within India.”

Jurisdictional issues in cases of E-commerce have not been extensively addressed. However, there are some instances the courts had in the preliminary stages assumed jurisdiction over a matter. In the case of SMC Pneumatics (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Jogesh Kwatra,​[596]​ the Delhi High Court assumed jurisdiction where a corporate’s reputation was being defamed through e-mails.

Taxation of E-commerce activities has been a controversial issue in several jurisdictions due to absence of national boundaries and physical nature of goods/ services. The policies framed by the Committee on Fiscal Affairs of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”), highlighted neutrality; efficiency; certainty and simplicity; effectiveness and fairness; and flexibility as guiding principles for the taxation of E-commerce transactions.​[597]​ The High Powered Committee (“HPC”) constituted by the Central Board of Direct Taxes, submitted its report in September 2001 and contemplated the need for introducing a separate tax regime for E-commerce transactions. 

The report took into account the principles laid down by the OECD albeit with some exemptions. However, based on the principle of ‘neutrality’, the HPC maintained that the existing laws are sufficient to tax E-commerce transactions and no separate regime for the taxation of E-commerce transactions is required.​[598]​ The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) guidelines provides directives on the conduct of mobile money services. And therefore, only such banks which are licensed and supervised in India and have a physical presence in India have been permitted to offer mobile payment services to residents of India.​[599]​ The services are restricted only to bank accounts/ credit card accounts in India which are KYC/AML compliant. AML/CFT issues are regulated under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act 2002. The law applies to banks and financial institutions. For banks, RBI has issued KYC guidelines and AML standards. The guidelines advise banks to categorize customers into low, medium, and high risk and to adjust identification requirements according to such risk category.​[600]​

5.5 Conclusion 
The chapter has revealed that the regime of M-Money services worldwide and Tanzania in particular has introduced various legal and regulatory challenges that need to be resolved. In order to harmonise the situation in the country, the guidelines provided by the international standard setting bodies and model laws have proved to be very useful in the making of legal framework for M-Money services. For example, the Basel committee on banking supervision guidelines assisted the creation of healthy regulatory framework for the National payment system of Tanzania. The recommendation paved the way for the amendment of BOT Act of 1995 in 2003. Tanzania adopted the UNICITRAL model law and SADC model law in the construction of the Electronic transaction Act of 2015.

Although, Tanzania is not a FATF member, its recommendations has assisted the establishment of a comprehensive National AML/CFT Strategy and client due diligence in accordance to the FATF 40 + 9 Recommendations and UN Conventions. These recommendations have been incorporated in to M-Money services, for both bank-led model and non-bank led model. It has also been revealed that countries such as South Africa, Brazil, Kenya and India have also adhered to International standard setting bodies and Model laws in the regulation of M-Money services. 

However, the serious challenge in all these countries has been the power of Central bank to regulate M-Money services and lack of specific M-Money regulations. For example, in India regardless of the enactment of Information Technology Act, 2000, the country has no separate consumer protection law that address online transactions. The advantage of regulatory mechanism regarding M-Money services in India is that Mobile payments in India adhere to bank-led system and therefore the central bank has exclusive jurisdiction in the supervision and oversight issues.

Tanzania can learn the experience of Kenya, South Africa, Brazil and Philippines regarding the regulation of both Bank- led model and Non-bank led model.​[601]​All these countries started to offer M-Money services before the development of formal legislative licensing and regulatory framework for M-Money. However, Tanzania should treat the challenges experienced in all these countries as a ladder of formulating a comprehensive legal and regulatory framework that stimulate risk mitigation strategies and innovations in the financial sector. 
For example, Safaricom has advanced in its operation without formal regulatory approval and the enactment of formal legislation, however, the information revealed from Safaricom indicates that they very much desire formal regulatory approval and a clear legal and regulatory framework to provide greater clarity and enhance consumer confidence in the operation.​[602]​





6.0 REGULATORY RESPONSE TO MOBILE MONEY IN TANZANIA 
6.1  Introduction
Innovation in payments that is taking place all over the world and Tanzania in particular has transformed the way financial services have been delivered in Tanzania through bringing a large number of marginalized groups in to the financial sphere. The innovation has caused the convergence of telecommunication sector and financial sector through mobile money services. The rapid uptake of mobile money services in the country has transformed the financial industry and created a favourable platform for both under banked and unbanked persons.

The infrastructure, in which mobile money services is positioned, the ubiquity and convenience coupled with the growing willingness of consumers to use it, made its implementation a tangible reality in Tanzania. Mobile money services have penetrated both in rural and urban areas and succeeded to serve a great number of people at the bottom of pyramid who were excluded with traditional banking services.​[603]​ The growth of this platform in the country has been utilized by various companies for bulk distribution of payments, such as dividends and disbursing of salaries. Utility companies, such as electricity and water companies, use the same platform to collect payments through its ‘bill pay’ function. This has shown a drastic shift in the heavy dependence on currency and paper cheques as mobile payments are slowly replacing more traditional payment methods.​[604]​ 
While this platform has created a favorable financial platform to people of all walks of life, it has not been supported with appropriate legal framework that provides sufficient protection to customers. As a result, consumer protection remains one of the primary concerns that mobile payments has brought.​[605]​

6.2 Tanzanian Legal and Regulatory Framework in Mobile Money
Since the introduction of the mobile banking services in 2008 in the country, there have not been in place proper law to guide and regulate the M-Money services despite its tremendous growth and dynamism.​[606]​ This lacuna in the legal system provides loopholes for illicit activities such as money laundering and terrorism financing that might engulf the rapidly increasing of mobile phone transactions. There has been little effort in transforming the legal system to accommodate the rapid development of ICT regime. The old Commercial laws in Tanzania that were designed to facilitate paper based transactions are still in force and therefore inefficient to address sufficiently new innovations brought by mobile commerce and particularly M- Money services.​[607]​

Although it can easily be argued that the government decided to use soft approach in the adoption of M- Money in order to attract a large fraction of the population who had no access to customary retail banking services due to their geographical setting. However, the government did not consider that an enabling policy and regulatory framework creates an open and level playing field that fosters competition and innovation, leverages the value proposition of both banks and nonbank providers, attracts investments, and allows providers to focus on refining operations and promoting customer adoption.​[608]​ 

Lack of comprehensive legal framework on mobile money services platform has been both a blessing and disguise. The setting up and implementation of M-Money services needs several legal and regulatory aspects that govern legality of M-Money services and the legal relationship between the banks, merchants and consumers. Along with such legal aspects are laws pertaining to banking activities, payment system and instruments, electronic money, data protection, banking secrecy, cybercrimes, and online contract. As such it is important to know what laws regulate M-Money services in Tanzania generally.​[609]​ 

Besides, the rapid growth interests from financial institutions and mobile companies in establishing payment solutions that replace the traditional payment solution need a critical analysis. The alternative solutions, although very attractive for consumers, require very complex legal structures that involve different areas of law, such as banking, telecommunications, electronic money, and data protection law.  It is therefore the interest of this thesis to assess the regulatory response taken by Tanzania to address sufficiently legal issues raised by mobile money services in order to synchronize and create conducive environment for mobile money platform. In this case therefore, it is the interest of this research to discuss the development of financial and telecommunication sectors and critically analyses relevant issues regarding privacy, consumer protection, money laundering, tax evasion, legal recognition of e-transactions, cybercrime, and several others in order to disclose legal gaps and thereafter to provide possible solutions.

6.2.1 	Legal and Regulatory development on telecommunication sector
 In an attempt to cope with convergence of information and communication technologies, on March 2003 the Government launched the National Information and Communications Technologies (ICT) Policy. The National ICT Policy vision aimed at making Tanzania the hub of ICT Infrastructure and ICT solutions that enhance sustainable socio-economic development and accelerated poverty reduction both nationally and globally’. The National ICT Policy objectives aimed at providing a National framework that enables ICT to contribute towards achieving national development goals and Transforming Tanzania into knowledge-based society through the application of ICT.​[610]​ 

The National ICT Policy further establishes an enabling environment for merging the affected sectors namely, telecommunications, information and broadcasting to work together. In November 2003, TCC merged with the Tanzania Broadcasting Commission (TBC) to form the Tanzania Communication Regulatory Authority (TCRA), which regulates telecommunications, broadcasting, postal services and electronic technologies and other ICT applications.​[611]​ In 2007, the Evidence Act 1967 was amended through the written laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act No 15 of 2007. The Written laws, 2007​[612]​ adjusted existing Evidence Act to incorporate electronic revolution and its impact on the laws and prevailing procedures. 

Amendment of the Evidence Act by Act 15 of 2007 made evidence obtained from undercover​[613]​ operations relevant and hence admissible.​[614]​ In 2010, the Government passed the Electronic and Postal Communications Act (EPOCA) 2010 that Amended the Tanzania communications regulatory authority Act, Cap.172 and the Fair Competition Act, Cap. 285. The Act confined its duties in establishing the Central Equipment Identification Register for registration of detachable S1M card and built-in S1M card mobile phones; to provide for duties of electronic communications and postal licensees, agents and customers, content regulation, issuance of postal communication licenses and to regulate competitions and practices; to provide for offences relating to electronic communications and postal communications and to provide for transitional provisions, consequential amendments and other related matters.

The TCRA Act and later on EPOCA failed to address serious problems posed by mobile financial services in the country. The two Acts did not address the converged issues between financial services and telecommunication services. The focus was placed on telecommunication sector and the financial sector was excluded. The Acts failed to consider that the introduction of mobile money services brought regulatory challenges due to an overlap between multiple sector regulators and competition regulator thus adding to the complexity of oversight needed. 

In 2015, the Government released the electronic transactions Act, 2015​[615]​ and the Cybercrimes Act, 2015.​[616]​ While the first addresses the e-services including electronic transactions, electronic contracts, and electronic certification. The Cybercrime law criminalises offences related to ICT and provides for investigation and use of electronic evidence. The Act, address among others, Illegal access to a computer system, illegal interception in a computer system, illegal remaining in a computer system, illegal data interference in computer system, data espionage, illegal system interference, forgery related to computer, fraud related to Computer,etc. The two Acts are considered to improve confidence among financial institutions on the use of ICT in carrying out their day to day activities.​[617]​However, a critical analysis of the two Acts is imperative in order to assess their potential in the harmonisation of mobile money services in the country.

6.2.2 	Legal and Regulatory Developments in Financial Sector
The Government incorporated the technological developments that were taking place worldwide through the amendment of the BOT Act in 2006 to bestow powers to Bank of Tanzania to administer and regulate non-bank entities in offering payment services. Section 6 of the Act empowered BOT to regulate, monitor, and supervise the payment, clearing and settlement system together with all products and services thereof as well as conduct oversight functions on the payment, clearing and settlement systems in any bank, financial institution or infrastructure service provider or company within Tanzania.​[618]​ 

In 2007 the BOT issued the Electronic Payment Schemes Guidelines (EPSG) 2007   which allowed Mobile Network Operators (MNOs) to offer payment services through mobile transfer. However, the guidelines covered only risk management for banks and other financial institutions, largely ignoring the role of MNOs. MNOs were required to partner with banks to receive “letters of no objection” (LNOs), which enabled the BOT to guarantee that consumer funds are protected in the banking system, backed with a 100% liquidity prerequisite.​[619]​ In March of 2012, the BOT published the first draft Mobile Payment Regulations (MPR) that allowed MNOs to continue receiving LNOs to perform as mobile payment service providers. This early draft was critically reviewed and discussed by industry players within the country as well as abroad, which sought to improve the draft for its next alteration. In May 2012, the BOT released a new version of the draft MPR.​[620]​

The updated draft established licensing regime for non-banks, such as MNOs, to offer mobile payments services. Non-bank mobile payments providers were required to obtain a license as wholly owned subsidiary companies and to hold trust accounts with commercial banks at 100% cover. Mobile money service providers were allowed to provide account to account funds transfers, person to person funds transfer, person to business funds transfer, business to person funds transfer, business to business funds transfer, cash in and cash out services.​[621]​ 
The draft regulation is broadly worded and does not specify a particular mechanism for implementation but is based on market demands. This is in line with the new interoperability agreement that has been signed in Tanzania by three leading MNOs on the 4th of June 2014. This agreement is considered as one of the steps towards greater financial inclusion for the population of Tanzania. It precedes the publication of the final MPR but it demonstrates the direction that the mobile industry is headed.​[622]​ The second draft of the MPR has already been reviewed and commented on and the final draft has been submitted to the Ministry of Finance. The MPR is expected to start its operations in line with the National Payment Systems Act.​[623]​

The government effort to improve financial inclusion in the country was given a handsome speed in 2013 when the National Financial Inclusion Framework was launched in the country. The National Financial Inclusion Framework sets the stage for the Financial Inclusion vision based on the concrete improvements that the country would like to see in the lives of all Tanzanians through the use of financial services. The Framework is a rolling plan with an initial implementation period of three years from 2014 to 2016.​[624]​ The framework covers the landscape of existing financial services in the country barriers to access financial services vision and definition of Financial Inclusion core enablers and priority areas guiding principles roles and responsibilities measurement framework coordination structure and monitoring and evaluation.​[625]​ The framework therefore acknowledges the financial revolution brought by mobile phone technology. In 2015, the Government enacted the National payment system Act, 2015,​[626]​ an Act to make provisions for the regulation and supervision of payment systems, regulation of electronic payment instruments, electronic money, payment system service providers, validity and enforceability of netting arrangements, finality and settlement of payment instructions and to make provisions for related matters. The Act has vested much power to the Central bank of Tanzania in the administration of payment system. 

Although, the financial sector has been abreast in addressing regulatory issues in mobile money services, the dynamism of the sector has not been comprehensive enough to answer various questions regarding the convergence of financial sector and telecommunication sector. For example, the BOT face many questions and concerns regarding their role in the regulation and oversight of mobile money services in non-bank led model. The BOT lacks the authority to oversee the retail agent’s activities because the use of agents falls under the jurisdiction of the Tanzania Communication Regulatory Authority (TCRA).​[627]​The BOT is also facing serious challenges regarding AML/CFT standards in mobile money services.​[628]​

6.3	 Regulatory Challenges in Specific Legal Aspects
6.3.1	Electronic Evidence 
The Electronic Evidence provides for admissibility of electronic evidence in criminal proceedings. This has implications for dispute resolution processes arising from fraud or money laundering in mobile money platform in that electronic receipt may be used as evidence. In 2007, the Evidence Act 1967 was amended through the written laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act No 15 of 2007. The Written laws, 2007​[629]​ adjusted existing Evidence Act to incorporate electronic revolution and its impact on the laws and prevailing procedures. Amendment of the Evidence Act by Act 15 of 2007 made evidence obtained from undercover​[630]​ operations relevant and hence admissible.​[631]​

Amendment of Tanzanian Evidence Act was amended through the written laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act, 2007. The principal Act was amended by adding immediately after section 40 the following new section
40A. in any criminal proceedings
a)	An information retrieved from computer systems, networks or servers; or
b)	The records obtained through surveillance of means of preservation of information including facsimile machines, electronic transmission and communication facilities;
c)	The audio or video recording of facts or behaviors or conversation of persons charged shall be admissible in evidence.

In addition, the principal Act was amended by adding immediately after the definition of the word “bank”, appearing in section 76, the following new definition-
“Banker’s book” include ledgers, cash books, account books and any other records used in the ordinary business of the bank or financial institution, whether the records are in written form or a data message or kept on an information system including, but not limited to computers and storage devices, magnetic tape, micro-film, video or computer display screen or any other form of mechanical or electronic data retrieval mechanism.’

The Evidence Act​[632]​ was amended by adding immediately after section 78 the following new section-
78A.-(1) A print out of  any entry in the books of a bank on micro-film, computer, information system, magnetic tape or any other form of mechanical or electronic data retrieval mechanism obtained by a mechanical or other process which in itself ensures the accuracy of such printout, and when such printout is supported by a proof stipulated under subsection (2) of section 78 that it was made in the usual and ordinary course of business, and that the book is in the custody of the bank it shall be received in evidence under this Act.
(2) Any entry in any banker’s book shall be deemed primary evidence of such entry and any such banker’s book shall be deemed to be a “document” for the purposes of subsection (1) of section 64.

The cited provisions have not provided detailed explanations regarding the admissibility of digital evidence. Moreover, the amendments have not answered comprehensively issues regarding validation of digital information under the current judicial rules and procedures. Although the basis for admissibility of evidence in courts are well-established, their applicability to digital data and devices from which electronic evidence is generated raises many questions. As a result, courts have applied different standards for similar types of evidence when computer-generated information and digital images are presented in court.​[633]​ This is because the main concern in the admissibility of digital evidence centres on the question of their security, reliability and credibility. 
The amendment of the Law of Evidence has not been able to eliminate issues of authenticity and integrity of new sources of evidence.​[634]​ Court rules require that for evidence to be admissible, it must be authenticated. In the simplest terms, this means that data and information must be shown to be what the proponent claims that it is. The foundations for digital evidence are based on established principles of authentication and admissibility that originated with the use of “paper” evidence.​[635]​

While the facts are very clear concerning admissibility of digital evidence, section 18(1) of the Electronic Transaction Act, 2015 has tried to confront the principles of admissibility of evidence as follows;
In any legal proceedings, nothing in the rules of evidence shall apply so as to deny the admissibility of data message on ground that it is a data message. 

The provision has provided protective mechanism without cementing legal features that will allow the admissibility of such electronic evidence before the court. In order to admit such weakness, section 18(4) of the same Act has provided a general statement to accommodate legal dilemma. The section provides;
For purposes of determining whether an electronic record is admissible under this section, an evidence may be presented in respect of any set standard, procedure, usage or practice on how electronic records are to be recorded or stored, with regard to the type of business or endeavours that used, recorded or stored the electronic record and the nature and purpose of the electronic record. 

In this circumstance, the Electronic Transaction Act, 2015 and the written laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act, 2007 have provided for the admissibility of electronic evidence, without amending the Criminal Procedure Act, 1985 to guide how, for instance, information retrieved from the computer systems, network or servers should be gathered and collected as evidence in a way that assures their authenticity, integrity and confidentiality. 

To ensure that the data collected are admitted in the court, prosecutors should adhere to the rules governing computer forensic.​[636]​Evidence from electronic sources must be properly collected; processed and preserved otherwise its weight, veracity and integrity will be questioned and impeached. Amendment to the law of Evidence Act, 1967, by written laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act No.15 0f 2007, did not lend any assistance on how to ensure the accuracy of electronic Evidence.​[637]​The emergence of M-Commerce and especially mobile money services have invited critical discussion in the field of evidence and especially on the proof of transactions conducted through the internet. The peculiarity of these issues and the confusion that has also greeted their interpretation by the courts has exposed the area in to critical analysis.​[638]​

For example issues regarding authentication of electronic evidence has invited serious discussion in the legal arena. In Lorraine v. Markel American Insurance Co.,​[639]​ the court denied a motion for summary judgment due to the failure to provide admissible evidence and properly authenticate computer-generated evidence. In Vinhnee v. American Express Travel Related Services Company, Inc.,​[640]​, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision not to admit computerized records because of the lack of foundation for business records and an authentication foundation to assure the accuracy of the records.​[641]​There are also lessons from India, from whose Indian Evidence Act, 1872 Tanzania based her law of Evidence Act, 1967.​[642]​ India gave legal recognition of transaction carried out by means of electronic data interchange by enacting Information Technology Act, 2000.​[643]​This law made extensive amendment of not only the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 to give legal recognition to the transactions carried out electronically, but went ahead to amend the Indian Penal Code of 1860, bankers’ Books of Evidence of 1891 and the Reserve Bank of India Bank of 1934.​[644]​

Computers can introduce errors and uncertainty in various ways, making it difficult to assess the trustworthiness of digital evidence meaningfully. Although, courts are warned to consider the computer systems involved carefully, yet several issues need a critical debate.​[645]​ M-Commerce transactions are paperless transactions made through magnetic materials such as tapes or disks. These are in contradistinction to paper-based transactions that are embodied in a permanent form and typically expressed in words and figures usually authenticated by signatures. Such transactions can therefore not be altered without an alteration on the face of the document.​[646]​
The serious challenges facing the courts regarding the admissibility of computer-generated evidence rest in the rule that a party must give the best evidence of facts that are in issue before the courts.​[647]​ In the context of M-Money services, information fed into the mobile phones and posted on the websites of sellers and suppliers of goods and services, when retrieved, would only be copies of such information and at best would be hearsay evidence. The communication between the parties would also be copies as against originals when downloaded from the internet, and for it to be admitted it would have to be put in under the Exceptional to the hearsay rule enshrined in section 34 of the Evidence Act, 1967.

The Canadian case against Pecciarich​[648]​ provides an interesting example of what may be considered hearsay in the context of online activities.​[649]​  Pecciarich was initially charged with one count of distributing obscene pictures and one count of distributing child pornography by using his personal computer to upload files to computer bulletin boards where others could download the files. The bulletin board was examined remotely, only allowing investigators to testify that they had seen many files on the bulletin board that contained the suspect's code name "Recent Zephyr" and had downloaded a few of them.​[650]​On appeal the judge overturned the distribution charges stating that, "the statements from the bulletin 'uploaded by Recent Zephyr' accompanied by a date in August or September 1993, are pure hearsay and, therefore, not evidence of uploading or of the date specified."​[651]​
Apart from the issue of hearsay there are several challenges that need to be digested in order to authenticate digital records. In order to demonstrate that the digital evidence is what the proponent claims it to be, the foundation must take into account not only the legal requirements of procedure and evidence, but must also include an evaluation of each components of the information system from which the evidence was generated. The rigor with which an evidentiary foundation must be established depends on the purpose for which the electronic information is being offered into evidence, whether there is any reason to believe the evidence is not authentic, and the extent to which the data and information can be corroborated.​[652]​

6.3.2	Cybercrimes
The development of digital technology has simplified money transfer and transaction through the use of mobile phone. As the technology grows in recognition and continues to offer more transactional services such as complex funds transfers, payment of bills and VAT, the possibility of these services being exploited for criminal gains rises exponentially. Though few incidences have been reported, the culprits have gained momentum of stealing money using mobile phones. For example, according to Mwananchi newspaper, ​[653]​15million Tanzanian shillings were stolen from a certain customer’s account using mobile phone. 

Although the culprits were apprehended and taken to the Court, the legal framework at that time in Tanzania was inadequate to address cyber related issues. This was intensified by the principle of “nullum crimes sine lege” that provides that no action shall be punishable as a crime unless it constitutes an offence in terms of existing laws and crimes. 

The recently introduced Cyber crime Act of 2015​[654]​ by the parliament of Tanzania guarantee security to all citizens from any sort of cyber related matters. The Act has been provided with provisions for criminalizing offences related to computer systems and Information Communication Technologies; to provide for investigation, collection, and use of electronic evidence and for matters related therewith.

The Act has not provided the meaning of the term cyber crime/computer crime; however Different types of cyber crimes have been described as offences. Crimes like illegal access, illegal interception, illegal data interference, data espionage, computer related forgery, computer related fraud etc have been identified and elaborated. Section 37(1) of the cybercrime Act, 2015 has provided for the use of forensic tools in the collection of evidence. The section reads as follows;
Where a law enforcement officer is satisfied that essential evidence cannot be collected under this part, he may apply to the court for an order to authorise the use of a forensic tool. 

However, when you look in part VII on consequential amendments of the Act, the Criminal Procedure Act, 1985 has not been touched. The Act was expected to be amended in order to provide guidelines on how such crimes could be prosecuted, and how evidence from the electronic sources should be collected, processed, preserved and tendered before the court. The emergence of cybercrime has resulted to the evolution of new methodologies regarding ways of prosecuting and rules governing evidence gathering and investigation. The reason for the evolution of new methodologies regarding ways of prosecuting and investigating Cybercrimes has been motivated by the challenges posed by the presence of an electronic medium (cyberspace) as an area of commission of the offences. ​[655]​

Section 12 of the Act in subsection 1(a) and (b) has provided for the offence of Computer related fraud. The sections read as follows; a person shall not cause a loss of property to another person by;
(a) Any input, alteration, deletion, delaying transmission or suppression of computer data; or
(b) Any interference with the functioning of a computer system, with fraudulent or dishonest intent.

The legal question in relation to all these provisions lies in the legal meaning of the term Fraud as it has not been defined in the Act. When discussing computer fraud, the word fraud can be a little misleading, and the activities commonly described as computer fraud can involve criminal offences other than those traditionally described as fraud. Fraud comprises a collection of similar offences such as obtaining property or services by deception, false accounting, false statements made by company directors, suppression of documents and income tax fraud including cheating.​[656]​ The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines fraud as Criminal deception, use of false representations to gain unjust advantage; dishonest artifice or trick; person or thing not fulfilling expectation or description; deceitfulness.​[657]​

The traditional definition of fraud varies with fraud in cyber environment in which the deception may not involve two persons but rather one person and a computer, or two computers one of which controlled by a person.​[658]​ Unlike traditional fraud where the victim and witness are human beings, in the electronic world the computer systems and on-line transaction systems become the witness. Rather than examining paper-based evidence, in the electronic world the evidence is less tangible and transient in nature. Consequently the need to identify, capture, and preserve potential electronic evidence using computer forensics is of paramount importance.​[659]​

In the case of DPP v Ray,​[660]​ Lord Morris emphasized the meaning of the term as follows;
“For a deception to take place there must be some person or persons who will have been deceived.”

In the case of Davies v Flackett​[661]​, a motorist was charged with obtaining car-parking services by deception. The charge was dismissed on the basis that a machine had no mind and, therefore, could not constitute the victim of a deception.

6.3.3 	Redress Mechanism, Jurisdiction and Choice of law
Availability of consumer redress mechanism in contractual dealings provides healthy situation and confidence. In M-Money services, consumers normally seek assistance in the initial stages through their agents, and through their telephone help lines. However, these channels have not been effective in dealing with the difficulties often experienced by mobile payment users.​[662]​ The regime of M-Money services in the Country has opened the door for transactions to be conducted within and beyond the borders. In this case the question has been which court assumes jurisdiction in resolving a dispute arising from a contract between the parties within and outside legal systems.

In the case of Bank-led model and for the matter taking place within the jurisdiction in which the MNOs operate as the agents of financial institutions, the redress mechanism is regulated by the BOT and guidelines on agent banking for banking Institutions, 2013.Section.10 (3) (j) of the guideline state that the banking institution is responsible to the customer for acts of omission and commission of the agent. In addition section 22 of the agent banking guidelines provides for complaints redressal system. The BOT has also established guidelines for banking consumers’ complaints, 2015.​[663]​ In resolving the complaints, the desk is guided by provision of applicable law, case law, underlying agreement, industry practices and the TBA​[664]​ code of banking practices, 2014. Under non-bank led model, regardless of several exemption clauses given by the MNOs in evading liability, the avenues for redress mechanism have been provided. For example, clause 20.2 of Vodacom m-pesa consumer terms & conditions of use provides that; 
“Any dispute arising out of or in connection with these Terms and Conditions shall be referred to Complaint Committee under Tanzania Regulatory Communication Authority”.

Section 1.0 of TCRA guidelines for consumer complaint handling provides this;
The Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority issues these guidelines for handling consumer complaints in accordance with Section 40 of Part VIII of the Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority Act, 2003. The guidelines apply to complaint by a consumer of postal and electronic communications goods or services against a supplier of goods or services related to postal and electronic communications except complaint of broadcasting content nature.


Section 2.3 provides avenue for redress by stating that;
Where a consumer is not satisfied with supplier’s action to resolve the complaint, he or she may refer the complaint to the Authority. The consumer will be required to fill a complaint form issued by the Authority and attach previous correspondence with the operator on the complaint.

The Committee in accordance with section 41 of the Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority Act, 2003 has been given vast powers in making several orders.​[665]​ Where a party is not satisfied with an award ordered by the Committee, may only appeal to the Fair Competition Tribunal within twenty one (21) days. The aggrieved party may in other cases other than those mentioned in section 2.13 apply for review of the decision to the Internal Review Committee within fourteen (14) days in accordance with section 34 of the Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority Act, 2003. The legal challenge governing TCRA consumer guidelines is centred under the mandate governing it. The TCRA is a quasi independent Government body responsible for regulating the communication and Broadcasting sectors in Tanzania. However, the M-Money services do not fall within the ambit of neither communication services nor broadcasting sectors and therefore outside the legal territory of TCRA.

The legal issues posed by M-Money services within the jurisdiction have also amplified the same in cross border matters. In February 2014, Millicom launched the world's first cross-border mobile money service with currency conversion between Tanzania and Rwanda. While such services are taking place, regulatory issues regarding Cross-border mobile payment are not certain. The domestic laws have not provided the comprehensive legal measures regarding jurisdiction issues and choice of law in case of any dispute. For example, under the Electronic Transaction Act, 2015, section 24(1) of the Act, provides that; 
“Unless otherwise agreed between the originator and the addressee, an electronic communication is deemed to be dispatched at the place where the originator has its place of business and is deemed to be received at the place where the addressee has its place of business.”  

The Act has provided explanations regarding the place of contract between the parties, and left a vacuum regarding the manner and mechanisms of resolving the disputes. The MNOs have also tried to provide the mechanism of dispute settlement in M-Money services in the country, regardless of legal dilemma surrounding the platform. Clause 9 of MIC Tanzania limited on subscriber/customer terms & condition concerning governing law states that;
These terms and conditions shall in all aspects be governed by the laws of Tanzania. 

 The standard chartered Bank mobile banking terms and conditions in clause 10 on laws and jurisdiction provide as follows;​[666]​
This Agreement shall be governed and fall under jurisdiction of the laws of the United Republic of Tanzania. All disputes or differences whatsoever which shall arise any time hereafter whether during the continuance of the Agreement in the first instance the parties shall endeavour to settle such matter amicably failing which the matter shall be referred to single arbitrator which shall be appointed by the parties from Tanzania Communication Regulatory Authorities (TCRA). This shall be done in accordance with and subject to the provisions of the Arbitration Act [CAP. 15 R.E. 2002] or any statutory modification or re-enactment thereof for the time being in force.

Clause 20 of Vodacom M-pesa consumer terms & conditions of use concerning jurisdiction and arbitration provides this in sub-clause 1 & 2;
These Terms and Conditions are governed by the laws of Tanzania. Any dispute arising out of or in connection with these Terms and Conditions shall be referred to Complaint Committee under Tanzania Regulatory Communication Authority.

The serious question regarding regulatory concern in this platform is the confusion regarding the mandate of TCRA and BOT in handling disputes over mobile money services. While the BOT has been vested with the power to regulate financial matters, the terms and conditions of MNOs in jurisdictions and dispute issues direct the matter to be referred TCRA. This is a regulatory confusion between the two entities vested with diverse powers.

As M-Commerce involves transactions over cyber-space or internet, which is borderless, contractual disputes and other related matter cannot be avoided. The main problem here is how to answer some legal and other uncertainty issues that are likely to happen between contracting parties from different countries. It might be very hard to determine which law will apply and which country will have jurisdiction.​[667]​

Jurisdiction of the courts in Tanzania is a statutory issue. For purposes of civil jurisdiction in the traditional contracts the relevant statutes include the Judicature and Application of Laws Act, 1961, the Magistrates Courts Act, 1984 and the Civil Procedure Act, 1966. These enactments limit the jurisdiction of the courts to their localities, and within the Tanzania mainland territory to the exclusion of Zanzibar (which has its own laws and a separate court system).​[668]​ 

Concerning the establishment of proper choice of law in the digital age, Governments, judiciaries and legislatures are just beginning to grapple with the question of whose laws apply in cyberspace, and the parties themselves all too often exhibit no clear understanding as to whose rules govern the arrangement and what recourse is available in the event of a dispute.​[669]​As a cross-border activity, e-contracting touches persons, interests, and policies of more than one state. Consequently, understanding which law applies in an e-contract with foreign elements may lead to a difficult choice of law question.​[670]​

For example, the current arrangement concerning the cross border money transfer reached by Millicom between Tanzania and Rwanda, involves two countries with different legal systems. While Tanzania practices common law system, Rwanda exercises civil law system. These variations, presents complex dispute settlement mechanism in case of any dispute.  Although the Internet may have introduced simplicity in electronic transactions, which is an important breakthrough in mobile commerce, it has complicated both transaction and litigation planning, thereby creating more conflict of laws problems.​[671]​ This is so precisely because it has brought together people from different legal traditions, and, as one author asserts, ‘wherever you find people you are bound to find disputes.​[672]​

For example, it is not certain as to which Country and court will have jurisdiction in case a person lose money when sending it to his family members in Rwanda. Or which country will have jurisdiction to apprehend a person who has fraudulently taken the e-money while transferred from Tanzania to Rwanda through Tigo- Pesa? And which law will be applicable in such matters? The only avenue that is available in cybercrime is the provisions of part III of Cybercrime Act, 2015 of Tanzania that provides as follows;
The courts shall have jurisdiction to try any offence under this Act where an act or omission constituting an offence is committed wholly or in part within the United Republic of Tanzania; on a ship or aircraft registered in the United Republic of Tanzania;  by a national of the United Republic of Tanzania; by a national of the United Republic of Tanzania who resides outside the United Republic of Tanzania, if the act or omission would equally constitute an offence under a law of that country; or by any person, irrespective of his nationality or citizenship, or location, when the offence is committed using a computer system, device or data located within United Republic of Tanzania; or  directed against computer system, device or data or person located in United Republic of Tanzania. In this section the term “court” means court of competent jurisdiction.​[673]​
In relation to internet contracts of which mobile money contract are subsets, the general rule is that jurisdiction is determined by reference to the place or country where the contract is performed. Where there are many jurisdictions where the contract is performed, the relevant jurisdiction is the jurisdiction where the dispute arises. The place of domicile may also determine the court that will have jurisdiction. Where the parties are domiciled in a contracting state under the Brussels Convention, the rules of the Convention are applicable, while the rules of common law are applicable where the parties are not domiciled within a contracting state. Also, a person's domicile must be assessed from the state's legal perspective to determine whether or not he is domiciled in a contracting state.​[674]​ 
Since the issue here is basically one of private International Law, and the relevant Convention is the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgment in Civil and Commercial Matters. The Convention is applicable to those countries that have ratified it and incorporated its provisions into their municipal laws. However, the two countries are neither member countries nor ratified the convention and hence not bound by it.​[675]​

6.3.5	Electronic Transaction/on-Line Contracts
Contracts are formed in the world of internet as easily as they are off-line. In Tanzania, as in other jurisdiction globally, a legal contract requires the consent of both parties, whether in writing or orally. And the traditional principles of contract tells us that, a contract entered in to online will be enforceable if the two (or more) parties entering in to contract mutually assent to its terms and the contract itself must be supported by some consideration. Under English law for a contract to be valid several conditions must be satisfied. These are offer, acceptance, consideration and intention to create legal relations.​[676]​

Section 3 of the electronic transaction Act, 2015 of Tanzania recognizes the electronic transactions, and the Act defines “electronic transaction” as a transaction, action or set of transactions of a commercial or non-commercial nature, that takes place electronically. Section 4 of the Act, goes further and provides that a data message shall not be denied legal effect, validity or enforceability on the ground that it is in electronic format. In addition section 21 of the Act emphasise the recognition of electronic contracts as follows;
21.-(1) For avoidance of doubt, a contract may be formed electronically unless otherwise agreed by the parties.
(2) Where an electronic record is used in the formation of a contract, that contract shall not be denied validity or enforceability on the ground that an electronic record was used for that purpose.

The cited provisions justify the applicability and the legal protection given to the electronic transactions in the country. However, the enforceability of electronic transaction needs the settlement of various issues. For example, There are many questions regarding whether electronic records and electronic signatures satisfy writing and signature requirements imposed by a variety of statutes and regulations; whether records maintained solely in an electronic form satisfies legal record keeping requirements; whether the record keeper can establish the authenticity and integrity of such records; whether an electronic record constitutes an “original” for evidentiary purposes; and whether electronic records and electronic signatures would be denied admissibility in court because of their electronic form?​[677]​

In an online environment there is a serious concern regarding offer and acceptance of communication. Acceptance in an on-line transaction has the potential to be extremely controversial. Usually the acceptance is communicated to a machine (the computer) or is made by a machine. This raises the question as to whether the law recognizes a computer as a proper contracting party.​[678]​ In Thornton v Shoe Lane Parking [1971]2 QB 163, the court had to consider the contractual implications in the use of an automated Car Park. Denning LJ (as he then was) held that the customer was committed at the very moment when put his money in to the machine.

“The contract was thus concluded at that time, it can be translated in to offer and acceptance in this way. The offer is made when the proprietor of the machine holds it out as being ready receive the money. The acceptance takes place when the customer puts his money in to slot.” The owner or person in control of the computer is bound by the legal communication made by the computer if such communications had been programmed in to the computer by the owner or person in control. It would therefore appear that English law would treat a web server as a mere agent of the cyber trade or cyber consumer and can make contracts on their behalf provided the relevant communications were pre-programmed by the natural or legal persons concerned.​[679]​
Although the electronic transaction Act, 2015 of Tanzania in section 26 has recognized contracts with interactive system, there are various issues that have not been settled. For example under traditional contracts law, a contract with a minor is invalid unless for necessaries, nevertheless the contract has not provided the situation when the other party is a minor.

The provisions regarding offer and acceptance have legal implications as far as the revocation or withdrawal of offers is concerned. According to Christie, the general rule is that an offer can be withdrawn at any time before acceptance.​[680]​ The implication is that the offer cannot be withdrawn once it has been accepted. This situation has not been given extensive explanation in Electronic Transaction Act, 2015 of Tanzania. Section 23 of the Act, has provided for the acknowledgement of the receipt but the manner and mechanism of revocation has not been extensively digested.

6.3.6	Money Laundering
Section 3 of the Anti-Money laundering Act, 2006 defines money laundering as “engagement of a person or persons, direct or indirectly in conversion, transfer, concealment, disguising, use or acquisition of money or property known to be of illicit origin and in which such engagement intends to avoid the legal consequence of such action and includes offences referred in section 12”. In essence money laundering seeks to achieve two basic goals: the first one is to separate the perpetrator and the proceeds from the underlying crime/predicate offence while the second is to disguise the proceeds as legitimate funds or assets and hence allow the criminal to enjoy the benefits of criminal activities.​[681]​

Terrorist financing is the provision of, or making available such financial or other related services to a terrorist, group or entity which is concerned with terrorist act. Money laundering and terrorist financing are linked together because the techniques used to launder money are essentially the same as those employed to conceal the sources and uses of terrorist financing.​[682]​

As M-banking grows in recognition and continue to offer more transactional services such as complex funds transfers, payment of bills and VAT the possibility of these services being exploited for criminal gains rises exponentially. For instance, the funds transfer services offered through mobile money services have been used to transfer or launder illegally obtained funds. For example, a resident of Kariakoo area in the city was arraigned before the Kisutu Resident Magistrate's Court on January 17, 2011, on 15 counts of fraud, theft and money laundering. In the elaborate money laundering scam, the businessman was alleged to have stolen hundreds of millions of shillings from one bank, transferred the money to another bank then quickly converted the cash into mobile phone vouchers. He is alleged to have used the stolen funds to purchase mobile phone vouchers worth more than 500m/- on different occasions to try to hide the source of the illicit money.​[683]​
Such behaviors need a law in place that addresses all issues clearly in order to clear legal gaps. It is required that providers should be regulated by the service they provide, consistent with the FATF’s functional definition of “Financial Institution”. On one end of the spectrum there is traditional banking regulation, under which a mobile operator has to enter into a partnership with a bank in order to be able to offer mobile money services. 

In order to control money laundering in Tanzania, the Anti- money Laundering Act, 2006 was enacted. An Act to make better provisions for prevention and prohibition of money laundering, to provide for the disclosure of information on money laundering, to establish a Financial Intelligence Unit and the National Multi- Disciplinary Committee on Anti- Money Laundering and to provide for matters connected thereto. Besides, section 57 of the cybercrime Act, 2015 amended s.3 of the Anti-money laundering Act, 2006 to include offences under cybercrime Act, 2015. This also is in adherence to FATF recommendation 3 which provides as follows;
Countries should criminalise money laundering on the basis of the Vienna Convention and the Palermo Convention. Countries should apply the crime of money laundering to all serious offences, with a view to including the widest range of predicate offences.

The Bank of Tanzania is one of the regulatory authorities provided for in the Anti-Money Laundering Act. Cap. 423. Section 6 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act. Cap. 423 empower the Financial Intelligence Unit to issue anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism guidelines to various stakeholders. According to the Anti-money laundering guidelines for Bank of Tanzania, Guidelines No.3, the Bank of Tanzania (BOT) has been vested with the duty of regulating and reporting matters related with money laundering and terrorism financing. 

As regulator of banking institutions in Tanzania, Bank of Tanzania is responsible for ensuring that all banking institutions comply with all provisions of the Anti-Money Laundering Act,​[684]​ Anti-Money Laundering Regulations, 2007 and various guidelines issued by the Financial Intelligence Unit from time to time. In this case, mobile phone companies that offer mobile money services under non-bank led model have been excluded from the operation of guidelines. This observation is supported by the provision of section 3.2 of the guideline that states as follows;
Bank of Tanzania is responsible for ensuring that institutions under its jurisdiction have in place adequate AML/CFT policies, procedures and controls that are implemented effectively.
The institutions under the jurisdiction of Bank of Tanzania are the banking and financial institutions that conduct Banking business.

Tanzania is a member of ESAAMLG and has incorporated FATF recommendations and made significant progress in improving their AML/CTF regime. FATF​[685]​ has provided 40 recommendations to be adhered by member countries in taking the necessary steps to bring their national systems effective in combating money laundering and terrorist financing. However, the weakness of the recommendation has been in the definition of “financial institution” that excludes mobile money services under non-bank led model.

 FATF directs that countries should require financial institutions and designated non- financial businesses and professions (DNFBPs) to identify, assess and take effective action to mitigate their money laundering and terrorist financing risks. Recommendation 22 has mentioned the designated non- financial businesses and professions that should maintain customer due diligence and record keeping requirements set out in Recommendations 10, 11, 12, 15, and 17. In all these information, mobile/telephone companies that have been registered to offer mobile money services have not been mentioned.

Regardless of all the legal weaknesses, mobile phone companies that are offering M- Money services in the country are also required to undertake customer due diligence (CDD) and record keeping measures when establishing business relations. Such provisions have been incorporated in the consumer terms & conditions of use of respective companies. However, the serious problem pertaining to customer identification in this platform is the lack of proper identification mechanism due to lack of National Identification for all citizens. Besides, the registration process has been under simplified and conducted in most cases by ordinary people who cannot precisely identify the customer and verify customer’s identity using reliable, independent source documents, data or information.​[686]​  For example, clause 3.4 of M- PESA terms and conditions of customers’ service provides this; 
 You may register for M-PESA Services with any M-PESA Agent in the United Republic of Tanzania.

The term “any M-PESA agent” suggests that whoever has been assigned the task of receiving and issuing e-money can register M-PESA customers. This is the serious weakness that needs to be filled with proper regulation. In addition absence of principal- agent relationship in this platform creates more questions than answers in handling important legal issues including those related to customer due diligence. For example, clause 13.3 of M- PESA terms and conditions provides this;
All agents are no more than independent outlets authorised by vodacom or an approved M-PESA agent aggregator to provide M-PESA services and no agency relationship exists between vodacom and the agents and we accordingly bear no responsibility or liability for any default or negligence on the part of the agents in providing the M-PESA services.

The principle that mobile phone companies offering M-Money services are obliged to conduct Know Your Customer (KYC), Customer Due Diligence (CDD), and Enhanced Due Diligence (EDD) for risky customers and transactions should be set out in law in order to impose specific CDD obligations, either through law or enforceable means.

6.3.7	Consumer Protection
Tanzania doesn’t have an independent consumer protection law; issues related to consumer protection are obtained in different pieces of legislations. However, the Fair Competition Act 2003​[687]​ is the parent consumer protection legislation in Tanzania.

The competition and consumer protection issues are administered under the Fair Competition Commission of Tanzania. The Fair Competition Commission is an independent government body established under the Fair Competition Act, 2003(No. 8 of 2003) to promote and protect effective competition in trade and commerce and to protect consumers from unfair and misleading market conduct. The Fair Competition Act, which came into force through Government Notice No 150 of May, 2004 contains both competition and consumer protection provisions. However, the Act neither explicitly illustrate any recognition of e-consumers nor does it address cross border transactions. This is in accordance to section 5(2) of the Act that limit the definition of the term “competition”. The section defines ''Competition'' as competition in a market in Tanzania and refers to the process whereby two or more persons: 
(a) Supply or attempt to supply the same or substitutable goods in a or services to the persons in the same relevant market geographical market; or
(b) Acquire or attempt to acquire the same or substitutable goods or services from the persons in the same relevant geographical market. 

The focus of the Act does not accord legal protection to participants in mobile commerce and especially mobile money that is transferred in different jurisdictions. A notable legal complication in M-Money services is the convergence of financial services and telecommunication services handled by two distinct regulators. The BOT is vested with the duties related to the protection of financial sector consumers, while telecommunications regulators oversee some consumer protection aspects related to communication.​[688]​ However, there is currently no comprehensive multi-sectoral consumer protection legislation or mandated authority in the country. In the absence of legislation governing M-Money services in the country, issues regarding consumer protection are still in dilemma.​[689]​

Part VI of the electronic transaction Act, 2015​[690]​ of Tanzania provides for the Consumer protection in various circumstances. Online suppliers are required to provide on Websites information to consumers related to where such goods or services are offered, full name, legal status and place of business, contact details including physical address, telephone and e-mail addresses; a full description of the goods or services offered; the price of the goods or services; information on the payment mechanism that complies with other written laws; and any other relevant information.​[691]​ Before a consumer places an order, the supplier shall provide the consumer with an opportunity to review the entire electronic transaction; correct any mistake; and withdraw from the transaction.​[692]​However, the Act in this part has not afforded consumer protection in mobile money services.

The section does not apply to electronic transactions for financial services; by way of an auction; for the supply of foodstuffs, beverages or other goods intended for daily consumption for services which began with the consent by the consumer before expiration of the seven day period; where the price for the supply of goods or services is dependent on fluctuations in the financial markets and which cannot be controlled by the supplier. Where the goods are made to the consumer's specifications; are clearly personalised; by their nature, cannot be returned; or are likely to deteriorate or expire rapidly; where audio or video recordings or computer software were downloaded or unsealed by the consumer; for the sale of newspapers, periodicals, magazines and books; for the provision of gaming and lottery services; for online gambling; for the provision of accommodation, transport, catering; and any other transactions as the Minister may, by notice published in the Gazette prescribe.​[693]​ In this case therefore financial services of which mobile money is a subset has been excluded from the Act.​[694]​ The crack in responsibility has made it difficult for regulators to take a strategic view of priorities across the entire retail financial services sector. 

The National payment system Act, 2015 of Tanzania has also addressed consumer protection issues through S.51 (1)-(2) that provides as follows;
The Bank shall prescribe consumer protection requirements relevant to payment system services and a payment system provider shall provide a consumer with;
a)	Terms and conditions that are transparent, fair, legible, in comprehensible language and provide the rights and obligations of the parties;
b)	Complaints handling and dispute resolution mechanism; and 
c)	Full disclosure of relevant information for the use of the electronic payment service including pricing of the products and services

However, what has been provided with the law does not conform to the realities in the ground. The terms and conditions of the MNOs are not that much fair and comprehensive. Besides, the terms and conditions do not conform to the standard form regulations, 2014.​[695]​ For example the M-PESA and Tigo-Pesa terms of services do not accommodate principal-agent relationship. Therefore, in case of negligence of agents the company will not be liable. Clause 13 of Vodacom terms of service have been drafted to exempt Vodacom from liability for faults committed by the M-PESA agents. This situation jeopardises M-PESA customers. 

Section 5(1) of the standard form regulations 2014, provides the following, in order to protect the consumers against the unfair contractual terms;
 A producer or trade association, for the purpose of establishing a sound order of trade and prevent unfair contractual terms from circulating, may prepare a set of standard contractual terms to be used in a particular field of trade and request the Commission to examine the terms to determine whether the terms are in contravention of these Regulations.

This provision appears to be more cosmetic than reality because the terms and conditions of MNOs have several exemption clauses that evade them from liabilities. Consumers are offered ‘use at your own risk’ services with little or no customer protection. Some of the service providers do inform customers that a transaction can be reversed in case of error; or that they offer particular services. However, these services are not available in practice. The reality is that consumers get little assistance from service providers. Customer care is difficult to access, and most of the time customers are not provided satisfactory assistance.​[696]​

Lack of comprehensive regulations on consumer protection pledge enormous powers to the mobile service providers to dictate the terms and conditions and rules of the game. In this case therefore the Bank of Tanzania, through its supervisory and oversight role, should ensure that it does what it can under existing statutory authority to ensure that existing consumer protections are applied to new payment methods. And the Government through law reform commission should put in place legislative reform that would provide authority for the Consumer Protection Act to have mandate over financial services and products.​[697]​

6.3.8	Deposit and Protection of Consumer Funds
The main distinguishing feature between financial institutions and mobile companies in the operation of mobile money services lies in the technical term as to whether the activities performed by MNOs constitute banking business. Section 3 of the Banking and Financial Institutions Act, 2006​[698]​ defines “banking business” as 
the business of receiving funds from the general public through the acceptance of deposits payable upon demand or after a fixed period or after notice, or any similar operation through the frequent sale or placement of bonds, certificates, notes or other securities, and to use such funds, in whole or in part, for loans or investments for the account of and at the risk of the person doing such business;

Section 3 of the Act defines “deposit” as a sum of money paid on terms which; 
(a) require it to be repaid, with or without interest or premium of any kind, and either on demand or at a time in circumstances agreed by or on behalf of the person making the payment and the person receiving it; and 
(b) is not referable to the provision of property or services or the giving of security, whether or not evidenced by any entry in a record of the person receiving the sum or by any receipt, certificate, note or other document, and references in this Act to money deposited and to the making of a deposit shall be construed accordingly; 

There have been blurred lines between what constitutes taking deposits as from the public even for purposes of effecting payment rather than for saving and accepting public deposits in the conventional sense an activity almost always reserved for prudentially regulated financial institutions such as commercial banks. These funds are held in a bank which is subject to strict prudential requirements and supervision. The protection of consumer funds is therefore usually a priority for any financial regulator.​[699]​ 

In mobile payments MNOs collect funds in exchange for electronically stored value, without being subject to the full range of prudential rules imposed on banks.  Funds collected by Vodacom, Tigo or Airtel, which customers increasingly use as a short-term savings mechanism, are deposited in pooled trust accounts at several commercial banks, for the benefit of the customers. In the event of insolvency however, there is no mechanism in place for customers to claim trust assets. This therefore leaves the consumer with no recourse if the said bank becomes insolvent. This further highlights the complexity that these electronically stored value poses. ​[700]​

A key prudential requirement typically imposed by regulators to ensure a customer’s money is available when the customer wants to redeem it is that the MNO, maintains liquid assets equal in value to the amount of money issued electronically. One common approach is to require assets to be isolated and held in a bank account.​[701]​ In an effort to distinguish such products from savings accounts, regulators around the world have regulated them as “payments” services, denying E‑Money accounts the benefit of interest payments and deposit insurance.​[702]​Surprisingly some MNOs​[703]​ have recently started paying the interest to the customers and therefore performing banking business. As E-Money is increasingly used as a savings vehicle, and as there is evidence that customers desire to earn interest, regulators should think of reevaluating perceived risks and reconsider permitting nonbank e-money issuers to pay interest earned on pooled accounts.​[704]​

Another area that is very important for the protection of customer funds is regarding deposit insurance for e-float. Although e-float is held in a bank, regulators in the developing world do not extend deposit insurance to customers of e‑money accounts issued by non-banks. Part VII of the Banking and Financial Institutions Act, 2006 contains major provisions regarding deposit insurance. However, the Act covers only for Banking and Financial institutions and therefore excludes MNOs. In other developing countries such as Filipino and Afghan, e-money is not considered a deposit and, thus, is not covered by deposit insurance.​[705]​

In Kenya, M-PESA funds are held as deposits by Safaricom in commercial bank accounts. These deposits are insured by Kenya’s Deposit Protection Fund, “however, this deposit insurance, designed for individual bank account holders, provides insurance on deposits up to a maximum of KSh 100,000, or about $1,300. Thus M‐PESA deposits are virtually completely uninsured against bank failure.” Arguably, Safaricom, as a bank account holder, may be eligible for protection under this scheme, but whether Safaricom will ensure that its customers’ funds are protected rests on its business judgment, rather than any legal obligation. Conversely, “any interest earned cannot benefit Safaricom as it will trigger the business of banking.​[706]​

6.3.9	The Legal Status of Agents in Mobile Money Services
The ‘agent’ is a central theme in the mobile money services. The agent can be characterized as an intermediary or facilitator in delivering financial services to enhance financial inclusion.​[707]​ The agent relationship exists in both business models, bank- based model and non-bank based model. Since mobile money services rely on agents for its customer interface, it is necessary to ensure that providers comply with applicable regulations when using third parties just as if the services were rendered directly by the providers.​[708]​  Tanzania has issued guidelines on agent banking for banking Institutions, 2013. The guidelines are made under Section 71 of the Banking and Financial Institutions Act, 2006.​[709]​ Section 3 of the guideline defines an “agent “as a person contracted by an approved banking institution to carry out agent banking business on behalf of the approved banking institution in the manner specified in the Guidelines.

The guidelines apply to all banking institutions and their agents.​[710]​ Since mobile companies are not financial institutions, it can be interpreted that they have been excluded from the guidelines. The principal-agents relationship is imposed by common law, contract law or statutory enactment. Part X of the law of contract Act, Cap 345 contains provisions regarding the relationship between an Agent and Principal. S.134 defines an “agent as a person employed to do any act for another or to represent another in dealings with third persons and the person for whom such act is done, or who is so represented is called the principal”. The Act has provided general picture regarding Principal-agent relationship but the guidelines on agent banking is specifically for banking and financial Institutions. And therefore regarding whether MNOs can also be included in the ambit of guidelines and the Act, is subject to critical discussion.

In bank-led model a customer establishes a direct contractual relationship with a licensed and supervised financial institution and therefore the relationship is controlled by banking prudential regulation. And therefore the principal can be accounted liable for agent’s conduct under the principal of vicarious liability. Section 13.1.of the guidelines on agent banking for banking Institutions, 2013 provides the details as follows;
 An approved banking institution shall be solely responsible and liable for all actions or omissions of its agent and this responsibility shall extend to actions of the agent even if not authorized in the agency agreement so long as they relate to agent banking services or matters connected therewith.

The situation that offers various questions regarding principal-agent relationship in the case of non-bank led model. A bank principal’s liability is traced from agent banking services or matters connected to a valid contract. Agents are typically defined broadly as an “entity that has been contracted by an institution and approved by the Central Bank” so as to capture all M-Money services outsourced entities. Problematically non-bank principals, such as MNOs, are not typically captured by such regulations.​[711]​  For example, Vodacom, Airtel and Tigo are MNOs, and therefore their agents fall outside the Agent Banking Guidelines, 2013 and their liability is therefore determined by the M-Money contract. 

The Vodacom M-PESA consumer terms and conditions of use 2015 under clause 13.3 evade principal-agent relationship as follows;
All Agents are no more than independent outlets authorised by Vodacom or an approved M-PESA agent aggregator to provide M-PESA Services and no agency relationship exists between Vodacom and the Agents and we accordingly bear no responsibility or liability for any default or negligence on the part of the Agents in providing the M-PESA Services

In Kenya, because Safaricom is MNO, its agents fall outside the CBK’s Agent Banking Guidelines and their liability is therefore determined by the M-PESA contract, which states: 
You acknowledge that M-PESA cash merchants are independent contractors and Safaricom shall not be liable for the acts or omissions of M-PESA cash merchants.


In Malawi, there are no agent banking guidelines and the E-Money Regulations do not explicitly allocate agent liability. Although the Bank of Tanzania is promoting financial inclusion with a light-touch regulatory regime, personal liability may undermine customer confidence and trust if the cash merchant is unable to fully compensate customers. The M-Money market characterised by an absence of clear regulatory regime creates opportunities for undesirable business practices and reduce confidence for customers relying in this platform. 
6.3.10	Privacy and Data Protection Issues in M-Money Services

Privacy is a valuable and advanced aspect of personality. Sociologists and psychologists agree that a person has a fundamental need for privacy. Privacy is also at the core of our democratic values. An individual therefore has an interest in the protection of his or her privacy.​[712]​ Section 47 of the National Payment System Act, 2015 guarantees the protection of customer information. The section reads as follows;
(1)	Without prejudice to any other written laws, a payment system provider shall;
a)	Protect the privacy of a participant and customer information; and
b)	Not disclose information of a participant or customer unless the disclosure is made in compliance with the law, an order of a court or with the express consent of the system participant or customer concerned.

Under ordinary banking business, secrecy is the heart and soul of the trust the client attributes to the banker.​[713]​ The fiduciary relationship between a banker and customer has long been recognized in the English case law. In the landmark case of Tourner v National Provincial & Bank of England,​[714]​ the English Court of Appeal decided that the right of a customer to keep his affairs confidential is a legal right. Thus, the banker cannot just disclose to unauthorized third-party information it has received as part of its handling of a client’s account. This duty is an implied contractual term.​[715]​

However, the client’s right to confidentiality is not unlimited. There are instances that warrant disclosure of such confidential information.  For example, while Section 45(1) of the National Payment System Act, 2015 provides that, information obtained in terms of section 44 shall be confidential and may not be disclosed by any director or officer of the bank unless such disclosure is required by law. S. 45 (2) explains that, notwithstanding subsection (1), the Bank may disclose any information to another agency responsible for regulating or supervising payment system providers consequent upon information sharing agreement whether in the United Republic or abroad, as long as that information is needed and is to be used for supervisory or oversight purposes and that its confidentiality will be maintained.

Though the duty of secrecy in Tourner’s case has laid a legal position in many African countries, the rise of modern technology and its application in the banking sector has shaken the foundations of the banker’s duty of secrecy.​[716]​ The regime of e-commerce has opened up a room for the enormous information to be transferred within and outside the boundaries of countries. In view of the openness and accessibility of the internet the protection of such data has been a constant source of concern for internet users and consequently has remained a threat to e-commerce and mobile money users particularly.​[717]​ 

Though mobile phone companies are not regulated by BOT, the FATF Recommendations apply to mobile money just as with traditional banking services. The global effort to combat money laundering and terrorism is as applicable to mobile money services as to traditional banking. From a general security perspective, the identification, verification, and reporting requirements of the FATF Recommendations are a positive effort to ensure that mobile money applications do not become tools for money laundering.​[718]​This requirement for user transparency in the control of money laundering and financing terrorism has been a potential problem in privacy and data protection. FATF Recommendation 10 states that financial institutions must perform Customer Due Diligence, which includes confirming the identity of clients and scrutinizing client transactions. Further, Recommendation 11 requires financial institutions to maintain records of all transactions for five years, “to enable them to comply swiftly with information requests from the competent authorities.” These requirements for transparency and record keeping pose a number of user privacy concerns for mobile money applications in the country.​[719]​

A mobile money ecosystem also invites serious privacy concerns as it involves several entities in it such as mobile network operator, financial institution, trusted service manager, agents and the customer. Each of these entities has a growing interest in collecting personal information tied to mobile money transactions. With so many interested parties and little consumer protection, the opportunities for data leakage and subsequent abuse are abundant.​[720]​ 

It is also argued that once personal information is collected in a database the person from whom such information was collected has significantly less control over his or her personal information. This loss of control over one's personal information leads to a potential lack of the subscriber's knowledge of data flows and blacklisting. In this view, databases create a prevailing climate of suspicion and tyrannical potential for a totalitarian government. In this situation, if the government knows your SIM card details, then it can monitor your calls and text messages.​[721]​

Although section 98 of EPOCA, 2010 lays down the foundation for Duty of confidentiality in order to ensure confidence for customers, yet it needs a critical discussion. The section states as follows;
98 (1)  A person who is member, employee of application service licensee, or its agent, shall have a duty of confidentiality of any information received in accordance with the provisions of this Act. 




The main concern in this aspect regarding privacy and data protection in mobile money environment includes the following. Firstly, there is no principal- agent relationship and therefore MNOs are neither liable for the acts of their agents nor agents are held responsible with the directives of the principal. This situation complicates the duty of confidentiality and efforts to keep consumer information private. In addition, the privacy regulations that apply to banks in respect of customer financial records do not extend to Mobile Network Operators.​[722]​

Although, the Constitution of United Republic of Tanzania guarantees the right to privacy and personal security in Article 16(1) as follows;
Every person is entitled to respect and protection of his person, the privacy of his own person, his family and of his matrimonial life, and respect and protection of his residence and private communications.

However this right is not absolute, it is restricted with article.16 (2) which provides this;
 For the purpose of preserving the person’s right in accordance with this Article, the state authority shall lay down legal procedures regarding the circumstances, manner and extent to which the right to privacy, security of his person, his property and residence may be encroached upon without prejudice to the provisions of this Article.

6.3.11 	Legal Issues in the Taxation of M-Money
There is no a single formulated definition of the term ‘tax” or “taxation. ‘Tax means a monetary charge imposed by the government on persons, entities, transactions, or property to yield public revenue. In its broad senses, tax embraces all governmental impositions on the person, property, privileges, occupations, and enjoyment of the people, and includes duties, import and excise. The imposition or assessment of a tax or the means by which the state obtains the revenue required for its activities is what is called taxation.​[723]​

” The Oxford dictionary defines a term “tax” to mean; 
“A compulsory contribution to the support of government levied on persons, property, income, commodities, transactions etc, now at a fixed rate mostly proportionate to the amount on which the contribution is levied.​[724]​


It has been argued that the relationship between taxation and the emergence of the modern state is one of symbiotic combination, because taxes make the state, and the state makes taxes. Taxation therefore remains an inevitable tool of running the state.​[725]​

Historically goods were physical, the production, distribution and consumption of these goods was easily traceable and therefore easily taxable. E-Commerce has fundamentally altered the traditional mode of business transaction which is physically-oriented, as compared with E-Commerce which is virtual in nature. The greatest challenge perhaps to a tax regime would be ability to adjust and adapt to the changing world.​[726]​ The existing legal framework in the country is fashioned towards physically-oriented business transactions as compared to virtual business transactions. A situation that compel a new tax regime to cater for taxation of e-commerce; otherwise the purpose of tax as a source of government revenue may be eroded.​[727]​ In a global environment where cyber transactions are growing at a rapid pace, tax administrations face the challenge of adopting tax systems to an economy that increasingly ignores physical borders. Since electronic commerce can be conducted virtually instantaneously around the globe, the question where the profits should be taxed becomes of outmost importance.​[728]​

The regime of M-Money services in the country has opened up a crucial discussion on taxation issues and especially with the introduction of cross border money remittances. Some countries have embraced the challenges brought about by e-commerce and have developed legislations in the area of taxation for ecommerce activities. The European Union (EU) is reputed to have the most advanced regime for taxation of VAT in e-commerce. Republic of India is a leading example of a developing country with the most robust measures for taxation.​[729]​ However, the existing challenges to e-commerce to the Tanzanian tax system are that the laws governing taxation have not been abreast to accommodate the ICT regime. For example, in 2015, the Tanzanian government passed the Electronic Transaction Act, 
An Act to provide for the legal recognition of electronic transactions, e-Government services, the use of Information and Communication Technologies in collection of evidence, admissibility of electronic evidence, to provide for the facilitation of use of secure electronic signatures; and to provide for other related matters.

Although the Act has addressed various problems brought by ICT regime, the Act contains no provisions regarding e- taxation. In addition the provisions of the Income Tax Act and the VAT Act have not specifically targeted online transactions and digital products. Section 2(1) of the Tanzanian VAT Act, 2014 has excluded mobile money services in the form of financial services. Section 2(1) (b) defines financial services as 
Transactions concerning money deposit, current accounts, payments, transfers, debts, cheques or negotiable instruments, other than debt collection or debt factoring;

The activities that have been included here are those conducted by banks and financial institutions with exclusion of Mobile phone companies. Section 2(1) of the Act has also excluded digital goods in its definition; the Act has defined goods as all kinds of tangible moveable property, excluding shares, stocks, securities, or money.
The definition of services under section 2 (1), yet is cloudy and does not encompass electronic and digital goods. The Act defines “services” as anything that is not goods, immovable property or money including but not limited to a provision of information or advice; a grant, assignment, termination, or surrender of a right; the making available of a facility, opportunity, or advantage; an entry into an agreement to refrain from or tolerate an activity, a situation, or the doing of an act; and an issue, transfer, or surrender of a license, permit, certificate, concession, authorization, or similar rights.

While cross- border M-Money transactions are taking place with Rwanda and Kenya, The Tanzanian VAT Act, 2014 does not provide a provision compromising a co-operation by other jurisdictions in the implementation of the VAT regime to e-products. The Act defines “place of supply” under section 44(1) as, a supply of goods shall be treated as a supply made in Mainland Tanzania, if the goods are delivered or made available in Mainland Tanzania. In E-Commerce and m-commerce particularly physical presence or the place of supply may have little or no relevance to the transaction. It has been noted that technologies are causing governments and suppliers to face many challenges in the collection of consumption taxes with respect to the jurisdiction in which tax should apply, verifying the place of consumption, determining the correct tax treatment of bundled products, bad debts, and tax credits; Retaining data; and Complying with audit requirements.​[730]​ The VAT Act should therefore be updated in order to address these m-commerce issues in the broader context of the treatment of services and intangibles in the global economy.
6.4 Conclusion 






7.0 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
7.1 Introduction
The principal purpose of this study is to search for an appropriate mobile money services legal framework that promotes innovation and development of converged services between the telecommunication sector and financial sector. This was done by evaluating the existing legislations in the country that support mobile money services. In order to achieve the intended objectives the following questions guided the research.  
1.	What are the legal gaps existing in the current laws governing mobile money services in Tanzania?
2.	Does the existing legal regime adequately address the risks and challenges associated with the mobile money services in Tanzania?
3.	Which regulatory approach should be adopted to effectively regulate converged services such as mobile money services?
4.	What has been the reaction of the government to emergent issues in mobile money services operations?

In order to assess the adequacy of legal and regulatory framework governing mobile money services in the country the international standard setting bodies and model laws were employed in the analysis. In addition the discussion invited the experience of other jurisdictions in order to determine their legal position in addressing the same issue. The experience of countries such as Kenya, Philippines, Brazil, India and South Africa were very useful in providing a direction concerning M-Money services. However, in all these countries the serious challenge was the modality of regulating non-bank led modal under banking regulation.

7.2 The Study
The study has answered extensively all four questions that were raised at the beginning of the study. The findings of the study have revealed that, the existing legislations in the country are inadequate and do not offer protection to the customers. There are several legal gaps in the National payment system Act, 2015, Electronic transaction Act, 2015, the fair competition Act, 2003, Electronic and Postal Communication Act, 2010, the standard form (consumer contracts) regulations, 2014 etc. All these documents have not digested extensively legal issues brought by M-Money services. Issues such as money laundering, consumer protection, taxation, interoperability, dispute settlement, deposit insurance etc have not been clearly resolved. 

Although the government reacted in different periods to address ICT related issues, the initiatives were weak to address the needs of time. Most of the legislations either addressed telecommunication issues or financial issues or left converged matters unsettled. For example, in 2010, the Government passed the Electronic and Postal Communications Act (EPOCA) 2010 that Amended the Tanzania communications regulatory authority Act, Cap.172 and the Fair Competition Act, Cap. 285. However, the Act has not put in place any provision extending the operation of mobile companies in to banking activities. In 2015, the government enacted the National payment system Act, 2015, to regulate and supervise payment systems, electronic payment instruments, electronic money, payment system providers, validity and enforceability of netting arrangements, finality and settlement of payment instructions and to make provision for related matters. The Act has vested power to the Bank of Tanzania to regulate and supervise payment systems and to grant and approve licenses to MNOs offering M-Money services. However, these powers are so limited in real sense due to the fact that the MNOs are regulated by TCRA and the M-Money services fall outside the mandates of the banking law that applies on banks and financial institutions.

7.3 Conclusion  
This thesis has addressed the development of mobile money services in Tanzania, the prospects and challenges associated with this platform. Despite the numerous benefits that these services bring to the Nation, banks and individuals, , there are several legal challenges that need special attention in order to bring favorable environment for the operation of the services. Although, services such as M-Pesa, Tigo-pesa and Airtel money have brought immense emancipation to the people at the bottom and shared a huge contribution to the GDP of the Nation, a careful oversight is imperative. The Bank of Tanzania (BOT) and TCRA are acting as watching dogs in the activities performed by MNOs; however, the memorandum of understanding entered between the two entities cannot act effectively in the absence of law. 

The regime of M-Commerce has brought Consumer risks that need a legal and regulatory approach in place in order to afford the healthy environment in the platform. It is true that the regulation and supervision of mobile financial services in the Country is still at an infant stage, like the product itself, and is still evolving. However, government should not capitalize on a wait and see approach as the only mechanism of dealing with these services. There must be in place concrete and clear cyber laws that will address the rights and obligations on the part of the respective participants (consumers, merchants, issuers and operators). Besides, People and concerned institutions should be given education concerning various threats surrounding this platform. Despite the fact that mobile payments have reduced important shortcomings commonly associated with banking bureaucracies, loss of customers’ fund through informal providers and other operational difficulties, there should be a balance that allows innovation that increases financial access and ensures a degree of consumer protection.
 
The study has confirmed that there are still controversial issues on the mandate of TCRA and BOT in the regulation of M-Money services. While the BOT has been vested with the supervisory powers on financial matters, the redress mechanism has been vested to the mandate of TCRA. This situation needs to be addressed with a clear legal environment. The growing nature of the convergence process and the rapid development of technologies signify that regulatory needs should continue to evolve. This presents a challenge to regulators, policymakers, and other actors in regulation. 

It has also been noted that mobile money services have been excluded from various financial regulations and hence increased the loop hole for money laundering and financial terrorism, tax evasion, and various cyber related issues.  These legal gaps need to be addressed with a comprehensive legal frame work that will enhance innovations and customer protection. The question of deposit insurance in e-money accounts are some of the consumer protection regulatory topics that invite a critical legal discussion, however, it could also sound if the Banking and Financial Institution Act could be amended to allow two deposit insurance funds that will be governed by one board. An efficient and consistent regulatory framework that would enhance innovations in payment system with consumer protection should be given room in Tanzania. 

The taxation of digital products is an area that has invited sober discussions at both the national and international level. And there is significant concern worldwide regarding the potential evasion of income taxes associated with electronic commerce. In Tanzania particularly, the Tax laws and even the electronic transactions Act, 2015 have not touched taxation of digital products. It has appeared that the current state of the Tanzanian laws fall short of an effective system of electronic commerce and does not adequately address the problems and challenges of regulation and taxation of digital products. There is therefore a need for urgent and immediate regulatory intervention.

7.4 Recommendations 
There are a number of issues that need to be determined for the realization of effective regulation of converged services in the country. Mobile money services would require reforms in order to address various legal and regulatory gaps and hence produce a valid and reliable financial platform. Consequently, this thesis recommends the following as efficient and effective ways of harmonising M-Money legal environment in Tanzania.
1.	Mobile money services whether bank-led model or non-bank led model should be regulated by Bank of Tanzania and should be given a separate department dealing with their activities. 
2.	The MNOs offering M-Money services should be agents of banking institutions under the principal-agents relationship
3.	The law should state categorically the identification process in order to adhere strictly with KYC regulations. This has become necessary in view of the rising criminality and money laundering practices. 
4.	 Production of M-Money laws
Tanzania does not have express laws addressing M-Money issues entirely, although the electronic transaction Act, 2015, EPOCA, 2010 and Cybercrime Act, 2015 have several provisions addressing cyber related matters. The existing laws are only fashioned to adapt to e-commerce and not M-Money services exclusively. 
5.	Creation of Awareness and clarification Campaign
People need to be educated on cyber culture. The concerned authorities should conduct awareness campaign on sensitive issues regarding M-Money transactions such as non-sharing of password and not disclosing their privacy information. 

7.5 Future Research Agenda 
The research has provided holistic examination of legal and regulatory issues surrounding mobile money services in Tanzania with critical focus on regulatory challenges brought by the convergence of Telecommunication sector and financial sector in offering mobile money services. However, for the interest of legal research, there are other areas that need special attention in order to provide more light in the area of mobile money services. The areas include;
a)	The law of evidence with Mobile money services
b)	Mobile money services with Cybercrimes
c)	Legal issues and challenges in the Prosecution and investigation of cybercrime offences
d)	Mobile money services and consumer protection
e)	Mobile money services and e-taxation
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SUGGESTED GUIDELINES FOR MOBILE MONEY SERVICES IN TANZANIA
1.0	 Introduction 
This Guideline addresses legal and regulatory issues pertaining to mobile money issues in Tanzania. The guideline is a product of the research work that analyses various legal instruments within and outside the country. These legal instruments have revealed that the convergence of telecommunications and financial sector through mobile money services have led to the urgent need for the development of an effective and healthy legal and regulatory framework. 

The convergence of mobile and financial services in Tanzania integrates two separate and traditionally distinct sectors that are regulated by different entities each with a limited scope of coverage. While telecommunication industry is regulated by TCRA, the financial sector is regulated by BOT. The existing arrangement creates legal gaps in various areas such as taxation, customer protection, money laundering and financial terrorism, agency banking etc. 

In considering such issues, this thesis offers mobile money guideline that stimulates the enactment of healthy and sound legislation that balance both innovations and customer protections. The guideline identifies the participants, and defines their roles and responsibilities in mobile money platform. Besides, it sets the basis for the regulation of services offered at different levels and by the participants.  The guideline has identified two models for the implementation of mobile money services namely bank Led and Non-bank led model.

For the purpose of this Guideline, mobile money involves “services that connect consumers financially through mobile phones and allows any mobile phone subscriber whether banked or unbanked to deposit value into their mobile account, send value via a simple handset to another mobile subscriber, and allow the recipient to turn that value back into cash easily and cheaply”

“Agent” means a person appointed by an e-money issuer to perform agency services on its behalf, Electronic money means electronically, including magnetically, stored monetary value as represented by a claim on the issuer; which is issued on receipt of funds; for purposes of making payment transactions … which is accepted by a natural or legal person other than the electronic money issuer

1.1  	Objectives of the guidelines
The guideline has the following objectives;
i.	To provide clarity and protection for mobile money services customers, mobile money service providers, mobile money agents and other parties involved in the provision of mobile money services in Tanzania
ii.	To propose for the legal and regulatory framework for mobile money services in Tanzania
iii.	To lay down comprehensive structure for mobile money agents and their legal liabilities 
iv.	To propose dispute settlement mechanism relating to the provision of mobile money services 
1.2 	Application
These Guidelines shall apply to:
All mobile money service providers
All Banks partnering with mobile money service providers
Mobile Network Operators
All mobile money agents; and
Mobile money customers

1.3	Regulatory & Supervisory Issues
In order to clear uncertainties and maintain high level of security in mobile money services;
a)	All MNOs requiring to offer M-Money services should get permission from the Bank of Tanzania and partner with a bank which is licensed and supervised in Tanzania 
b)	All mobile money service providers should be regulated by Bank of Tanzania and should comply with financial regulations.
c)	All mobile money service providers should comply with the provisions of the KYC guidelines as stipulated in the Anti-money laundering Guidelines for Bank of Tanzania.
d)	MNOs licensed to offer M-Money services may utilize agents to perform agency services on their behalf.
e)	The MNOs that utilise agents to perform agency services on their behalf should be required to submit such information  in writing to the Bank of Tanzania explaining,
i.	The procedure for recruiting agents
ii.	The physical address of agents
iii.	A copy of the proposed standard agency agreement or agreements 
iv.	The agent manual and any materials used for training agents and
v.	 The security measures to be adopted for agent premises 
f)	MNOs or their agents shall develop systems able to provide an accurate and fully accessible audit trail of all e-money transactions. 
g)	MNOs or their agents shall keep records of every e-money transaction processed by them for a period of five years.

1.4 	Agency banking 
a)	There should be in place agency banking guideline for mobile money services that will adhere to principal- agency relationship
b)	The e-money business should be conducted in a suitable and protected environment.
c)	Mobile network operators will be “fully responsible for the services rendered by their agents.”
d)	An agent must be a registered limited liability company or sole proprietor with a sound financial status.

1.5	Registration of customers for mobile service
a)	There should be in place registered agents who are well trained and conversant with mobile money services
b)	On registration of the customer, the full details of the Terms and Conditions of the service offered shall be communicated to the customer.
c)	The Terms and Conditions of the service offered by MNOs should adhere to standard form contract regulations of Tanzania 
d)	 Mobile Network Operators should adopt a registration system which is valid and reliable in order to control ICT related risks.
e)	At mobile money account opening, the consumers must be served with a copy of the agreement with the service provider. 
f)	The agreement must be communicated by the agent clearly and in plain language. The relevant fees, charges, penalties and any other consumer liabilities or obligations in the use of mobile money services should be explained.

 1.6	Data protection and Consumer Protection
a)	Mobile money service providers as well as their agents shall uphold privacy and confidentiality of customer information and data
b)	There should be adequate consumer education activities to ensure that consumers are sensitized on the services. 
c)	Mobile Network Operators should ensure that appropriate consumer protection mechanisms are in place against loss of service, fraud and privacy of customer information to enhance confidence in the mobile money services. 

1.7	Taxation 
The existing legal framework in the country is fashioned towards physically-oriented business transactions as compared to virtual business transactions. The OECD has prescribed certain guidelines that they feel governments should adhere to while formulating new provisions regulating taxation of e-commerce transactions. In this case therefore, the electronic transaction Act, 2015 and VAT Act, 2014 should be amended to provide for taxation of digital transaction as per OECD guidelines.

1.8	Deposit Insurance
In the banking laws of many countries, deposit taking is considered the exclusive domain of fully prudentially regulated banks and therefore in an effort to distinguish e-money issued by non-banks such as mobile network operators regulators have denied e-money accounts the benefit of interest payments and deposit insurance. It is therefore suggested that the Banking and Financial Institution Act, 2006 should be amended to allow two deposit insurance funds that will be governed by one board 

1.9	Complaints Handling and Consumer Recourse
Mobile money service providers shall ensure that appropriate and effective procedures for receiving, considering and responding to complaints are put in place.
Cross border transfers should be highly elaborated and terms and conditions regarding jurisdiction and choice of law should be well addressed

1.10	Future Development of the Regulatory Framework for Mobile Money




^1	  International Telecommunications Union., The mobile money revolution: ITU-T Technology Watch Report, 2013, pp.5
^2	  Mobile money service is a term used to explain financial services delivered by way of mobile networks using mobile phones.
^3	  Ernst & young, Mobile money the next wave of growth: optimizing operator approaches in a fast changing land scape, 2013, pp.4.
^4	  Yakub, J.O, Bello, H.T & Adenuga, I.A .,  Mobile Money Services in Nigeria: An inquiry of existing Models, International Journal of Economics and Management Sciences Vol. 2, No. 9, pp. 94-105,2013,pp.3.  
^5	  Yakub, J.O, Bello, H.T & Adenuga, I.A., op.cit, pp.3 
^6	  International Telecommunications Union., The mobile money revolution: ITU-T Technology Watch Report, 2013, pp.10.
^7	  GSMA,.Mobile money; choosing a technical model for A2A interoperability: lessons from Tanzania and Pakistan, 2015 at pp. 8
^8	  (ITU, 2011; Demirguc-Kunt & Klapper, 2012)
^9	  Ibid 
^10	 Lachaal, L & Zhang, J.,Mobile Money Services, Regulation and Creating an Enabling Environment in Africa,2012.pp.2
^11	  Gidvani, L & Di castri, S .Enabling Mobile Money Policies in Tanzania, A test and learn approach to enabling Market- led digital financial services, 2014. pp.2 
^12	  Ibid 
^13	  Currently, there are four mobile phone services providing mobile phone money transfers services. They include Vodacom (M-Pesa), Airtel (Aitel Money), Zantel (Z-Pesa) and Tigo (Tigo-Pesa)
^14	  Gidvani,L & Di castri,S op.cit pp.2 
^15	  Nyamtiga, B.W et al ., Enhanced  Security Model for Mobile Banking Systems in Tanzania International Journal of Technology Enhancements and Emerging Engineering Research,vol 1,issue 4 ISSN 2347-4289,2013, pp.4
^16	  See http://www.datavision.co.tz/2011/02/25/govt-to-table-bill-on-mobile-banking-regulations/,accessed on 05th September, 2014.
^17	  Chatain, P, et.al. Protecting mobile money against financial crimes: Global policy challenges and solutions, 2011, pp.69
^18	 Anonymity in the context of M-Money refers specifically to the risk that a criminal may gain access to m-money using a false name or may be allowed to access the services by not disclosing his identity to the MNO or banker.
^19	  Elusiveness may exist in the use of M-Money to facilitate money movements. Certain cultural practices could provide cover for the true initiator and recipient of a transaction. Mobile phone “pooling,” which is used in poorer communities and the delegation of use in wealthier circles are both examples of exclusiveness. For example, phone pooling is a growing practice in rural villages throughout Africa and Asia. The local community appoints a responsible person to manage a mobile phone that is shared among those in the village. If the phone is registered, it will be under the name of the responsible carrier, not all of those people in the community who may use it.
^20	 The convenience of M-Money programs—the ability to use them quickly and practically anywhere at any time—can aid efforts to “layer” a transaction. In ML terminology, layering is the practice of obscuring the origin of funds by complicating their path (for example, transferring them frequently through different accounts within a jurisdiction, and even between jurisdictions). The high speed at which this can be done makes layering much easier than in traditional transfer methods that can require face-to-face interaction with bank personnel at each step. A criminal sitting in one spot with several phones in hand could easily move funds across multiple m-money accounts.
^21	  The risk of poor oversight has emerged because current and emerging m-money programs may fall outside anti-money laundering/combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) regulations in some countries. The AML/CFT regulations in place for other financial institutions may not legally apply to the new providers that facilitate m-money (such as telecommunications companies [telecom]) because their primary business is not the provision of financial services. Because the m-money market is generally newer than the AML and CFT legislation in many countries, governments did not consider m-money providers when drafting those laws.
^22	  Anti-money laundering/combating the financing of terrorism
^23	  Bank of Tanzania Act, 2006 
^24	  Gidvani,L & Di castri,S op.cit,pp. 6
^25	  Ibid 
^26	  The no objection letters specified that mobile money deployments were subject to BOT oversight and the (prudential and non-prudential) regulatory requirements for the provision of the services, including: Presentation to the BOT before approval, obtaining a Tanzanian Communication Regulatory Authority (TCRA ) licence for the provision of value added services, providing a risk management plan to the BOT, establishing safeguards for customer funds, submitting monthly data on the volume and value of transactions, as well as trust account balances, consumer protection mechanisms, distribution requirements, Know Your Customer (KYC) standards, Maximum transaction limits and Restrictions on the use of interest.
^27	  Gidvani,L & Di castri,S op.cit,pp. 6
^28	  Ibid 
^29	  Ibid 
^30	  Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Counter-terrorist Financing (CFT) 
^31	  Ibid 
^32	  Ibid 
^33	  See http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/24/tanzania-tigo-idUSL6N0LT2W120140224 accessed on 26th May 2014 at 15.30.
^34	 www.telegeography.com/products/commsupdate/articles/2014/06/05/airtel-tigo-and-zantel-establish-mobile-money-interoperability-in-tanzania/ accessed on 26th May,2014
^35	  Merritt, C., Mobile money transfer services: the next phase in the evolution of person to person payments, Retail Payments Risk Forum White Paper Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 2010.
^36	  Ibid 
^37	  Uganda Law Reform Commission., Development of Legislation to govern Mobile financial services in Uganda (Mobile Money and Internet Banking), 2014, available in http://www.ulrc.go.ug accessed on 15th July, 2014 
^38	 Di castri,S & Gidvani,L., Enabling mobile money policies in Tanzania: A test and learn approach to enabling market –led digital financial services, 2014, pp.9 
^39	 Ibid pp.6-7
^40	  USAID., Tanzania mobile money assessment and case study examining cash payment streams and their electronic alternatives among USAID implementing partners,2013,pp.12
^41	  BOT, (2011)., Tanzania Mainland’s 50 years of independence, A review of the Role and functions of Bank of Tanzania, pp. 68
^42	  International Telecommunication Union., The regulatory landscape for mobile banking: GSR 2011 Discussion paper,pp.15-17
^43	  Villasenor, J., Smartphones for the Unbanked: How Mobile Money Will Drive Digital Inclusion in Developing Countries, Issues in Technology Innovation number 24, 2013.
^44	  Odhiambo, O.J., Convergence between mobile telecommunications and financial services implications for regulation of mobile telecommunications in Kenya, a thesis submitted to the school of law in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of master of laws of the University of Nairobi, 2013.
^45	  Adoption and effectiveness of electronic banking in Kenya, Electronic Commerce Research and Applications ,2010, pp.277–282
^46	  Adoption and effectiveness of electronic banking in Kenya, Electronic Commerce Research and Applications ,2010, pp.277–282
^47	  Argent, J. et al., The regulation of mobile money in Rwanda, working paper August, 2013
^48	  Emmanuel, A., Mobile Banking in Developing Countries: Secure Framework for Delivery of SMS-banking Services, Master thesis, 2007
^49	  SMS banking is a type of mobile banking, a technology-enabled service offering from banks to its customers, permitting them to operate selected banking services over their mobile phones using SMS messaging. SMS Banking is a service that allows customers to access their account information via mobile phone. SMS banking services are operated using both push and pull messages. Push messages are those that the bank chooses to send out to a customer's mobile phone, without the customer initiating a request for the information. Pull messages are those that are initiated by the customer, using a mobile phone, for obtaining information or performing a transaction in the bank account.
^50	 AFI.,The African Financial Inclusion  Policy Forum, Zanzibar, March 1-2,2012
^51	  Afanu,E.K & Mamattah,R.S., Mobile Money Security, A Holistic Approach, Master’s Thesis, Lulea University of Technology,2013, pp.1 & 62
^52	  Vibhute,K & Aynale,F.,Legal research methods: Teaching material,2009, pp.26
^53	  Ibid pp.29
^54	  Ibid pp.30
^55	  Singhal, A.K & Malik, I., Doctrinal and socio-legal methods of research: merits and demerits, Educational Research Journal Vol. 2(7), pp. 252-256, July 2012 Available online at http://www.resjourn accessed 20th may 2014.
^56	  Singhal, A.K & Malik, I. op.cit 
^57	 Makulilo,A,B., Protection of Personal Data in sub-Saharan Africa, PhD Thesis, Bremen University,2012 pp.88
^58	  Eberle, E.J., The method and role of comparative law, Washington University Global Studies Law Review, Volume 8 number 3, 2009 
^59	  Ibid 
^60	  USAID., Standards and Practices Report for Electronic and Mobile Payments, 2012, pp.18
^61	  Ali,R et.al., Innovations in payment technologies and the emergence of digital currencies, Quarterly Bulletin 2014,pp.3
^62	  Ibid 
^63	  Villasenor,J.,op.cit,pp.1
^64	  Semenova,A., The origins of money: evaluating chartalist and metallist theories in the context of ancient Greece and Mesopotamia, PhD thesis, University of Missouri-Kansas City, 2007,pp.1
^65	  Alhassan, H.A., Money and Banking, National Open University of Nigeria, 2008, pp.7
^66	  Ibid 
^67	  http://www.econ.ku.dk/okocg/VM/VM11/Lectures%20and%20lecture%20notes/Ch16-2011-1.pdf, visited on 18th August,2015 at 15.17 p.m
^68	  Chartalism is the theory that money originated with states.'  The early-20th-century German economist Georg Friedrich Knapp first developed the theory of chartalism, which defines money as a unit of account with value that is determined by what the government will accept as payment for tax obligations. In other words, chartalism states that money does not have intrinsic value, but is given value by the government.
^69	  Tcherneva,P.R, op.cit
^70	  Ibid 
^71	  Ibid 
^72	 Alhassan op.cit, pp.6-7
^73	  Alhassan op.cit, pp.6-7
^74	  Ibid 
^75	  Ibid 
^76	  Alhassan, op.cit, pp 6-7
^77	  Perlman,L.J.,Legal and regulatory aspects of mobile financial services, Doctoral thesis, University of South Africa, 2012, pp.74
^78	  Ibid pp.75
^79	  ibid 
^80	  Perlman,L.J., op.cit 
^81	  El-Gawady,Z.M., Relationship between E-money and Monetary Policy in Egypt,2006 at pp.3
^82	 Alhassan, H.A, Money and banking, National Open University of Nigeria, 2008, pp.7-10
^83	  Alhassan, H.A, op.cit
^84	  Ibid 
^85	  Alhassan op.cit, pp.8
^86	  Alhassan op.cit, pp.8
^87	  Perlman,op.cit, pp.90
^88	  Perlman,op.cit, pp.90
^89	  Ibid  pp.90-91
^90	  Ibid  pp.90-91
^91	  Perlman,op.cit, pp.91
^92	  The first iteration of paper money in Europe was the banknote, first thought to be paper ‘coins’ issued in Protestant Leyden in the Netherlands during the Spanish siege of 1574, while the first proper European banknotes were issued in 1656 by Stockholm’s Banco, a predecessor of the Bank of Sweden. 
^93	  Ibid 
^94	  Plastic money refers to the use of credit or debit cards as an alternative for cash in making payments for goods and services. Apart from withdrawing money on an ATM or transacting on a Point of Sale (POS) in a retail market, plastic money brings with it enhanced security, portability, 24 hour accessibility to account balances, easy payment of monthly utility bills or transfer funds between accounts.
^95	  Kaseke,N., cash or plastic money – an investigation into the payment mode post multi-currency period in Zimbabwe, International Journal of Advanced Research in Management and Social Sciences, Vol. 1 | No. 6  December, 2012.pp.2.
^96	  Ibid 
^97	  Kamnar, N.P., The use of electronic money and its impact on monetary policy, JCEBI, Vol.1 (2014) No.2, pp. 79 - 92 at pp.79
^98	  Ibid 
^99	  Stuber,G etal., Electronic Money and Payments: Recent Developments and Issues, Bank of Canada Discussion Paper 2014-2,2014,pp.7
^100	  Geva,B & Kianieff,M., Reimagining E-Money: Its Conceptual Unity with other Retail Payment Systems, 2002 at pp.1
^101	  Act, No.4 of 2015
^102	  Alampay,E & Bala,G.,M-money for the BoP in the Philippines, Information Technologies & International Development journal, Volume 6, Number 4, Winter,2010, 77–92 at pp.77
^103	  Ibid 
^104	  Stuber, G et al., op.cit, pp.8
^105	  Bell,S., the hierarchy of money, Working Paper No. 231, Visiting Scholar, The Jerome Levy Economics Institute,1998,pp.1
^106	  Semenova,A., The origins of money: evaluating chartalist and metallist theories in the context of ancient Greece and Mesopotamia, PhD Thesis, the University of Missouri-Kansas City,2011 at pp.15
^107	  Bell,op.cit,pp.1
^108	  Bell,op.cit,pp.1
^109	  Ibid pp.2
^110	  Ibid 
^111	  Bell,op.cit
^112	  Ibid 
^113	  Ibid 
^114	  Carl Menger is the founder of the Austrian School of economics. Menger contributed to the development of the theory of marginalism, (marginal utility), which rejected the cost-of-production theories of value, such as were developed by the classical economists such as Adam Smith and David Ricardo. Carl Menger has provided an irrefutable praxeological theory of the origin of money. Praxeology is the distinctive methodology of the Austrian School. The term was first applied to the Austrian method by Ludwig von Mises, who was not only the major architect and elaborator of this methodology but also the economist who most fully and successfully applied it to the construction of economic theory 
^115	  Bell,op.cit,pp.2
^116	  Ibid 
^117	  Ibid 
^118	  Bell op.cit,pp.2
^119	  Ibid pp.4
^120	  Semenova,A., The origins of money: evaluating chartalist and metallist theories in the context of ancient Greece and Mesopotamia, PhD Thesis, the University of Missouri-Kansas City,2011 at Pp.46
^121	  Bell,op.cit,Pp.4
^122	  Semenova,A., op.cit, pp.15
^123	  Bell,op.cit,Pp.4
^124	  Semenova,A., op.cit, Pp.49
^125	  Rabbior,G., Money and monetary policy in Canada,Candian foundation for Economic Education, 1994
^126	  Ibid 
^127	  NOUN., Money and banking, 2008,at pp.23
^128	  Ibid 
^129	  Ibid 
^130	  NOUN
^131	  Ibid  pp.24
^132	  Ibid 
^133	  NOUN.,op.cit pp.24
^134	  Ibid 
^135	  NOUN.,op.cit.pp.25
^136	  NOUN.,op.cit
^137	  Ibid 
^138	  Ibid  pp.25
^139	  NOUN op.cit .26
^140	  NOUN op.cit .26
^141	  Ibid 
^142	  Ibid 
^143	  Ibid 
^144	  NOUN.,op.cit,Pp.27
^145	  Ibid 
^146	  Bećirović,S.,challenges facing e-money, University journal of Information Technology and Economics, VOL.1 (NO.1), 2014,pp.28-36,pp.29
^147	  Semenova,A.,op.cit
^148	  Tuba,M.D., the regulation of electronic money institutions in the SADC region: some lessons from the EU,P.E.R, Volume 17 No 6, 2004,PP.1
^149	  Putnis,J.,The banking regulation review,4th,Edition,2013,pp.774
^150	  Act No.4 of 2006
^151	  Bank for International Settlements, implications for central banks of the development of electronic money,Basle,1996,pp.1
^152	  AFI., Mobile financial services; Regulatory approaches to enable access, policy note,pp.9
^153	  Ernst & Young., Mobile money An overview for global telecommunications operators, 2009, pp.6
^154	  Ibid 
^155	  Lawack,V.A.,Mobile money, financial inclusion and financial integrity: the South African case,  Washington Journal of law, Technology & Arts volume 8, issue 3mobile money symposium, 2013,pp.3
^156	  Ernst & Young., op.cit, pp.6
^157	  Lal,R., Mobile Money Services - Design and Development for Financial Inclusion, Working Paper 15-083, Harvard Business School,2015,pp.3
^158	  Rumanyika, J.D.  obstacles towards adoption of mobile banking in Tanzania: a review, International Journal of Information Technology and Business Management, Vol.35 No.1, 2015,PP.2
^159	 Rumanyika, J.D. op.cit  
^160	  Ibid pp.9
^161	  Diniz,E.H, Albuquerque,J.P and Cernev,A.K., Mobile Money and Payment: a literature review based on academic and practitioner-oriented publications (2001-2011),2011 at pp.3
^162	 Diniz,E.H, op.cit, pp.3 
^163	  UNCTAD,op.cit, Pp.12
^164	  Financial inclusion refers to the government strategies of offering affordable, convenient and high-quality financial services to people from all socio-economic backgrounds.
^165	  Webb Henderson., Mobile money regulation, 2014 at pp.1
^166	  Ibid 
^167	  Webb Henderson,op.cit
^168	  Rumanyika, J.D.  op.cit,pp.2
^169	  Ibid 
^170	  UNCTAD, Mobile money for business development in the East African community, a comparative study of existing platforms and regulations, pp.16-19
^171	  UNCTAD, op.cit,  pp.16
^172	  http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/business/Mobile-money-subscribers-on-the-rise-across-the-region-/-/2560/2834470/-/item/0/-/extrpf/-/index.html, visited on 6th,May,2016 at pp. 17.27
^173	  Ibid 
^174	  UNCTAD,op.cit,pp.16
^175	  Ibid pp.18
^176	  Ibid 
^177	  UNCTAD,op.cit
^178	  Ibid 
^179	   Vodacom Tanzania has partnered with umoja switch ATMS for M-Pesa customer to withdraw money through umoja switch ATMS. Through the ATM's clients can access their money 24 hours a day, seven days a week, check their balances, print mini statements, make transfers and purchase utilities. Umoja switch members are, Access Bank ,Akiba Commercial Bank, Amana Bank ,Azania Bank, Bank Of Africa, Commercial Bank Of Africa ,DCB PLC, Efatha Bank, Kagera Farmers Cooperative Bank, Kilimanjaro Cooperative Bank ,Maendeleo Bank, Mbinga Community Bank ,Mkombozi Commercial Bank, Mufindi Community Bank, Mwanga Community Bank, NIC Bank Tanzania, Peoples Bank of Zanzibar, Njombe Community Bank ,Tanzania Investment Bank, Tanzania Postal Bank, Tanzania Women Bank, Twiga Bancorp, Uchumi Commercial Bank. Cited at http://www.advansbanktanzania.com/index.php?id=669 ,on 7th,May,2016 at 18.23
^180	  UNCTAD,op.cit pp.7
^181	  ITU., The Regulatory Landscape for Mobile Banking, GSR 2011 Discussion Paper,2011,pp.7
^182	  ITU,op.cit,pp.7
^183	  Economides,N & Jeziorski,P., Mobile money in Tanzania, 2016,PP.4
^184	  Economides,N & Jeziorski,P. op.cit, pp.4
^185	  Economides,N & Jeziorski,P. op.cit, pp.4
^186	  ITU,op.cit,pp.7 
^187	  Ibid pp.8
^188	  ITU,op.cit,pp.11
^189	  Ibid pp.10 
^190	  Ibid 
^191	  Odhiambo, O.J., Convergence between mobile telecommunications and financial services implications for regulation of mobile telecommunications in Kenya pp.57
^192	  Perhaps the most successful non-bank m-banking service is M-PESA, a mobile money transfer service launched on a pilot basis in October 2005 by Safaricom and Vodafone and commercially launched in March 2007. One year after an extremely successful launch of the service in Kenya, the service went live in Tanzania, April 2008.
^193	  Odhiambo, O.J., op.cit, pp.58
^194	  “banking business” means the business of receiving funds from the general public through the acceptance of deposits payable upon demand or after a fixed period or after notice, or any similar operation through the frequent sale or placement of bonds, certificates, notes or other securities, and to use such funds, in whole or in part, for loans or investments for the account of and at the risk of the person doing such business;
^195	  Odhiambo,op.cit,pp.59
^196	  ITU,op.cit,pp.11
^197	  Odhiambo, op.cit.pp.59
^198	  Odhiambo, op.cit.pp.59
^199	  UNCTAD, op.cit, pp.13 cited at Jenkins, B. “Developing Mobile Money Ecosystems” Washington, DC: IFC and the Harvard Kennedy School, 2008
^200	  Ibid pp.5
^201	  UNCTAD,op.cit,pp.14
^202	  UNCTAD,op.cit,pp.13
^203	  Malala,J., Consumer Protection for Mobile Payments In Kenya: An Examination Of The Fragmented Legislation and The Complexities It Presents For Mobile Payments,2013 at pp.7
^204	  Victor, D. op.cit, pp.5
^205	  Malala,J.,op.cit
^206	  ibid pp.7
^207	  UNCTAD,op.cit,pp.13
^208	  Ibid pp.14
^209	  Malala,J.,op.cit,pp.7
^210	  Malala,J.,op.cit,pp.7
^211	  Victor, D., op.cit, pp.5, Tanzania is a member of Alliance for financial inclusion.
^212	  UNCTAD,op.cit,pp.13
^213	  Rumanyika, J.D.  op.cit,pp.2
^214	  BOT.,Tanzania Mainland’s 50 Years of Independence: A Review of the Role and Functions of the Bank of Tanzania (1961—2011),2011,pp.6
^215	  Ibid 
^216	  Ibid 
^217	  BOT,op.cit pp.6
^218	  Ibid 
^219	  Johnson,C.A &Steigerwald,R.S., Legal and Policy Aspects of the Central Bank’s Role in the Payment System: Some Costs and Benefits of the Choice of Settlement Asset,2006, pp.1
^220	  Johnson,C.A &Steigerwald,R.S.,op.cit pp.9
^221	 Kokkola,T.,Payments,securities and derivatives and the role of euro system, European Central Bank,pp.151
^222	  Kokkola,T, op.cit
^223	  Ibid pp.10
^224	  Johnson,C & Steigerwald,R., op.cit,pp.11
^225	  Johnson,C & Steigerwald,R., op.cit,pp.11
^226	  Perlman,op.cit, pp.67
^227	  Ibid 
^228	  Ibid pp.68
^229	  Perlman,op.cit, pp.68
^230	  Ibid 
^231	  Kokkola,T.,op.cit, pp.153
^232	  Kokkola,T.,op.cit, pp.153156
^233	  Al-Laham,M etal., Development of Electronic Money and Its Impact on the Central Bank Role and Monetary Policy, Issues in Informing Science and Information Technology Volume 6, 2009,pp.1
^234	  Ibid 
^235	  Berentsen, A., Monetary policy implications of digital money, University of Bern,1997,pp.4
^236	  Ibid 
^237	  Seigniorage means the difference between the value of money and the cost to produce it, in other words, the economic cost of producing a currency within a given economy or country. It is a source of revenue for government as the value of money printed is generally higher than the cost of producing it.
^238	 Al-Laham,M etal., Development of Electronic Money and Its Impact on the Central Bank Role and Monetary Policy, Issues in Informing Science and Information Technology Volume 6, 2009,339-349,pp.346 
^239	  Fälth,M., Electronic Money and the Future Role of Central Banks, Gothenburg School of Economics and Commercial Law, Master thesis,1999 at pp.21
^240	  Kamnar,N.P., The use of electronic money and its impact on monetary policy,JCEBI, Vol.1 (2014) No.2, pp.79 - 92 | at,pp.89
^241	  The velocity of money (also called the velocity of circulation of money) refers to how fast money passes from one holder to the next. It can refer to the income velocity of money, which is the frequency at which the average unit of currency is used to purchase newly domestically-produced goods and services within a given time period. In other words, it is the number of times one dollar is spent to buy goods and services per unit of time. Alternatively and less frequently, it can refer to the transactions velocity of money, which is the frequency with which the average unit of currency is used in any kind of transaction in which it changes possession not only the purchase of newly produced goods, but also the purchase of financial assets and other items.
^242	  Fälth,M., op.cit
^243	 In monetary economics, a money multiplier is one of various closely related ratios of commercial bank money to central bank money under a fractional-reserve banking system. Most often, it measures the maximum amount of commercial bank money that can be created by a given unit of central bank money. In order to determine how much money can be created in the economy from an initial deposit, one must first solve for the money multiplier: Money Multiplier= 1/ Reserve Ratio  This means that for every $1 increase of deposits leads to a $ (1/reserve ratio) increase in money supply. The money multiplier can be used to determine the total increase in money supply:  Total Increase in Money supply= Money Multiplier x Deposit.  
^244	  Al-Laham,M etal.,op.cit,Pp.346
^245	  Fälth,M.,op.cit,Pp.20
^246	  Ibid 
^247	  Ibid 
^248	  Bankable Frontier Associates.,  managing the risk of mobile banking technologies,2008,pp.9
^249	  Ibid 
^250	  Tarazi and Brefloff, 2010
^251	  Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, Risk management for electronic banking and electronic money activities, 1998, pp.4
^252	  A retail payment instrument is defined here as an instrument that facilitates the transfer of funds, for example a check, debit card, or credit transfer. A related term is electronic payment instrument, which is defined here as a payment instrument that uses electronic means for initiation, authorization and authentication of a payment transaction. Even though a transaction might be initiated electronically, the subsequent processes of clearing and settlement might involve a combination of manual and electronic procedures
^253	  Bank for International Settlements., Non-banks in retail payment systems,2014 at pp.22
^254	  Merritt,C.,op.cit,pp.18
^255	  Kokkola,T., Payments, securities and derivatives, and the role of the Eurosystem,2010 at pp.25
^256	  Jones,J.,Operational risk in payment systems,2006 at pp.2
^257	  Basle Committee on Banking Supervision.,op.cit,pp.5
^258	  Jones,J.,op.cit,pp.2
^259	  Ibid 
^260	  Bank for International Settlements., Non-banks in retail payment systems,2014 at pp.23
^261	  Kokkola,T.,op.cit,pp.116
^262	  Lee, BC and Longe-Akindemowo, O.,op.cit,pp.9
^263	  Bollen,R.,op.cit,pp.37
^264	  Ibid 
^265	  Ibid 
^266	 Bollen,R., “Best practice in the regulation of payment services “A Doctoral thesis, School of Accounting College of Business RMIT University,2010, at pp.41
^267	 Ibid 
^268	   Kokkola,T.,op.cit,pp.127
^269	  Basle Committee on Banking Supervision,op.cit,pp.7
^270	  Kokkola,T.,op.cit,pp.127
^271	  Ibid., pp.128
^272	  Booz etal.,Mobile Financial Services Risk Matrix, 2010
^273	  Ibid 
^274	  Bandt,O & Hartmann, P.,Systemic risk: a survey, European  Central Bank working Paper series,2010,pp.11
^275	  Stephens, M.C., Promoting Responsible Financial Inclusion: A Risk-based Approach to Supporting Mobile Financial Services Expansion, banking and finance law review, 2012, 329-343, pp.333.
^276	  Lee, B.C & Akindemowo, O.L., Regulatory Issues in Electronic Money: A Legal- Economics Analysis Working Paper Series 1998,pp.8
^277	  USAID.,standards and practices report for electronic and mobile payments,pp.47-48
^278	  Ibid 
^279	  Ibid pp.49
^280	  USAID.,pp.50
^281	 USAID.op.cit, pp.50
^282	  Basle committee on banking supervision., risk management for electronic banking and electronic money activities, 1998,pp.9
^283	  Basle Committee on Banking Supervision.,op.cit,pp.10
^284	  Ibid 
^285	  Ibid 
^286	  Perlman,L.J., Legal and regulatory aspects of mobile financial services, PhD thesis, University of South Africa, 2012 at pp.239
^287	  Mtaho,A.B., Improving Mobile Money Security with Two- Factor Authentication, International Journal of Computer Applications (0975 –8887) Volume 109 –No. 7,2015,(8-15),pp.8
^288	  Senthe,S.E., op.cit,pp.39-40
^289	  Harris, A et al.,  Privacy and security concerns associated with mobile money applications in Africa, Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts volume 8, issue 3mobile money symposium ,2013,245-263,at Pp.253
^290	  Mtaho,A.B.,op.cit,pp.9
^291	   Harris, A etal., op.cit
^292	  Ibid 
^293	  Ibid 
^294	  Mtaho,A.B.,op.cit,pp.9
^295	  Ashraf,I.,op.cit,pp.13
^296	  Ibid 
^297	  Wi-Fi is the name of a popular wireless networking technology that uses radio waves to provide wireless high-speed Internet and network connections. A common misconception is that the term Wi-Fi is short for "wireless fidelity." Wi-Fi is a local area wireless computer networking technology that allows electronic devices to network, mainly using the 2.4 gigahertz (12 cm) UHF and 5 gigahertz (6 cm) SHF ISM radio bands. The Wi-Fi Alliance defines Wi-Fi as any "wireless local area network" (WLAN) product based on the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers' (IEEE) 802.11 standards. However, the term "Wi-Fi" is used in general English as a synonym for "WLAN" since most modern WLANs are based on these standards. 
^298	  Ashraf,I.,op.cit
^299	  Perlman,L.J.,op.cit,pp.214
^300	  Ibid pp.211
^301	  Ashraf,I.,op.cit,pp.13
^302	  Ashraf,I.,op.cit, pp.13-14
^303	  Perlman,L.J.,op.cit,pp.212
^304	  Kappelin,F and Rudvall,J., Fraud Detection within Mobile Money, A mathematical statistics approach, Master’s thesis, Blekinge Institute of Technology, 2015, pp.9
^305	  Ashraf,I.,op.cit,pp.14
^306	  Ibid 
^307	  Ashraf,I.,op.cit,pp.14
^308	  Ibid pp.14
^309	  Ashraf,I.,op.cit,pp.14
^310	  Ibid 
^311	  Senthe,S.E., op.cit,pp.45-46
^312	  Senthe,S.E., op.cit,pp.46
^313	  Ibid 
^314	  Ibid 
^315	  Senthe,S.E., op.cit,pp.46
^316	  Senthe,S.E., op.cit,pp.46
^317	 Nyaga,J.K., Mobile banking services in the East African Community (EAC): challenges to the existing legislative and regulatory frameworks, Journal of Information Policy 4 (2014): 270 -295,pp.280 
^318	  Nyaga,J.K, op.cit, pp. 280
^319	 Odhiambo, F., convergence of regulation and competition in telecommunication and finance: a proposed regulatory framework, University of Nairobi, 2015 at pp.3
^320	  ITU.,The Regulatory Landscape for Mobile Banking,GSR 2011 discussion paper,2011,pp.11
^321	  ITU,op.cit pp.11
^322	  Ibid 
^323	  Ibid 
^324	  ITU,op.cit, pp.12
^325	  ITU,op.cit, pp.12
^326	  Act No.3 of 2010
^327	  Section 5(1)
^328	  ITU,op.cit, pp.12
^329	  ITU.,op.cit,pp.13
^330	 Smedinghoff,T.J., The Legal Requirements for Creating Secure and Enforceable Electronic Transactions,2002,pp. 3-4
^331	  Smedinghoff,T.J, op.cit, pp. 4
^332	  Ibid Pp.11
^333	  Ibid 
^334	  Ibid 
^335	 O’Shea,K. etal., Electronic Contract Administration , Legal and Security Issues Literature Review Report No. 2005-025-A,2006,pp.11
^336	 O’Shea,K. etal., Electronic Contract Administration , Legal and Security Issues Literature Review Report No. 2005-025-A,2006,pp.11
^337	  Ibid 
^338	  (1818) 1 B & Ald.681
^339	  (1879) L.R.4EX.DN.26
^340	 http://media.mofo.com/files/PrivacyLibrary/3531/TanzaniaPositionpaperonecommerceadobe.pdf  surfed on 5th, October, 2015 at 11.41.
^341	  [2004] 2 SLR 594
^342	  E-agents, therefore, are computer programs or software with the ability to perform certain functions desired by their programmer or by themselves, depending on their nature
^343	  Nangela,D.J., The Adequacy of the Tanzanian Law on E-commerce and E-contracting: Possible Solutions to be Found in International Models and South African Legislation, PhD Thesis, University of Cape Town,2011, pp.52
^344	  Nangela,D.J., op.cit,pp. 56
^345	  Ibid 
^346	  Grinngras,C.,The laws of the internet, second edition,butterworths LexisNexis, Reed Elsevier,2003, pp.47
^347	  Ibid 
^348	  De las Heras Ballell, T.R., applicable law and jurisdiction in electronic contracts 1, 2010 at pp.3.available also in http://www.emarketservices.com/clubs/ems/prod/E-Business%20Issue%20Applicable%20law%201(1).pdf
^349	  Grinngras,C., op.cit,pp.47
^350	  De las Heras Ballell,T.R.,op.cit
^351	 www.cuts-international.org/arc/nairobi/pdf/African_Dialogue_Vol1-Issue2.pdf,surfed on 24th,May,2014 at 17.34
^352	  OECD., Report on Consumer Protection in Online and Mobile Payments, OECD Digital Economy Papers, No. 204,2012 at pp.5
^353	  Mwenegoha, T. The Development of Consumer Protection Laws in Tanzania for Electronic Consumer Contracts,PhD  thesis, Bond University, 2015,pp. 27
^354	  Mwenegoha, T. op.cit
^355	  Huffmann,H., Consumer Protection in E-Commerce, Master of Laws dissertation, University of Cape town,2004,pp.3
^356	  Act No.8 of 2003
^357	  Section 3 of the Act, Act No.6 of 2015
^358	 Erasmus,C., Consumer protection in International electronic contracts, Masters Mini-dissertation, North-West University,2011,at pp.13
^359	  Huffmann, H., op.cit pp.21
^360	  See http://lawyer.20m.com/English/articles/e.money.htm,visited at 12.30 on 15th May 2011
^361	  Act No.6 of 2015
^362	 Section one of Part two of Guidelines for Consumer Protection in the context of Electronic Commerce (2000) OECD 
^363	  Ibid 
^364	  UNCTAD,op.cit pp.20
^365	  UNCTAD,op.cit,pp.20
^366	  R v Brown[1996] 1 All ER 545,556 cited in Akomolede,TI., contemporary legal issues in electronic  commerce in  Nigeria, PER, 2008 Volume 11 No.3 at pp.4
^367	  Akomolede, TI., contemporary legal issues in electronic commerce in  Nigeria, PER, 2008 Volume 11 No.3 at pp.5
^368	  South African Law Reform Commission, privacy and data protection, discussion paper 109 Project 124,2005,pp.7
^369	  South African Law Reform Commission, privacy and data protection, discussion paper 109 Project 124,2005,pp.7
^370	 Ibid ,pp.10
^371	  South African Law Reform Commission, privacy and data protection,op.cit,pp.10
^372	  Ibid, pp.10
^373	  South African Law Reform Commission, privacy and data protection,op.cit,pp.11
^374	  Ibid 
^375	  The electronic and postal communications (consumer protection) regulations, 2011
^376	  The electronic and postal communications (consumer protection) regulations, 2011
^377	 Lubua, E.W., Cyber Crimes Incidents in Financial Institutions of Tanzania, International Journal of Computer Science and Business Informatics, Vol. 14, No. 3. 2014,[Pp.37-48] at pp.37
^378	  Ibid 
^379	  Leena, N., Cyber Crime Effecting E-commerce Technology, Oriental Journal of Computer Science & Technology Vol. 4(1), 209-212, 2011, at pp.210
^380	   Leena, N., op.cit
^381	  ITU., Understanding cybercrime: Phenomena, challenges and legal response,2012,at,pp.17
^382	  ITU., Understanding cybercrime: Phenomena, challenges and legal response,2012,at,pp.17
^383	 Ibid pp.20
^384	  Leena,N.,op.cit,pp.210
^385	  Ibid 
^386	  ITU,op.cit,pp.30
^387	  Leena,N.,op.cit,Pp.211
^388	  Pfleeger,C.P., Security in computing, third edition, Prentice Hall, 2003,pp.139
^389	  Pfleeger,C.P.,op.cit
^390	  ITU,op.cit,pp.31




^395	  Ibid 
^396	  Ibid 
^397	 UNCTAD, op.cit,pp.24 
^398	  Ibid 
^399	  CGAP., Regulating Transformational Branchless Banking: Mobile Phones and Other Technology to Increase Access to Finance, focus note No.43,2008,pp.7-8
^400	  Senthe, S.E., Transformative technology in microfinance: delivering hope electronically? 13 PGH. J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 1,Vol.XIII,pp.29
^401	 Ngendakuriyo,F., Mobile and Agency Banking in the East African Community Countries: A diagnostic analysis,pp.4
^402	  Ibid
^403	  This Focus Note uses the term “agent” to refer to any third party acting on behalf of a bank (or other principal), whether pursuant to an agency agreement, service agreement, or other similar arrangement. In most countries, a principal is liable under law for the actions of its agents, whether such actions are explicitly or implicitly authorized. Liability for the actions of a non agent acting on behalf of the bank may be different and will often depend on the contractual agreement. However, a bank’s liability (whether by law or contract) for third-party actors will likely impact the bank’s policies and procedures, which will in turn impact the supervisor’s oversight of the bank.
^404	  Lauer,K etal., Bank Agents: Risk Management, Mitigation, and Supervision, CGAP focus note No.75,2011,pp.1
^405	  Ngendakuriyo,F.,op.cit,pp.12
^406	  Senthe, S.E.,op.cit,pp.30
^407	 Ibid  
^408	  Senthe, S.E.,op.cit,pp.30  
^409	  Ibid ,pp.31
^410	  Webb Hunderson,op.cit,pp.4
^411	  Ibid, pp.4
^412	  CGAP,op.cit,pp.8
^413	  Mayer,C & Klein,M., Mobile Banking and Financial Inclusion; The Regulatory Lessons, Policy Research Working Paper, 5664,2011,pp.27
^414	 CGAP,op.cit,pp.9 
^415	  Ibid ,pp.9
^416	  Ibid 
^417	  CGAP,op.cit,pp.9
^418	  Senthe, S.E.,op.cit,pp.36
^419	  Ibid 
^420	  Senthe, S.E.,op.cit,pp.36
^421	  Ibid 
^422	  Ibid 
^423	 Senthe, S.E.,op.cit, pp.43-44
^424	  (A3044/2010) [2010] ZAGPJHC 112; 2012 (1) SA 615 (GSJ) (18 November 2010)
^425	  Senthe,S.E., op.cit,pp.45
^426	  Ibid pp.45
^427	  Ibid 
^428	  Sit,B.,Electronic retail payment systems in conflict of laws, Basic Electronic Payment Systems and Determination of the Applicable Law in North America and Europe, Ankara Law review, Vol.2 No.2 2005, pp. 145-170,pp.147
^429	  Money that depends for its value on confidence that it is an accepted medium of exchange
^430	 Athanassiou,P & Mas-Guix,N., Electronic money institutions current trends, regulatory issues and future prospects, Europen Central Bank, Legal working paper series,No.7,2008,pp.6
^431	  Ibid 
^432	  [1899] 2 QB 111, 116, cited at Geva,B & Kianieff,M.,op.cit pp.5
^433	  Geva,B & Kianieff,M.,op.cit pp.5
^434	  Ibid 
^435	  Geva,B & Kianieff,M.,op.cit pp.8
^436	  Clark,D., A2A Interoperability; Making Mobile Money Schemes Interoperate,2014,pp.2
^437	  IFC., Achieving Interoperability in mobile financial services; Tanzania Case Study,2015,pp.2
^438	  Clark,D., A2A Interoperability; Making Mobile Money Schemes Interoperate,2014,pp.2
^439	  Clark,D.,op.cit,pp.2
^440	  IFC.,op.cit,pp.2
^441	  Ibid 
^442	  IFC.,op.cit,pp.2
^443	  Ibid 
^444	  Ibid pp.5
^445	  IFC.,op.cit, pp.3
^446	  Argent etal.,op.cit,pp.11
^447	  Opara,L.C., tax challenges of e-commerce in Nigeria: the panacea for legal jurisprudence, Global Journal of Politics and Law Research Vol.2, No.4, pp.1-5,2014,at pp.1
^448	  www.oecd.org/tax/consumption/5594899.pdf, visited on 9th October,2015 at 16.42
^449	  Jones,R & Basu,S., taxation of electronic commerce: A developing problem, International review of law of computers & technology, volume 16, no. 1, [pp. 35–52], 2002,at pp.1-2.
^450	 In residence-based taxation, the country has jurisdiction to tax its residents on their worldwide income. In this system, the determination of residency for tax purposes is critical. The justification for residence-based tax jurisdiction stems from the contribution of the country of residence to the abilities of the income producer. It is alternatively justified by the social contract made between the members of the country and the governing body. 
^451	  In source-based taxation, the country has jurisdiction to tax income sourced to its territory. Source rules determine the source of the income for this purpose by distinguishing between different categories of income. Hence, income classification is the first step needed to apply source-based taxation. The justification for source taxation is that the source country has contributed infrastructure and other facilities in the income production process.
^452	  Agrawal, N, et al. Impact of E-commerce on Taxation, International Journal of Information and Computation Technology. ISSN 0974-2239 Volume 4, Number 1 (2014), pp. 99-106, at pp.2
^453	  Agrawal, N, et al, op.cit,pp.2
^454	  Ibid 
^455	  Gringras,C.,The laws of the Internet, second edition,Butterworths LexisNexis,2003,pp.404
^456	  Jones,R & Basu,S.,op.cit,pp.36
^457	  Watanagase,T., Standard Setting Bodies and Alliance for Financial Inclusion as Platforms for Peer Learning on Financial Inclusion,2014,pp.1
^458	  GPFI., Global Standard Setting Bodies and Financial Inclusion, Insight and lessons from five countries: Brazil, Kenya, Mexico, Philippines and South Africa,2011 at pp.1
^459	  GPFI.,op.cit, Pp.1
^460	  Di castri, op.cit, pp.14
^461	  The Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS) was created in 1990 as a forum for the central banks of the Group of Ten countries (G10) to monitor and analyses developments in domestic payment, settlement and clearing systems as well as in cross-border and multicurrency settlement schemes.The member countries are: France, Germany, Belgium, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada, with Switzerland playing a minor role.
^462	  Bank of Ghana, the national payment systems oversight framework, 2013 at pp.4
^463	  Act No.4 of 2015
^464	  Bank of Ghana, the national payment systems oversight framework, 2013 at pp.4
^465	  Ibid 
^466	  Bank for international settlement., Innovations in retail payments, 2012, pp.3
^467	  See https://www.bot-tz.org/PaymentSystem/Green%20book%20draft%2003dec-final.pdf, visited on 19th October,2015 at 11.11
^468	 Bank for International Settlements (BIS)., payment systems in the Southern African Development Community(SADC),Basel,1999.
^469	  Ibid 
^470	  https://www.bot-tz.org/PaymentSystem/Green%20book%20draft%2003dec-final.pdf, visited on 19th October, 2015 at 12.13.
^471	  Ibid 
^472	  Ibid 
^473	  GPFI.,op.cit
^474	  Ibid 
^475	  See http://www.iadi.org/aboutiadi.aspx?id=48#members, visited on 19th October,2015 at 14.37
^476	  Korea Deposit Insurance Cooperation., Modernization of Deposit Insurance System in Tanzania, 2012 at pp.61
^477	  Ibid 
^478	  Banking and Financial Institutions Act, Act No.5 of  2006
^479	  Chatain, P.L., mobile money, financial inclusion and policy challenges, an extension of 10th IADI Annual Conference titled “Beyond the Crisis: the Need for Strengthened Financial Stability Framework”, Warsaw Poland,2011, (107-116), at pp. 113
^480	  Ibid 
^481	 Chatain, P.L. op.cit pp.114
^482	  Chatain, P.L. op.cit pp.116
^483	  The FATF members include: Argentina; Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, European Commission, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Gulf Cooperation Council, Hong Kong, China, Iceland, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, Kingdom of the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, People’s Republic of China, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States.  
^484	  Kobor,E.S., the role of Anti-money laundering law in mobile money systems in developing countries, WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS VOLUME 8, ISSUE 3MOBILE MONEY SYMPOSIUM,(304-315), 2013 at pp.311
^485	  De Koker,L., The 2012 revised FATF recommendations: assessing and mitigating mobile money integrity risks within the new standards framework, Washington journal of law, technology & arts volume 8, issue 3 mobile money symposium ,2013,(166-196) at pp.167
^486	  Ibid 
^487	  De Koker,L.,op.cit, pp.169
^488	  De Koker,L.,op.cit, pp.169
^489	  Ibid 
^490	  Ibid 
^491	  Lyman, T & Noor, W., AML/CFT and Financial Inclusion: New Opportunities Emerge from Recent FATF Action, CGAP focus note, 2014, at pp.
^492	  FATF., Improving Global AML/CFT Compliance: On-going process, 2014
^493	  Ibid 
^494	 The Basel committee members are Russia, Hong Kong SAR, United Kingdom, Netherlands, Germany, Turkey, Mexico, France, Switzerland, Luxembourg, China, Sweden, Korea, Canada, Spain, Japan, Brazil, South Africa, Italy, Belgium, Singapore, and Indonesia. Australia, Saudi Arabia, India
^495	  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Basel_Committee_on_Banking_Supervision, visited on 03rd Agost,2015 at 15.31
^496	  GPFI., Global Standard-Setting Bodies and Financial Inclusion for the Poor, 2011, pp.3
^497	  ibid pp.14
^498	  GPFI. op.cit.  pp.54
^499	  Ibid 
^500	  Cockfield, A.J., the rise of the OECD as informal 'world tax organization' through National responses to ecommerce tax challenges, Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 8 Issue. 1, Art. 5,[138-186],2006,pp.140
^501	  Krensel,A., VAT Taxation of E-Commerce, Masters of Law dissertation at the University of Cape Town,
^502	  Ibid 
^503	  Azam, R., E-commerce taxation and cyberspace law: the integrative adaptation model, Virginia journal of law &technology, VOL. 12, NO. 5,pp.12
^504	  Ibid 
^505	  Cockfield, A.J.,op.cit,pp.141
^506	  Ibid 
^507	  Jones,R & Basu,S.,op.cit,pp.10
^508	  AFI., mobile financial services: technology risks,pp.1
^509	  ibid 
^510	  AFI., The African Financial Inclusion Policy Forum Scaling up financial services through mobile technology ,2012,Pp.11. Available also at http://www.afi-global.org/sites/default/files/publications/120905_AFI_Forweb_single.pdf visited at 20th October,2015 at 14.17
^511	  See http://www.afi-global.org/blog/2014/04/29/maya-declaration-emboldens-financial-inclusion-efforts-tanzania, visited on 20th October, 2015 at 14.30.
^512	  The Maya Declaration is a statement of common principles regarding the development of financial inclusion policy made by a group of developing nation regulatory institutions during the Alliance for Financial Inclusion's (AFI) 2011 Global Policy Forum held in Mexico.
^513	 http://www.afiglobal.org/sites/default/files/publications/2014_maya_declaration_progress_report_final_low_res.pdf. visited on 20th October, 2015 at 14.30
^514	  Castellani,L.G., the role of UNCITRAL texts in promoting a harmonized legal framework for cross-border mobile payments, Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts Volume 8, Issue 3, mobile money symposium 2013,(266-284),at pp.268.
^515	  Ibid pp.269
^516	  Ibid 
^517	  Castellani,L.G.,  pp.270
^518	  Ewelukwa, N., Is Africa Ready for Electronic Commerce? A Critical Appraisal of the Legal Framework for Ecommerce in Africa,2009,pp.15-16
^519	  Ewelukwa, N., op.cit
^520	  Nangela,D.E., op.cit,pp.352
^521	  Ibid 
^522	  http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_status.html, visited on 20th, October, 2015 at 15.55.
^523	  Tuba, M.D., the regulation of electronic money  institutions in the  SADC region: some lessons from the EU,P.E.R, VOLUME 17,No 6,[2269-2314],2014 at pp.2281
^524	  Ibid pp.2281-2282
^525	  Tuba, M.D., op.cit, pp.2281-2282
^526	  Yurtçiçek,M.S., the legal nature of electronic money and the effects of the EU regulations concerning the electronic money market, Law & Justice Review, Volume:IV, Issue:1, 2013,pp.3
^527	  Ibid 
^528	  Tuba, M.D., the regulation of electronic money  institutions in the  SADC region: some lessons from the EU,P.E.R, VOLUME 17,No 6,[2269-2314],2014 at pp.2289
^529	  Ibid 
^530	  Ibid 
^531	  Ibid 2275
^532	  HIPSSA –Electronic Transactions & Electronic Commerce: SADC Model Law
^533	  Ibid pp.1
^534	  Nangela,D.E.,op.cit pp.218
^535	  See, http://www.ippmedia.com/frontend/?l=62800, visited on 22nd October,2015 at 15.16
^536	  Batista,C etal., International Experiences of Mobile Banking Regulation, country policy note, 2012 at,pp.1
^537	  Tarazi, M. and P. Breloff ., Nonbank E-Money Issuers: Regulatory Approaches to Protecting Customer Funds, CGAP Focus Note 63,2010
^538	  Batista, C et al., op.cit,pp.2
^539	  Ibid 
^540	  Muthiora, B., enabling mobile money policies in Kenya: fostering a digital financial revolution, 2015, at pp.6
^541	  AFI.,op.cit
^542	  AFI.,op.cit
^543	  Andiva,B.,mobile money financial services and regulations in Kenya,2015 at pp.5
^544	  Muthiora, B., op.cit, pp. 20
^545	  Ibid 
^546	  Muthiora, B., op.cit, pp. 21
^547	  Malala,j., consumer protection for mobile payments in Kenya: an examination of the fragmented legislation and the complexities it presents for mobile payments, Kenya bankers association,2013,pp.13
^548	  Ibid 
^549	  CGAP., Update on Regulation of Branchless Banking in South Africa,2010,pp.2
^550	  Lawack,V.A., The Legal and Regulatory Framework of Mobile Banking and Mobile Payments in South Africa, Journal of International Commercial Law and Technology Vol. 7, Issue 4 (318-327),2012, at Pp.320
^551	  WIZZIT –payment ltd is a provider of basic banking services for the unbanked and under banked in South Africa. Launched in 2004, WIZZIT is formerly a division of the South African Bank of Athens, but its brand is owned and its operations are run by a group of independent entrepreneurs.
^552	  Ned bank, First National Bank, Standard Bank, and ABSA
^553	  Lawack,V.A., mobile money, financial inclusion and financial integrity: the South African case, Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts Volume 8, Issue 3 mobile money symposium 2013,(317-346) at pp.320
^554	  Lawack,V.A, op.cit 323
^555	 Ibid 
^556	  Ibid 
^557	  Lawack,V.A, op.cit 323
^558	 (Section 12(1) 
^559	  BSP.,Financial Inclusion Initiatives,2014 at pp.1
^560	  Bankable Frontier Associates, mobile money regulation in the Philippines,2010,at,pp. 2
^561	  ibid 
^562	  Ibid 
^563	  UNCTAD., Review of e-commerce legislation harmonization in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, New York,2013,pp.35
^564	  International Telecommunication Union(ITU)., the regulatory landscape for mobile banking,2011 at pp.8
^565	  UNCTAD., policies and regulation for financial inclusion: Philippine experience,2014,pp.7
^566	  Ibid 
^567	  Batista,C etal., international experiences of mobile banking regulation,2012 at pp.10
^568	  UNCTAD., Review of e-commerce legislation harmonization in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, New York, 2013,pp.35
^569	  Ibid 
^570	  Ibid 
^571	  UNCTAD.,op.cit
^572	  CGAP.,update on regulation of branchless banking in brazil, 2010 at pp.4
^573	  Ibid 
^574	  Almeida,G.M., M-payments in Brazil: notes on how a country’s background may determine timing and design of a regulatory model, Washington journal of law, technology & arts volume 8, issue 3mobile money symposium, 2013,(348-374) at pp.361
^575	  Almeida,G.M.,  pp.356
^576	  International Finance Corporation, IFC Mobile Money Scoping Country Report: Brazil,2010,pp.9
^577	  Ibid 
^578	   Almeida,G.M.,op.cit,pp.363
^579	  Ibid 
^580	  Ibid 
^581	  CGAP., Branchless Banking and Consumer Protection in Brazil,2009,pp.18 
^582	 Dias,D and McKee., Protecting Branchless Banking Consumers: Policy Objectives and Regulatory Options,2010,pp.10
^583	 http://www.bakerlaw.com/files/Uploads/Documents/Data%20Breach%20documents/International-Compendium-of-Data-Privacy-Laws.pdf, visited on 30th October,2015, at 16.10.
^584	  International Finance Corporation, IFC Mobile Money Scoping Country Report: Brazil,2010,pp.12
^585	  Ibid pp.12
^586	 http://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/sg/Documents/financial-services/sea-fsi-digital-financial-services-in-Indonesia-noexp.pdf, visited on 2nd,November,2015 at 13.06 
^587	  Udapud,S.V & Ghosh,B., The Information Technology Act of India: A critique, ZENITH  International  Journal of Business Economics & Management Research Vol.2 Issue 5,[182-194] 2012, at pp.186 Online available at http://zenithresearch.org.in
^588	  Udapud,S.V & Ghosh,B.,op.cit,pp.186
^589	  Nishith Desai Associates.,E-commerce in India, Legal, Tax and Regulatory Analysis,2015,pp.12
^590	  Ibid pp.13
^591	  Ibid pp.17
^592	  Kasyap,A.K.,Indian Banking; Contemporary issues in law and challenges, Allied Publishers PVT Ltd,New Delhi,2004 ,pp.5
^593	  Ibid 
^594	  Ibid 
^595	  Nishith Desai Associates.,op.cit pp.26
^596	  Suit No. 1279/2001,cited at Nishith Desai Associates.,op.cit pp.26
^597	  Nishith Desai Associates.,op.cit pp.28
^598	  Nishith Desai Associates.,op.cit pp.28
^599	  Devadevan,V., Mobile Banking in India – Issues & Challenges, International Journal of Emerging Technology and Advanced Engineering, Certified Journal, Volume 3, Issue 6, 2013,[516-520],at pp.518
^600	  CGAP., Update on Regulation of Branchless Banking in India, 2010, at pp. 6
^601	  These countries offer Mobile money services under bank led model and non-bank led model.
^602	  Chatain,P. etal.,protecting mobile money against financial crimes; Global policy challenges,pp.164
^603	  Kenya Bankers Association, Consumer Protection for Mobile Payments In Kenya: An Examination Of The Fragmented Legislation and The Complexities It Presents For Mobile Payments,2013, at pp.3
^604	  Kenya Bankers Association., op.cit, pp. 3-4
^605	  Ibid 
^606	  see http://www.datavision.co.tz/2011/02/25/govt-to-table-bill-on-mobile-banking-regulations/ 
^607	  See http://www.lrct-tz.org/Positionpaperone-COMMERCE.DOC. Visited on 22nd August at 19.30 hrs
^608	  Di Castri,S.,Mobile money: enabling regulatory solutions,2013, at pp. 4
^609	  Ally,A., op.cit
^610	  See Telecommunications/www.natcomreport.com/Tanzania/pdf-new/telecommunications.pdf, visited on 23rd July at 14.00 hrs.
^611	  Ibid 
^612	 Act  No.15 of 2007 
^613	  Undercover operations have important value for investigations. In some cases, they provide results that probably could not have been obtained or only with greater difficulty, with other investigative instruments. Furthermore, the undercover operations that have been carried out do generally pass review by the courts. At the same time, the aspect of unpredictability constitutes an important common characteristic of undercover operations. For example, agreements between undercover agents and suspects for criminal transactions are often not complied with
^614	  Section 40A of Evidence Act 1967
^615	  Act, No.13 of 2015
^616	  Act,No.14 of 2015
^617	 http://www.thecitizen.co.tz/magazine/businessweek/TCRA--Banks-to-benefit-by-two-new-laws/-/1843772/2865624/-/c6c5ap/-/index.html, visited on 3rd November,2015 at 15.14
^618	  Clyde & Co., Mobile financial services in Tanzania: The current and future status of the legal and regulatory framework,2014,pp.2
^619	  Clyde & Co, op.cit
^620	  Ibid 
^621	  Clyde & Co.,op.cit,pp.3
^622	  Ibid 
^623	  Ibid 
^624	  National Financial Inclusion Framework of Tanzania,2013 pp.1
^625	  Ibid 
^626	  Act No.4 of 2015
^627	 Alliance for Financial Inclusion, Mobile Financial Services: The Bank of Tanzania learns from the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas,2011,pp.2-3
^628	  Alliance for Financial Inclusion, Mobile Financial Services: The Bank of Tanzania learns from the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas,2011,pp.2-3 
^629	 Act  No.15 of 2007 
^630	  Undercover operations have important value for investigations. In some cases, they provide results that probably could not have been obtained or only with greater difficulty, with other investigative instruments. Furthermore, the undercover operations that have been carried out do generally pass review by the courts. At the same time, the aspect of unpredictability constitutes an important common characteristic of undercover operations. For example, agreements between undercover agents and suspects for criminal transactions are often not complied with
^631	  Section 40A of Evidence Act 1967
^632	  Cap 6, R.E. 2002
^633	  Thomson,L.L., Mobile devices; New challenges for admissibility of electronic evidence,SolTeoh Lawyer, Volume 9,Number 3,2013,pp.1. available also at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/science_technology/mobiledevices_new_challenges_admissibility_of_electronic_device.authcheckdam.pdf visted on 1st December,2015 at 14.27
^634	  Ally, A., the impact of ICT revolution in Tanzania’s legal system; a critical analysis of cybercrimes and computer forensic evidence, Master’s thesis, the Open University of Tanzania,2007 at pp.112-113.
^635	  Thomson,L.L.,op.cit,pp.2
^636	  Computer forensic science is the science of acquiring, preserving, retrieving, and presenting data that has been processed electronically and stored on a computer media
^637	  Ally, A., op.cit 
^638	  Akomolede,TI., contemporary legal issues in electronic commerce in Nigeria,P.E.R,volume 11 No.3,[1-25],2008,pp.12
^639	 241 F.R.D. 554 (D. Md. 2007),  
^640	  336 B.R. 437 (9th Cir. BAP 2005)
^641	  Thomson,L.L.,op.cit,pp.3
^642	  Ally,A,op.cit,pp.162
^643	  Act No. 21 of 2000
^644	  Juma, I.H. Op.cit at  pp.7
^645	  Ibid 
^646	  Akomolede, TI. op.cit, pp.12-13
^647	  Ibid 
^648	  Regina v Pecciarich (1995) 22 O.R. (3d) 748, Ontario Court, Canada (Available online at http://www.efc.ca/pages/law/court/R.v.Pecciarich.html
^649	  Casey, E. Digital evidence and computer crime: forensic science, computers and  the internet at ch. 1.2
^650	  Ibid 
^651	  Ibid 
^652	  Thomson,L.L.,op.cit,pp.5
^653	  Mwananchi newspaper of 13th June 2011 at pp. 2
^654	  Act,No.4 of 2015
^655	  Brenner, S.W. Cybercrime investigation and prosecution; the role of penal and procedural law
^656	  Ally,A.,op.cit,pp.144
^657	  Ibid 
^658	  Ibid 
^659	  Ally,A.,op.cit pp.145
^660	  [1974] AC 370
^661	  [1973] RTR 8
^662	  Kenya’s Banking Association., op.cit pp.32
^663	  BOT Banking consumers’ complaints resolution Desk,2015
^664	  Tanzania Bankers Association
^665	  requiring a party to supply goods or services for specified periods, requiring a party to supply goods or services of specified terms and conditions, requiring a party to pay the costs of another party or of a person appearing at the hearing or producing documents, dismissing a complaint, imposing fines depending on the nature of the case, for specific performance, for refunds, appointing trustees, setting escrow accounts; and for such other relief as may be deemed necessary or reasonable.
^666	  https://www.sc.com/tz/_pdf/Mobile_Banking_TC2012.pdf, visited on 15th December,2015 at 16.57
^667	  Mambi,A.J.,ICT law book;A source book for Information and Communication Technologies and Cyber law in Tanzania and East African Community, Mkuki na Nyota,Dar es salaam,2010 at pp.69
^668	  Nangela,D.E.,op.cit,pp. 104
^669	  International Chamber of Commerce,  Jurisdiction and applicable law in electronic commerce, Electronic Commerce Project (ECP)'s Ad hoc Task Force, 2001,pp.1
^670	  Nangela,D.E.,op.cit,pp.148
^671	  Nangela,D.E.,op.cit,pp.150
^672	  Ibid 
^673	  S.30 (1) & (2) of the Act
^674	  Akomolede,TI.,op.cit, pp.10
^675	  Ibid ,pp.9
^676	  Wild,C. et al., op.cit,pp.1-2
^677	 Smedinghoff,T.J., the legal requirements for creating secure and enforceable electronic transactions,2002,pp.2
^678	  Wild,C. etal.,op.cit pp.5
^679	  Wild,C. etal.,op.cit pp.6
^680	  Jobodwana, Z.N.,op.cit pp.292
^681	  United Republic of Tanzania., strategy for anti-money laundering and combating terrorist financing,2013,pp.9
^682	  United Republic of Tanzania., strategy for anti-money laundering and combating terrorist financing,2013,pp.9
^683	  http://www.antimoneylaundering.us/news_det.php?id=1640&area=News&gratis=Si  cited on 11th June 2011
^684	  Cap. 423
^685	  International standards on combating money laundering and the financing of terrorism & proliferation; the FATF recommendations, 2012
^686	  FATF recommendation 10 (4) (a)
^687	  Act No 8 of 2003
^688	  Ibid 
^689	  Ibid 
^690	  Act No.6 of 2015
^691	  S.28 (1)(a-f)
^692	  S.28 (2)(a-c)
^693	  S. 30(5)(a-l)
^694	  S. 30(5)(a)
^695	  The standard form (consumer contracts) regulations, 2014
^696	  Mwenegoha,T., op.cit, pp.131
^697	  Ibid 
^698	  Act No.5 of 2006 
^699	  Kenya Banker’s Association, op.cit pp.25
^700	  Kenya Banker’s Association, op.cit pp.25
^701	  Ibid Pp.25-26
^702	  Ehrbeck,T and Terazi,M., Putting the Banking in Branchless Banking: Regulation and the Case for Interest-Bearing and Insured E‑money Savings Accounts,
^703	  Tigo company in Tanzania has started paying interest
^704	  Ehrbeck,T and Terazi,M.,op.cit
^705	  Terazi,M & Brelof,P., op.cit, Pp.7
^706	 Senthe, S.E., Transformative Technology in Microfinance; Delivering Hope Electronically? Volume XIII, 2012, pp.48
^707	  Ibid pp.30
^708	  Kenya Banker’s Association,op.cit,pp.31
^709	  See S.1 of the guideline
^710	  See S.2 of the guideline
^711	  Buckley,R.P etal., Regulating digital financial services agents in developing countries to promote financial inclusion,2014,pp.12
^712	  South African Law Reform Commission, privacy and data protection, 2006
^713	  Makulilo, A.B., Privacy in mobile money: central banks in Africa and their regulatory limits, International Journal of law and information technology, 2015, [372-391] at pp. 383
^714	  [1924] 1 KB 461
^715	  Makulilo,A.B., op.cit, pp. 383
^716	  Makulilo, A.B., op.cit, pp.384
^717	  Akomolede,TI.,op.cit,pp.5
^718	  Harris,A etal., Privacy and security concerns associated with mobile money applications in Africa, Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts volume 8, issue 3mobile money symposium,[245-264], 2013,pp.248
^719	  Ibid 
^720	  Harris,A etal.,op.cit
^721	  Makulilo, A.B., Computer and Telecommunications Law Review; Registration of SIM cards in Tanzania: a critical evaluation of the Electronic and Postal Communications Act, 2010, 2011, pp. 3-4.
^722	  Kenya Bankers Association., op.cit, pp.35
^723	 Ariyoosu,D.A., an examination of the legal regulations and taxation of telecommunications and electronic commerce in Nigeria, A thesis submitted to the faculty of law, university of Ilorin, Ilorin, Nigeria, in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the award of the degree of doctor of philosophy in law,2012,pp.50
^724	  Makinyika,L.F.D.A.M.,income tax law in Tanzania, a sourcebook of income tax law in Tanzania,
^725	  Mulondo,W.V., application of Kenyan VAT law to e-commerce, A Thesis Submitted in Part Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Award of Degree of Master of Laws (LL.M) of University of Nairobi,2012,pp.1
^726	  Mulondo,W.V.,op.cit
^727	  Ariyoosu,D.A.,op.cit
^728	  Ibid 
^729	  Mulondo,W.V., op.cit pp.12
^730	  OECD., Implementation issues for taxation of electronic commerce
